Donoway v. State
| Decision Date | 06 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 453-2022 |
| Parties | ALAN M. DONOWAY v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Wicomico County Case No.: C-22-CR-20-000439
Kehoe Ripken, Eyler, James R. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ.
In March of 2022, a jury in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County convicted Alan Donoway ("Donoway"), appellant, of several offenses related to the illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition.[1] The court ordered an aggregate sentence of 16 years incarceration.[2] Donoway noted this timely appeal. For the reasons to follow, we shall affirm.
The State argued at trial that on the afternoon of July 15, 2020, Donoway illegally possessed a handgun and ammunition seized from a car that he was driving. Amanda Whilman ("Whilman") and several police officers from the Wicomico County Sheriff's Office testified for the State. The defense contended that Donoway was not in possession of the gun and ammunition seized from his car. Donoway called no witnesses. The following facts are drawn from the evidence presented at Donoway's trial.
In July of 2020, Whilman lived at the Traveler's Motel in Delmar, Maryland with her two children. Donoway is the father of Whilman's youngest child, who was approximately five years old at the time. On the morning of the incident, Whilman and Donoway were Facetiming[4] when Donoway asked Whilman if there was a woman at the motel named Tamara, stating that the woman had followed him. Whilman replied that the woman was her neighbor at the motel. Donoway then displayed a handgun and told Whilman that he planned to go to the motel and not to let the children outside. While they were Facetiming, Whilman took two screen shots of Donoway with the gun. When the conversation ended, Whilman showed the screenshots of Donoway to the motel manager.
The motel manager contacted the police and sent the screen shots to a Detective with the Wicomico County Sheriff's Office, who requested help from fellow officers in locating Donoway. Approximately an hour later, a Sergeant with the same Sheriff's Office initiated a traffic stop of a car in which Donoway was the driver and Kim Grimes, Donoway's wife, was the front seat passenger. When the Sergeant approached the car, he saw Donoway place his hands below the dashboard. Donoway was ordered out of the car and was placed in handcuffs. A subsequent search of the car revealed a loaded Ruger 380 semiautomatic firearm with a magazine on the front passenger side floorboard near the door. The police found a second magazine containing ammunition and a cell phone in the vehicle's glove box. Neither the gun, magazines, ammunition, nor the cell phone were submitted for fingerprint or DNA analysis.
The Detective, who arrived on the scene, testified that Donoway's appearance matched the screen shots sent to him, including facial tattoos, build, and hair. Additionally, the handgun in the screenshots matched the recovered handgun-the recovered handgun and the handgun in the screenshots had the word "Ruger" on it; the magazine and grip of the recovered handgun matched that magazine and grip of the handgun in the screenshots; and the recovered handgun and the handgun in the screenshots both had the trigger guard sawed off.
Based on text and Facebook[5] messages, the police determined that the cell phone recovered from the glove compartment of the car belonged to Donoway. The police downloaded the contents of the cell phone and found an exchange from the week prior on Facebook Messenger[6] between "Snow Donoway"[7] and another individual. A copy of the exchange was admitted into evidence. In the exchange Donoway wrote: "Either way I just picked up 2 380s wit matchin 30 clips so Ima keep em on me at all times brah[.]" The other individual responded: "I need a strap asap and need to know where craig stays at pls bro I'm a spank him on fb live[.]"
On cross-examination, Whilman testified that she spoke with the prosecutor in the hallway before testifying in court that day. Whilman indicated that during that conversation, she told the prosecutor that she had planned to provide testimony favorable to Donoway so he could be released from jail, but then she changed her mind because she did not want to get in trouble for lying. Whilman further testified that about a month before trial, Donoway instructed her to write a letter to the prosecutor. According to Whilman, Donoway told her what to write and said Grimes would meet with her about the letter.
In the first letter, which Grimes wrote and Whilman signed, Whilman said she had pressed charges against Donoway out of anger, and she did not want to testify against him, but the prosecutor was forcing her to do so. Donoway directed Whilman to write a second letter because she "messed up" the first one. In the second letter, which she wrote and signed, Whilman again said she did not want to testify against Donoway, but the prosecutor was forcing her to. She added that the screenshots she took of Donoway with a handgun were "photo-shopped." At trial, Whilman explained that she lied in the letters "[b]ecause I was trying to help my son's father get out of jail, give him another, second chance of being a father." She testified that she wrote the letters because Donoway was "constantly threatening" her to aid in his release from prison, and he told her that there was "no way I could get in trouble[.]" On cross-examination, Whilman admitted that when she was 12 years old, she filed a false police report because her father had forced her to.
The parties stipulated that the recovered handgun was operable, and Donoway was prohibited from possessing a regulated firearm. Additional facts will be included as they become relevant to the issues.
Donoway argues that the circuit court erred when it limited his cross-examination of Whilman about her conversation with the prosecutor the morning of trial. Citing Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616 (2010), Donoway asserts that he should have been allowed to inquire The State responds that the court properly exercised its discretion in sustaining its objection to the defense's question on cross-examination of Whilman. The State first contends the defense's question called for impermissible hearsay when defense counsel inquired, "[d]id the [prosecutor] tell you that you would be in trouble. . ." The State also asserts this question "was repetitive of the earlier question and harassing the witness" as Whilman previously answered that when she talked to the prosecutor, they discussed how she could be put in jail for lying.
"The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him." Martinez v. State, 416 Md. 418, 428 (2010) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986)). These guarantees afford a defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses regarding matters that affect the witnesses' bias, interests, or motive to testify falsely. Pantazes v. State, 376 Md. 661, 680 (2003). This right, however, is "not boundless." Id. On the contrary, a "trial court may impose reasonable limits on cross-examination when necessary for witness safety or to prevent harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, and inquiry that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Martinez, 416 Md. at 428 (citing Lyba v. State, 321 Md. 564, 570 (1991)). The extent to which a witness may be cross-examined rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Pantazes, 376 Md. at 681. Discretion is exercised by balancing the probative value of the inquiry against the unfair prejudice, "[o]therwise, the inquiry can reduce itself to a discussion of collateral matters which will obscure the issue and lead to the [jury's] confusion." Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting State v. Cox, 298 Md.173, 178 (1983)).
Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4) grants a criminal defendant the right to question a State's witness about facts that imply that "the witness is biased, prejudiced, interested in the outcome of the proceeding, or has a motive to testify falsely[.]" Cross-examination to challenge a witness's credibility "should be prohibited only if (1) there is no factual foundation for such an inquiry in the presence of the jury, or (2) the probative value of such an inquiry is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice or confusion." Calloway, 414 Md. at 638 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Leeks v. State, 110 Md.App. 543, 557 (1996)). Relevant to the first prong is whether there was an evidentiary foundation indicating that the witness expected or hoped for leniency from the State in exchange for testimony. See Manchame-Guerra v State, 457 Md. 300, 319-22 (2018). When evaluating whether there would be substantial prejudice or confusion under the second prong, "the trial court is entitled to consider whether the witness's...
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