Dooley v. Duckworth, 86-1555

• Decision Date: 30 October 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-1555,86-1555
• Citation: 832 F.2d 445
• Parties: Carl DOOLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jack R. DUCKWORTH, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 445

832 F.2d 445

Carl DOOLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Jack R. DUCKWORTH, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 86-1555.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued June 11, 1987.

Decided Oct. 30, 1987.

Janet M. Castonquay, Legal Asst., Michigan City, Ind., for petitioner-appellant.

Samuel L. Balinger, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Ind., Indianapolis, Ind., for respondent-appellee.

Before WOOD, CUDAHY and MANION, Circuit Judges.

HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge.

Petitioner-Appellant Carl Dooley was convicted in Indiana state court of rape and burglary and sentenced to twenty years in prison. The conviction was affirmed by a divided Indiana Supreme Court. Dooley v. State, 428 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.1981). Dooley then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, which was denied. Dooley now appeals that denial and raises two issues for our consideration: first, whether the factual findings of the Indiana Supreme Court are to be accorded a presumption of correctness, and second, whether the victim's in-court identification of Dooley is reliable, notwithstanding a suggestive pretrial lineup. We conclude that the Indiana Supreme Court's findings of facts are entitled to a presumption of correctness and that the in-court identification was reliable despite the suggestive lineup. The decision of the district court denying the petition for the writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

We take our statement of facts directly from the Indiana Supreme Court opinion:

On September 10, 1977 at around 11:00 p.m., D.D., the victim, was asleep at her residence on Fieldhouse Avenue in Elkhart [Indiana]. D.D., was awakened by a noise and walked into her living room to investigate. She saw a man standing at her back door. The man broke the door window, reached in, unlocked the door, and started to enter. D.D., slammed the door shut but the assailant pushed the door open and entered the house. D.D., ran into the kitchen where her attacker grabbed her and they struggled. D.D., broke free and switched on a light. She turned and faced her assailant, who was approximately four feet away. The man jumped at D.D., turned off the light, and forced her to the floor where he raped her. D.D. later identified the defendant as the rapist.

The defendant was singled out in a lineup by the victim on September 21, 1977, eleven days after the crime occurred. Prior to the first trial of this cause, ¹ defendant filed a motion to suppress, asking that the victim's identification of defendant as the rapist be suppressed at trial. On April 19, 1978, the State stipulated that the lineup had been impermissibly suggestive. All evidence concerning the lineup and identification was suppressed. During the trial of the case at bar, the State asked D.D., to make an in-court identification of her assailant. The defense objected and a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury. When the jury returned, the victim was allowed to identify the defendant as the rapist.

....

During the hearing, D.D., testified that she turned on a light and was able to see the defendant from a distance of four feet. The light was on for a few seconds. When the light was off, defendant was lying on top of D.D., face to face, for ten minutes. D.D., said her eyes adjusted to the darkness and she was able to determine that the rapist had a beard, though she was uncertain whether it was full or partial. When the defendant left, she saw him walk through her well lighted backyard. When the police arrived, D.D., described the rapist as a black male, 5'6" to 5'7", slender build, beard, and wearing a white T-shirt. On the stand, D.D., testified that the defendant was now heavier and had not been wearing glasses. After defendant took the stand he admitted that he had gained about forty pounds since the time of the initial arrest. He also said he did not always wear glasses and that they were not prescription lenses.

... She [D.D.] was alone with her assailant for 10-15 minutes in close proximity, much of the time face to face. D.D., saw her assailant both in the bright light of her dining room and her backyard. D.D., made no inaccurate identification of her assailant and has never failed to identify the defendant as her attacker. The only discrepancy is that one officer, Officer Loney, called to D.D.'s home, said she would not describe the defendant as "slender." The term "slender" is one open to many definitions and this comment has not affected the independent basis for identifying the defendant.

Dooley, 428 N.E.2d at 3, 4 (caption omitted).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Defendant's primary argument is that D.D.'s in-court identification was so infected by the pretrial lineup, stipulated as suggestive by the State, that it violated principles of due process and should not have been allowed. Faced with such an argument this court's task is to determine, viewing the totality of the circumstances, whether the in-court identification is reliable despite the suggestive pretrial procedure. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375, 381, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Love v. Young, 781 F.2d 1307, 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2923, 91 L.Ed.2d 551 (1986). The reliability of the identification is determined by an analysis of several factors which the United States Supreme Court set forth in Biggers. Those factors include

the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct. at 382; Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977).

Our review of these factors is a mixed question of law and fact. Love, 781 F.2d at 1311. Under this standard of review, as well as by statutory prescription, findings of subsidiary facts made by state courts are entitled to a presumption of correctness. Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 1306, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982) (Sumner II ) (per curiam); 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). ² Thus in reaching our legal conclusion we are constrained to follow state court determinations of such factual issues as whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the defendant. Sumner II, 455 U.S. at 597, 102 S.Ct. at 1306; Griswold v. Greer, 712 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir.1983).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Indiana Supreme Court's Findings of Fact

As a preliminary matter, defendant contends the Indiana Supreme Court's factual findings should not be accorded the presumption of correctness required under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). ³ Under that statute there are eight circumstances in which the presumption does not apply. Defendant argues that the record does not "fairly support" the subsidiary fact that D.D. was able to observe her assailant and thus falls within the eighth statutory exception. ⁴ We do not agree.

The finding that D.D. observed her attacker finds support throughout the record, and is primarily predicated on three instances: when the assailant was in the bright light of D.D.'s living room at a distance of approximately four feet, when they were face-to-face during the rape for approximately ten minutes, and finally as the assailant exited through D.D.'s well-lit backyard.

Under direct and cross examination D.D. testified that she saw the attacker's face as he stood "frozen" for a moment in the bright light of her living room. D.D. also testified that she saw the attacker's face during the rape when they were face-to-face for approximately ten minutes. Although the rape occurred in a darkened room, D.D. testified that her eyes had adjusted to the darkness. Additionally, she testified that she observed the assailant as he walked from her house to an automobile, which was visible under the illumination of a street light. In light of this testimony we find it hard to understand the defendant's argument that the Indiana Supreme Court's factual finding that D.D. observed her assailant is not supported by the record.

Defendant contends, however, that D.D.'s description is too general to support the finding that she had an adequate opportunity to observe her assailant. While D.D.'s description of her attacker is phrased in general terms, there is no indication that any feature of the defendant other than his beard would warrant anything other than a general description. Defendant next asks a hypothetical question: If D.D. had adequate time to observe the attacker why did she express uncertainty at the time of the incident as to whether his beard was full or partial when it appears from a photo taken eleven days after the incident that the beard is unmistakably full? We can conceive of several possible explanations and are not limited to defendant's conclusion that D.D. obviously must not have seen her attacker clearly. It could be that the trauma of the event and the subsequent activity at her home involving her parents and several police officers distracted D.D., making it difficult for her to relate a fully detailed description of her attacker to the investigating officer. The discrepancy might also be attributed to the police officer who, upon noting D.D.'s emotional state, failed to press for a more accurate description. Perhaps D.D. did not fully understand what was being asked of her, or maybe she was unfamiliar with the various styles of men's beards. It does not seem unreasonable under the circumstances, in which the victim was under substantial emotional strain, that she was unable to fine-tune her description of the assailant.

Defendant also places great weight on statements made by the officer who took D.D.'s statement at the scene of the crime. This officer indicated in testimony reflecting her police report that the "victim was...