Dooley v. St. Louis County, ED 86624.

Decision Date04 April 2006
Docket NumberNo. ED 86624.,ED 86624.
Citation187 S.W.3d 882
PartiesJ. Michael DOOLEY, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Missouri, Charlie A. Dooley and James Baker in their Individual and Official Capacities, Defendants/Respondents.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

David Eric Sowers; Ferne Paula Wolf; Co-Counsel; Sowers & Wolf LLC, St. Louis, MO, for Appellant.

Patricia Redington; County Counselor, Cynthia Lou Hoemann; Associate Counselor, Clayton, MO, for Respondent.

Before MARY K. HOFF, P.J. and CLIFFORD H. AHRENS, J. and PATRICIA L. COHEN, J.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

J. Michael Dooley (Plaintiff) appeals from the trial court's judgment granting St. Louis County (County), Charlie A. Dooley (Executive), and James Baker's (Baker) (collectively referred to as Defendants), in their individual and official capacities, motion to dismiss Plaintiff's petition, which was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (petition). The petition alleged that Defendants had violated Plaintiff's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by terminating Plaintiff's employment in retaliation for Plaintiff's opposition to certain proposed road projects supported by Executive. We find the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's petition because Plaintiff adequately stated a cause of action. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.1

Facts

Plaintiff alleged the following facts in his petition: Plaintiff was the former Director of the St. Louis County Department of Highways and Traffic. Plaintiff's job duties required him to be involved in the planning of certain proposed road projects that were supported by Executive but opposed by Plaintiff. Those projects included: 1) the connection of Folk Road and Hanley Road; 2) the condemnation of privately-owned land in order to make improvements to Kienlen Avenue and Natural Bridge Road; 3) the extending and re-routing of Geiger Road and the method of funding the project; 4) the County's purchase of a right-of-way to build a sidewalk along Keller Road and Suson Hills Drive; and 5) the County's maintenance of a retaining wall being built on private land as part of improvements to Big Bend Boulevard.

Plaintiff opposed: 1) the connection of Folk Road and Hanley Road because he believed such a connection was potentially dangerous; 2) the County's payment of additional monies to a landowner near the Kienlen Avenue-Natural Bridge Road project because the landowner already had been compensated for the loss of access from his land to the roads; 3) the extending and re-routing of Geiger Road because he believed paying the cost of the project was not an appropriate use of taxpayers' money in that the County did not have the funds to pay for the project and the project failed to meet the criteria of an arterial road; 4) in relation to the County's purchase of a right-of-way to build a sidewalk along Keller Road and Suson Drive, the County paying for the erection of a fence along the property of a landowner from whom the County had purchased the right-of-way; and 5) the County's maintenance of the retaining wall being built on private land as part of the improvements to Big Bend Boulevard because the County already had paid the landowner for the loss of his land to be used as a right-of-way and for the retaining wall. Beginning in November 2003 and throughout most of 2004, Plaintiff voiced his opposition to County's involvement in the projects to Executive, Baker, and another County employee.

In October 2004, Baker suspended Plaintiff from work for three weeks because Plaintiff had failed to discipline an employee in Plaintiff's department for sending an inappropriate email via the County's email system. When Plaintiff returned to work in November 2004, Plaintiff met with Executive and discussed several issues, including the Keller Road project and the Big Bend Boulevard retaining wall project. During the meeting, Executive stated that he was considering discharging Plaintiff, that "this negative stuff" had to stop if Plaintiff continued his employment with the County, and that Executive would decide whether Plaintiff would continue in his employment.

On November 19, 2004, Baker informed Plaintiff that he was being discharged from his employment and that Plaintiff's last day would be November 30, 2004. Baker also stated that the reasons for Plaintiff's discharge were: 1) Plaintiff had not called Executive to apologize while Plaintiff was on suspension; 2) Plaintiff had not met with Baker on Plaintiff's first day of work following his suspension; 3) Plaintiff did not come to the office on the first day of his suspension to tell the staff what had happened; and 4) Plaintiff had expressed to Baker that a three-week suspension was excessive.

In his petition, Plaintiff further alleged that: Baker's stated reasons for discharging Plaintiff were pretextual and not the true reasons for the discharge; Defendants discharged Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff's protest of the aforementioned road projects, which involved matters of public concern; Defendants' actions in discharging Plaintiff violated his right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and enforceable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; and Defendants' violation of Plaintiff's rights was wilful, wanton, and malicious and in reckless disregard of Plaintiff's federally-protected rights.

In response to Plaintiff's petition, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. Executive and Baker also asserted that they were public officials serving County and had acted in a discretionary capacity insofar as any of their actions related to the subject matter of the petition; thus, they were immune from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

The trial court subsequently granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the petition and found that Plaintiff's statements of protest concerning the road projects as described in the petition were "wholly internal, private in nature and purely job related[,]" and, therefore, were not statements of public concern and protected speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The trial court made no findings as to Defendants' asserted affirmative defense of qualified immunity. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Our review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is solely a test of the adequacy of the plaintiff's petition. State ex rel. Diehl v. Kintz, 162 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Mo.App. E.D.2005): Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. banc 1993). We assume that all of the plaintiff's averments are true and liberally grant the plaintiff all inferences therefrom. State ex rel. Diehl, 162 S.W.3d at 155; Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 306. We make no attempt to weigh any alleged facts to determine whether they are credible or persuasive but review the petition only to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action or of a cause that might be adopted. Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 306. The plaintiff's petition must...

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