Dora v. Dora

• Decision Date: 02 May 1958
• Citation: 141 A.2d 587,392 Pa. 433
• Parties: Mary DORA and Mayer Sniderman, v. George DORA, John Dora, George Dora, Jr., Mary Planich, Anna Mayzel and First National Bank of Clairton, Pennsylvania, Appellants.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 587

141 A.2d 587

392 Pa. 433

Mary DORA and Mayer Sniderman, v. George DORA, John Dora, George Dora, Jr., Mary Planich, Anna Mayzel and First National Bank of Clairton Pennsylvania, Appellants.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 2, 1958.

Rehearing Denied June 3, 1958.

Daniel T. Zamos, Charles P. Lewis, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

John A. Metz, Jr., Mayer Sniderman, Pittsburgh, Metz, Cook, Hanna & Kelly, Pittsburgh, for appellees.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO, ARNOLD, BENJAMIN R. JONES and COHEN, JJ.

CHARLES ALVIN JONES, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs sued in trespass to recover damages from the defendants (both individual an corporate) for their wilful interference with a contract right of the plaintiffs. The right was in relation to a sum of money which had been deposited in the defendant bank in escrow, to be paid to the plaintiffs upon fulfillment of certain contingencies agreed upon by the parties in settlement of the property righs of Mary Dora, one of the plaintiffs, against her husband, George Dora, one of the defendants. The remaining defendants are the four children of George Dora by a former marriage. The settlement agreement was entered into during the trial of an equity suit which Mary Dora had instituted against the present individual defendants, at which time the chancellor made the following order: 'And now, to wit, May 17, 1954, this matter came on for hearing after conclusion of the testimony, the case is continued as settled. See settlement stated in Trial Record.'

Under the settlement agreement, which was reduced to writing and signed by the parties, the plaintiff, Mary Dora, and her attorney, Mayer Sniderman, were to receive jointly the $5,500 in escrow upon exhibiting to and filing with the bank (1) a certified copy of a decree of divorce in favor of Mary Dora to be entered by the court of common pleas of Allegheny County with all costs of record paid, (2) a satisfaction in full of all proceedings, judgment and costs in a desertion and non-support action which Mary Dora had instituted against her husband in the county court of Allegheny County, (3) a certificate of satisfaction, with all costs paid, in the equity suit, (4) a release executed by Mary Dora releasing her husband and his four children, absolutely, from any and all liability on claims up to the date of the release, and (5) the delivery to the bank of a written acknowledgment that certain premises occupied by Mary Dora (the title to which was in the name of one of the defendant children) had been surrendered by her by a specified time.

Without the knowledge or consent of Mary Dora or of her attorney, the four children of her husband withdrew from the bank the escrowed deposit of $5,500 on the representation, as evidenced by the written receipt therefor signed by them, that the settlement agreement had been breached by Mary Dora through her failure to surrender to the record owner the indicated premises by the date mutually agreed upon.

The trial judge submitted the case to the jury, which returned a verdict, as molded by the court, in favor of the plaintiffs and aganist the defendants in the sum of $5,500, the defendant bank to pay to the plaintiffs in addition the sum of $495 as interest (i. e., damages for detention). The defendants moved for a new trial and for judgment n. o. v. The court en banc refused both motions and entered judgment on the verdict.

The appellants' principal contentions raise questions of law which properly are matters to be considered only on a motion for judgment n. o. v. The appellees argue, however, that the defendants failed to present a point for binding instructions prior to the court's submission of the case to the jury and were, therefore, without standing to file a motion for judgment n. o. v. after the rendition of the verdict, citing Essex Packers Limited v. Kisecker, 373 Pa. 351, 95 A.2d 544. Such is, of course, the unexceptionable rule. But we are not persuaded that the defendants did not present timely a point for binding instructions which the trial court denied. The following appears in the printed record. After the court had specifically passed upon a number of points for charge submitted by the defendants, counsel for the defendants stated,--'Your Honor, I have contained also in there some requests for binding instructions and specific instructions. They are all in the same blue back. They are on the last page. The Court: All right. That is refused too. * * * The Court: I refuse the first request for binding instructions.'

In any event, we find no merit in the appellants' legal contentions. The action was properly laid in trespass. Damages for intentional interference with known contractual rights may be recovered in trespass: Keifer v. Cramer, 356 Pa. 96, 99, 51 A.2d 694. Nor need malice or fraud be proven in order to support the action for damages in trespass. In Klauder v. Cregar, 327 Pa. 1, 7, 192 A. 667, 670, after quoting that 'A violation of legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action, and it is a violation of legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognized by law if there be no sufficient justification for the interference', this court recognized that the intentional doing of the wrongful act without legal or social justification was all that was necessary and pointed out that 'Maliciousness 'does not necessarily mean actual malice or ill will, * * *".

The alleged oral modification of the settlement agreement providing for the extension of the specified date of Mary Dora's surrender to the title owner of the real property she occupied, which issue the jury by its verdict impliedly found in the plaintiff's favor, did not violate the parole evidence rule. In Elliott-Lewis Corporation v. York-Shipley, Inc., 372 Pa. 346, 349-350, 94 A.2d 47, 49, we stated that 'The Parol Evidence Rule which prohibits the admission of oral evidence to vary or contradict a written contract does not apply to or prohibit a subsequent modification by parol; it applies only to prior or contemporaneous statements or agreements which induced the written agreement in question. Grubb v. Rockey, 366 Pa. 592, 79 A.2d 255. * * * it is well settled that a written agreement may be modified by a subsequent (written or) oral agreement and that this modification may be shown by writings or by words or by conduct or by all three. Betterman v. American Stores Co., 367 Pa. 193, 80 A.2d 66; Knight v. Gulf Refining Company, 311 Pa. 357, 166 A. 880; Friday v. Regent Improvement Co., 330 Pa. 481, 199 A. 914. * * *.'

The appellants' contentions that the settlement agreement was unenforceable in that it constituted a contract to procure a divorce and that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the jury to pass upon whether or not such was a purpose of the agreement, are untenable.

The...