Dorchy v. Fifth Third Bank

• Decision Date: 17 December 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:21-cv-10078
• Parties: Natasha DORCHY, Plaintiff, v. FIFTH THIRD BANK, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

585 F.Supp.3d 1021

Natasha DORCHY, Plaintiff,
v.
FIFTH THIRD BANK, Defendant.

Case No. 1:21-cv-10078

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division.

Signed December 17, 2021

585 F.Supp.3d 1022

Amanda M. Ghannam, Nacht Roumel & Hurwitz PC, Detroit, MI, Samuel L. Estenson, Deloof, Dever, Eby, Milliman, and Issa PLLC, Ann Arbor, MI, Nicholas Roumel, Ann Arbor, MI, for Plaintiff.

Anna Sofia Kozak, Deborah L. Brouwer, Susan D. Koval, Nemeth Law, P.C., Detroit, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THOMAS L. LUDINGTON, United States District Judge

This matter is before this Court upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 23. For the reasons stated hereafter, Defendant's Motion will be denied.

585 F.Supp.3d 1023

I.

Defendant Fifth Third Bank has employed Plaintiff Natasha Dorchy since 2007. ECF No. 26 at PageID.344. Plaintiff was the putative victim of a domestic altercation with her spouse, which she reported to the police and Child Protective Services (CPS). See ECF No. 23 at PageID.205–09. Plaintiff also reported the incident to Defendant, her employer, as required by company policy. See id. Defendant placed Plaintiff on administrative leave, conducted an internal investigation and an external assessment, then terminated her employment in October 2020. See id. at PageID.205–12. In January 2021, Plaintiff brought a complaint alleging that Defendant's termination of Plaintiff's employment violated the Michigan Whistleblower's Protection Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.361 et seq. See ECF No. 1; ECF No. 23 at PageID.189.

In October 2021, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Plaintiff responded. See ECF Nos. 23; 25.

II.

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the movant "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The movant has the initial burden of "identifying those portions of the [record that] it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant and determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; see Lossia v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc. , 895 F.3d 423, 428 (6th Cir. 2018).

The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must set out specific facts showing "a genuine issue for trial." Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citation omitted). The nonmovant must show more than "some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Indeed, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of the nonmovant does not establish a genuine issue of material fact. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Summary judgment will be granted if the nonmovant "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. But summary judgment will be denied "[i]f there are ... ‘genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may...