Dorman v. Satti
| Decision Date | 01 February 1988 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. H-86-898(AHN). |
| Citation | 678 F. Supp. 375 |
| Parties | Francelle DORMAN v. C. Robert SATTI, State's Attorney, Judicial District of New London, in his Official Capacity; and Lester J. Forst, Commissioner of Public Safety, State of Connecticut, in his Official Capacity. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Kathleen Eldergill, Beck & Eldergill, Manchester, Conn., for plaintiff.
James Clark, Harry Weller, Carl Schuman, Asst. State's Attys., Wallingford, Conn., L.D. McCallum, Asst. State's Atty., Hartford, Conn., for defendants.
RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case requires the court to consider the constitutionality of Connecticut's newly-enacted Hunter Harassment Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. Section 53a-183a, which penalizes those who interfere with or harass persons engaged in the "lawful taking of wildlife." The plaintiff was arrested under the Act after she had approached several hunters taking waterfowl in state marshlands near her home and verbally attempted to dissuade them from their hunt. Although the charge against her was subsequently dismissed, she brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 in order to adjudicate the Act's constitutionality. On cross motions for summary judgment, for the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the Act as written is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
An Act concerning Harassment of Hunters, Trappers or Fishermen ("Hunter Harassment Act" or "the Act"), which became part of Connecticut's penal code by legislative enactment in 1985, provides that:
No person shall: (1) Interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife by another person, or acts in preparation for such taking, with intent to prevent such taking; or (2) harass another person who is engaged in the lawful taking of wildlife or acts in preparation for such taking.
Conn.Gen.Stat. Section 53a-183a. It is a class C misdemeanor, subjecting an offender to a fine and/or imprisonment for up to three months. Conn.Gen.Stat. Sections 53a-28 and 53a-36(3).
The Hunter Harassment Act is Connecticut's version of legislation that has been enacted in nearly half the states for the purpose of protecting lawful hunters from intentional interference by those who would disturb their hunt.1 In adopting the Act the legislature clearly intended to provide an effective deterrent against persons who actively oppose hunting.2 The Senate voted down a proposed amendment aimed at eliminating the harassment subsection as "vague" and reducing the Act's "very severe penalty" to an infraction carrying a fine of up to $99. 28 S. Proc., Pt. 10, 1985 Sess., pp. 3325-34. A spokesman for the bill explained to his colleagues that examples of hunter "harassment" would include "intentionally blaring a radio when someone intended to go out and pursue game," giving "verbal abuse to someone who was preparing to go out into some public property perhaps to take game," and "spreading human hair around the facility so that game would be deterred." Id., p. 3327 (Sen. Benson).
The plaintiff, Francelle Dorman, lived near a state forest containing marshland inhabited by a variety of waterfowl. By her own admission, Ms. Dorman is "morally opposed to the hunting and senseless killing of harmless and defenseless animals, including all waterfowl." Affidavit of Francelle Dorman, filed December 30, 1986, at para. 2.
On January 30, 1986, during the goose-hunting season, Ms. Dorman approached several hunters in the marsh with the intention of convincing them to abandon their plans to hunt. Complaint, filed Aug. 21, 1986, at para. 10. To that end, as she describes it, she "walked with the hunters, ... and spoke to them about the violence and cruelty of hunting, of the beauty of the waterfowl and of their right to live peacefully and without harm." Id. at para. 11. The hunters, in contrast, regarded her behavior as "antics" that were in "rude and blatant disregard of their rights to precious recreational time" and "to pursue their enjoyment of hunting." Letter from Roger Horley to Mr. Hauser (Feb. 24, 1986), attached as Exhibit B to Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed Dec. 8, 1986. They advised Ms. Dorman that her actions were unlawful and, when she refused to leave, they summoned a state law enforcement officer who arrested her for violating the Hunter Harassment Act.
In a pretrial appearance in state court, the prosecutor conceded that the arrest had been premature because Ms. Dorman had only been "talking about what she was going to do to interfere with hunting geese." Transcript at 2 (April 22, 1986), State v. Dorman, No. CR-10-151085. At the prosecutor's request, the court dismissed the charge against Ms. Dorman for lack of probable cause.
On August 21, 1986, Ms. Dorman filed this action in federal court against C. Robert Satti, chief prosecutor for the New London Judicial District, and Lester J. Forst, Commissioner of Public Safety for the State of Connecticut, who are responsible for enforcing the laws of Connecticut and prosecuting violations thereof.3 The plaintiff grounds her suit in 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that her arrest violated her rights under the first, fourth and fourteenth amendments; she seeks a declaratory judgment that the Hunter Harassment Act is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and further seeks to have the court enjoin the defendants from enforcing and prosecuting under the Act.
On November 19, 1986, the defendants moved the court to dismiss on grounds that there existed no case or controversy, that the court lacked jurisdiction over the suit, and that the action failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. After hearing oral argument on April 9, 1987, the court denied the motion.
The plaintiff has now moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R. Civ.P., arguing that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that, because the Act is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, she is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The defendants have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, asserting the constitutionality of the Act. The court heard oral argument on September 23, 1987.
Summary judgment is viewed in this circuit as an effective and correct method of avoiding protracted trials where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Meiri v. Deacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985). See Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. The Supreme Court has come to look with favor on the device, stating that summary judgment "is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, ___, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Rule 1, Fed.R.Civ.P.). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2506, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the pleadings, depositions, and interrogatories, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, then summary judgment shall be granted to the moving party if he is entitled to it as a matter of law. Cross motions for summary judgment, absent more, do not make the court more ready or likely to grant summary judgment. Heyman v. Commerce and Industry Insurance Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir.1975); American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 388 F.2d 272, 279 (2d Cir.1967).
Where a law is challenged as facially inconsistent with the first amendment because it impinges upon constitutionally protected activities, a summary judgment motion is particularly appropriate because the claim turns on a legal, not a factual, question. Holy Spirit Association for Unification of World Christ v. Hodge, 582 F.Supp. 592, 595 (N.D.Tex.1984). See also Invisible Empire Knights of KKK v. City of West Haven, 600 F.Supp. 1427, 1430 (D.Conn.1985). Because the parties here are in complete accord as to the facts, and their sole dispute is whether the Hunter Harassment Act is constitutional, the summary judgment motions now before the court are an eminently suitable vehicle for examining and determining the ultimate viability of the plaintiff's case.
The plaintiff asserts that the Hunter Harassment Act is facially — that is, wholly — invalid because it is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.4 She grounds her argument in the premise that the statute so implicates free expression as to trigger both first amendment overbreadth analysis and the concomitant stringent review for vagueness. The defendants' position is that the plaintiff's analysis is inapposite because the Act regulates conduct, not speech. They argue that the Act is valid under the vagueness and overbreadth standards applicable to content-neutral statutes; that is, that it is reasonable regulation necessary to further substantial state interests.5 They contend that, in effect, it is "nothing more than a reasonable time, place and manner restriction on certain conduct and incidental speech." Memorandum of Defendant C. Robert Satti in Support of His Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 14, 1987, at 15 ("Defendant's Memorandum").
"In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). As a threshold matter, then, the court must determine...
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