Dormeyer Industries v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Division, 19665

• Decision Date: 21 June 1962
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 19665,19665,1
• Citation: 133 Ind.App. 500,183 N.E.2d 351
• Parties: DORMEYER INDUSTRIES, Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION, Douglas J. Morris, William G. Johnson, and Frank C. McAlister, as Members of and Constituting the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division; and Margaret Mailloux, Appellees
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 351

183 N.E.2d 351

133 Ind.App. 500

DORMEYER INDUSTRIES, Appellant, v. REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION Douglas J. Morris, William G. Johnson, and Frank C McAlister, as Members of and Constituting the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division; and Margaret Mailloux, Appellees.

No. 19665.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1.

June 21, 1962.

John W. Barce, George Vann, Kentland, for appellant.

Edwin K. Steers, Keith Campbell, Indianapolis, for appellees.

AX, Judge.

This action is an appeal by the appellant, Dormeyer Industries, from the decision of the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division allowing benefits to the claimant-appellee, Margaret Mailloux, on a claim filed by said claimant- appellee with the Lafayette Office of the Indiana Employment Security Division. The Local Office claims deputy denied benefits to said claimant-appellee for the reason that said claimant voluntarily quit her employment with the appellant, Dormeyer Industries, without good cause.

From the decision of the Local Office claims deputy said claimant-appellee, Margaret Mailloux, requested and was granted a hearing before a claims referee who affirmed the decision of the local claims deputy. The claimant-appellee properly appealed the decision of the claims referee to the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division wherein said Review Board, without the introduction of any additional evidence, and based upon the prior record, reversed the decision of the claims referee and allowed said claimant-appellee benefits.

Appellant has brought the appeal assigning as error that the decision of the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division is contrary to law.

Appellant contends (1) that the decision is contrary to law because the Review Board failed to make specific findings of fact to support the decision, and (2) that the facts found are insufficient to sustain the decision because the findings of the Review Board show as a matter of law that appellee voluntarily quit her employment without good cause. In support of its first contention appellant cites Burns' Indiana Statutes Annotated 1960 Supplement § 52-1542k, which provides in part as follows:

'Any decision of the Review Board shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact. * * *'

'* * * An assignment of errors that the decision of the review board is contrary to law, shall be sufficient to present both the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision, and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding of facts. * * *'

Also appellant argues that in the case of Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, (1951), 121 Ind.App. 227-229, 98 N.E.2d 512, 513 this Court, speaking through Chief Judge Wiltrout, says:

'The Employment Security Act contemplates that the Review Board shall make a finding of facts. Burns' 1951 Replacement, § 52-1542k.'

With that statement of Judge Wiltrout we are without dissent. However, we are of the opinion that the Review Board in the instant case did make a specific finding of facts as is found in its decision which, omitting the caption, is as follows:

'STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED: Indiana Employment Security Act, § 1501, Burns' 1959 Supp., § 52-1539 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

'CASE HISTORY--SOURCE OF APPEAL: Claimant appealed to the Review Board from the referee's decision that she voluntarily left her work without good cause. Claimant appeared in person, with a union representative, before the Review Board on May 11, 1961, where the employer did not appear but requested review on the record.

'STATEMENT OF FACTS: The claimant, aged 31, is married and the mother of three children. She had worked in this employer's 'pool test department' about two years, when she left her work on November 11, 1960, because she was convinced she could not continue under the circumstances. The claimant was a recent convert to the Catholic faith and, as the 1960 election approached, a young man (17) repeatedly made such derogatory remarks to her as, that he did not know what the country was coming to; or that it would be bad to have a Catholic President, because all Catholics were communists. Also, she was under conflicting orders as to whether or not this same young man, an inspector-trainee whom she was supposed to help train, had any authority over her or whether she should continue to look solely to her department supervisor for her orders. This young inspector-trainee would assert authority or question what she was doing, when she thought she was carrying out the proper orders of her superior. On one occasion, when she and this trainee were working together, she suggested to him that they reconcile their differences and try to get along. This, however, they were never able to do.

'Claimant referred her problems to higher authority and complained to them about certain work methods and orders as they were carried out, all in connection with the relationship between herself and said inspector-trainee. Claimant received no definite clarification, however, as to the relative status of herself and the trainee and was admonished that they were to get along together. It is not evident, however, that the employer made any effort to correct the young man's behavior. The evidence indiates that she was above the average in literacy, intelligence, and sense of responsibility in her work of testing and inspecting coils; that her '* * * work was very good and she is more or less a perfectionist * * *'; the evidence also indicates that claimant is temperamental and officious, but that her sole difficulty was in her employment relationship to this young trainee.

'FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: The disparaging remarks about her religion may have been only unfeeling teasing or 'kidding,' but it was also the unfunny kind that can be seriously upsetting to any sensitive person. The relationship between the claimant and her fellow employee, and eventually between herself and the company, resulted in such an impasse that the claimant was compelled, in her own mind, to quit her job, although she was enthusiastic about the work and did not want to leave it. The employer did nothing to retain the claimant's services.

'The referee found that the circumstances under which the claimant left were somewhat confusing; that as a result of the accumulating circumstances of this separation, the employment relationship of this employer and this claimant reached a point where no alternative was available to the employer but to separate her. The majority of the Board believes that this doubt should be resolved in the claimant's favor. Whether or not the claimant had good cause to leave his work in any case is a fact question to be decided upon the basis of the circumstances attendant to the particular case. National Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Review Board (1960) Ind.App., 170 N.E.2d 381. The claimant in the instant case did not leave her work voluntarily without good cause.

'DECISION: The referee's decision in his case No. 60-A-2553, issued January 26, 1961 is hereby reversed.

'REVIEW BOARD

'Douglas J. Morris, Chairman

'William G. Johnson, Member

'Frank C. McAlister, Member, dissents'

In the Allis-Chalmers case, supra, cited by appellant, Judge Wiltrout stated:

'The Review Board, after summarizing the evidence introduced, made what purports to be a finding of facts, but which in our opinion is not such. Much of it consists of arguments, the validity of some of which are questionable, as well as conclusions of law, and there is also some speculation and conjecture.

'The misconduct which the employer attempts to show is the reporting by claimant of the completion of more units of work than she actually completed. There is no specific finding as to whether or not claimant made an incorrect report, and if so, of facts from which it can be determined whether or not such incorrect reporting amounted to misconduct in connection with her work.'

Under the particular facts and circumstances of the case before us, the one and only issue submitted to the Board by the claim for benefits of the appellee, Margaret Mailloux, under the provisions of the Employment Security Act, § 52-1525 to § 52-1563b inclusive, Burns' 1951 Replacement, as amended, Burns' 1962 Cumm.Pocket Supplement, § 52-1526a to § 52-1561d, inclusive, was whether she voluntarily quit her employment with good cause. She properly assumed the burden of establishing such issue in her favor and did so successfully.

Whether, under all the circumstances of this particular case, 'good cause' existed which warranted said appellee to voluntarily cease her employment with appellant was an ultimate fact to be found by the Board, and the Board, as above quoted, did find the ultimate fact to be that said appellee 'claimant in the instant case did not leave her work voluntarily without good cause.'

We find no statute or other authority which requires the Board to make a 'specific' finding of facts, as urged by appellant. It may be accepted that the Act 'contemplates that the Review Board shall make a finding of facts.' See the Allis-Chalmers case, supra. This statement seems to find its source in the provisions of § 52-1542k, Burns' 1962 Cumm.Pocket Supplement, that 'an assignment of errors that the decision of the Board is contrary to law shall be sufficient to present both the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision, and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding of fact.' Our research has uncovered no statute or authority prescribing the form, definitions, extent, or content of the Board's findings of fact.

Under the issue here presented to the Board, as above stated, the only finding the Board was required to make was whether or not said appellee voluntarily quit her employment with good cause. No other question or claim is or was raised or presented by...