Dornfeld v. Julian

Decision Date30 November 1984
Docket NumberNo. 59841,59841
Citation104 Ill.2d 261,84 Ill.Dec. 471,472 N.E.2d 431
Parties, 84 Ill.Dec. 471 Anne C. DORNFELD, Appellee, v. William R. JULIAN, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

David M. Gerson, Ltd., Chicago, for appellant.

E. Barry Greenberg, Patrick J. Gorman, E. Barry Greenberg & Associates, Ltd., Oak Brook, for appellee, Anne C. Dornfeld.

SIMON, Justice:

On August 11, 1981, Anne C. Dornfeld (plaintiff) filed a paternity suit in the circuit court of Du Page County alleging that William R. Julian (defendant) was the father of her child born out of wedlock on June 19, 1978. The complaint prays for a declaration of the defendant's paternity and asks that he be held responsible for expenses incurred during and after the pregnancy and for support of the child.

In November 1982, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, relying on section 4 of the Illinois Paternity Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 40, par. 1354), which provides in pertinent part:

"No such action may be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the birth of the child. However, where the person accused has acknowledged the paternity of the child by a written statement made under oath or affirmation or has acknowledged the paternity of such child in open court, prosecution may be brought at any time within 2 years from the last time such acknowledgment was made or within 2 years from the last time the person accused contributed to the support, maintenance, education and welfare of the child subsequent to such acknowledgment. The time any person so accused is absent from or conceals himself within the State shall not be computed."

While this cause was pending in the circuit court, the Supreme Court held a Tennessee paternity statute containing a two-year limitation period unconstitutional because it denied equal protection to children born of unwed parents in obtaining paternal support. (Pickett v. Brown (1983), 462 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2199, 76 L.Ed.2d 372.) Subsequently, our appellate court held the two-year time limit in our statute unconstitutional in Jude v. Morrissey (1983), 117 Ill.App.3d 782, 73 Ill.Dec. 280, 454 N.E.2d 24. See also People ex rel. McCoy v. Sherman (1984), 123 Ill.App.3d 444, 78 Ill.Dec. 698, 462 N.E.2d 817.

The circuit court in the present case then ruled that the two-year limitation in the Paternity Act is unconstitutional, but held the balance of the Act valid and denied the motion to dismiss. Although the denial of a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory, rather than a final, order, the defendant filed a notice of appeal to the appellate court within 30 days. The plaintiff did not challenge the defendant's notice of appeal; instead, after the cause had been pending in the appellate court for approximately four months, the plaintiff filed a motion in this court under Rule 302(b) (87 Ill.2d R. 302(b)) seeking an expedited resolution of the constitutionality of section 4. That motion was never allowed; rather, upon the application of the plaintiff to this court, the case was erroneously docketed under Rule 302(a)(1) (87 Ill.2d R. 302(a)(1)), which provides for appeals as of right to this court from final judgments in cases in which a State statute has been held invalid. The circuit court judgment was not, of course, a final order. However, because of the length of time the case has been pending on appeal and the importance of the constitutional issue to be decided (see George D. Hardin, Inc. v. Village of Mt. Prospect (1983), 99 Ill.2d 96, 101, 75 Ill.Dec. 435, 457 N.E.2d 429), we choose to retain this cause under the supervisory authority granted to this court by the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, sec. 16).

It is clear that the two-year limitation in section 4 of the Paternity Act for bringing an action pursuant to the Act is invalid under Pickett v. Brown. The issue that we must determine is whether the entire Paternity Act is rendered invalid by the unconstitutionality of the limitations clause. The defendant argues that there is a presumption that a legislature intends an act to be effective as an entirety, absent a severability clause establishing the contrary presumption. (Williams v. Standard Oil Co. (1929), 278 U.S. 235, 241-42, 49 S.Ct. 115, 117, 73 L.Ed. 287, 309.) Because the Paternity Act contains no severability clause, the defendant contends that the invalidity of the limitations clause renders the entire act invalid.

In construing a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. (Gill v. Miller (1983), 94 Ill.2d 52, 56, 67 Ill.Dec. 850, 445 N.E.2d 330.) However, we are unpersuaded by the defendant's argument that the legislature intended to create a cause of action only if the two-year time limit were operative. Rather, we assume that the legislature intended to enact a statute that was consistent with the Constitution (Gill v. Miller (1983), 94 Ill.2d 52, 56, 67 Ill.Dec. 850, 445 N.E.2d 330); that we must give effect to as much of a statute as is possible, consistent with the Constitution (Sup v. Cervenka (1928), 331 Ill. 459, 462, 163 N.E. 396); and that the Act should be construed in light of the subject it addresses and its apparent objective (Chastek v. Anderson (1981), 83 Ill.2d 502, 511, 48 Ill.Dec. 216, 416 N.E.2d 247).

The Paternity Act provides for the paternal support, maintenance and education of children born of unwed parents, thereby converting a father's moral obligation of support into a legal one, and preventing such children from becoming public charges. (People ex rel. Mathis v. Brown (1976), 44 Ill.App.3d 783, 3 Ill.Dec. 475, 358 N.E.2d 1160.) Without the two-year limitation, the Paternity Act is constitutional and meets these objectives. These policy...

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  • Weegar v. Bakeberg
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • February 8, 1995
    ...down two-year limitation periods are: District of Columbia ex rel. W.J.D. v. E.M., 467 A.2d 457 (D.C.1983); Dornfeld v. Julian, 104 Ill.2d 261, 84 Ill.Dec. 471, 472 N.E.2d 431 (1984); R.L.G. v. T.L.E., 454 N.E.2d 1268 (Ind.App.1983); State ex rel. Rake v. Ohden, 346 N.W.2d 826 (Iowa 1984); ......
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