Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist.
Citation | 271 N.E.2d 834,27 Ohio St.2d 102,56 O.O.2d 58 |
Decision Date | 07 July 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 70-487,70-487 |
Parties | , 56 O.O.2d 58 DORRIAN, Columbus City Treasurer, et al., Appellants, v. SCIOTO CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, Appellee. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
Syllabus by the Court
1. In statutory construction, the word 'may' shall be construed as permissive and the word 'shall' shall be construed as mandatory unless there appears a clear and unequivocal legislative intent that they receive a construction other than their ordinary usage.
2. The powers of the board of directors of a conservancy district to levy an assessment and to borrow money in behalf of the district and to issue notes therefor, as authorized by R.C. 6101.45 and 6101.46, are permissive or discretionary in nature.
3. Where a board of directors of a conservancy district borrows money and issues notes therefor, pursuant to authorization provided in R.C. 6101.45 and 6101.46, the source of funds to satisfy such obligation is discretionary with the board of directors of the conservancy district.
On September 15, 1962, the Scioto Conservancy District executed and delivered to the city of Columbus its note for $950,000.
At the time the note was executed and delivered to the city of Columbus, the Conservancy District pledged, for the repayment thereof, receipts from the anticipated assessments to be levied pursuant to the provisions of R.C. 6101.45, and from the improvement fund as received pursuant to the applicable section of R.C. Chapter 6101.
No payments were ever made on the note, although the interest payments thereon were made until the institution of this action, and none have been made since.
The note had an original maturity date of 1964, which date was extended to March 15, 1966. Prior to the expiration of the extended maturity date the Conservancy District indicated to the city of Columbus that it did not have funds with which to satisfy the debt. The extended maturity date expired and the note remained unsatisfied. Interest was paid on the obligation through March 1968.
The city of Columbus commenced an action for a declaratory judgment on or about February 7, 1968. The petition, in substance, alleges that the Conservancy District had failed to pay the principal on the note or to apply funds in its possession toward the payment of the principal. In addition, the petition alleges that the Conservancy District had failed to levy an assessment pursuant to R.C. Chapter 1601, in anticipation of which the note was issued.
The city of Columbus also alleges that a controversy exists between the parties with respect to whether or not the Conservancy District has a duty to levy an assessment or to turn over funds in its possession to repay the principal of the note.
In its answer, the Conservancy District admits the terms and existence of the note; that no payment has been made on the principal of the note; and that no assessment was levied pursuant to R.C. 6101.45. The existence of a controversy between the parties was denied.
Appellants filed a reply to the answer.
The Common Pleas Court of Franklin County, following the taking of testimony, found that no real controversy exists between the parties that would permit the city of Columbus to obtain a declaratory judgment, and dismissed the petition.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals found that a real controversy did exist between the parties involving the manner in which the Conservancy District must meet its obligation to the city of Columbus.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated that the action sought a determination whether R.C. 6101.45 and 6101.46 mandated the Conservancy District to levy a preliminary assessment pursuant to R.C. 6101.45 in order to repay to the city of Columbus a loan made in anticipation of such assessments.
The Court of Appeals found that there was a justiciable issue between the parties but held that the Conservancy District was not required to levy the assessment set forth in R.C. 6101.45 and 6101.46. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Common Pleas Court, entered final judgment in accordance with its decision and remanded the cause to the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County for further proceedings.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
John C. Young, City Atty., William J. Melvin and Thomas A. Bustin, Columbus, for appellants.
Caren, Lane, Huggard, Alton & Horst, and William M. Lane, Columbus, for appellee.
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the Scioto Conservancy District is mandated by R.C. 6101.45 and 6101.46 to levy preliminary assessments based upon the benefits determined by the court as provided by R.C. 6101.08 to satisfy its obligation to the city of Columbus. The answer is 'no.'
The pertinent part of R.C. 6101.45 reads as follows:
* * *'(Emphasis supplied.)
The pertinent part of R.C. 6101.46 reads as follows:
* * *'(Emphasis supplied.)
It is the contention of the appellant that the word 'may,' as used in R.C. 6101.45 and 6101.46, is mandatory in nature and that the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting that word in ...
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State ex rel. [Deceased v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio
...mandatory obligation unless other language evidences a clear and unequivocal intent to the contrary"); Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist. , 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 107, 271 N.E.2d 834 (1971), citing Dennison v. Dennison , 165 Ohio St. 146, 134 N.E.2d 574 (1956) (stating that "[t]he word ‘shall’......
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State v. Grigsby
...The word "shall" is usually interpreted to make the provision in which it is contained mandatory. Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy District, 27 Ohio St. 2d 102, 107, 271 N.E. 2d 834(1971). In contrast, the use of the word "may" is generally construed to make the provision in which it is contai......
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...for installment payments, we use an abuse of discretion standard to review MetroHealth's argument. Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist. , 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 108, 271 N.E.2d 834 (1971).{¶ 126} MetroHealth did not offer a specific reason why it should be allowed to pay the judgment in installm......
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State v. Morgan
...legislative intent that [it] receive a construction other than [its] ordinary usage." (Emphasis added.) Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist. , 27 Ohio St.2d 102, 271 N.E.2d 834 (1971), paragraph one of the syllabus.{¶ 23} R.C. 2151.281 does not provide a "clear and unequivocal legislative in......