Dorricott v. Fairhill Center for Aging

• Decision Date: 21 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. 1:97-CV-1373.,1:97-CV-1373.
• Citation: 2 F.Supp.2d 982
• Parties: Denise A. DORRICOTT, Plaintiff, v. FAIRHILL CENTER FOR AGING, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

2 F.Supp.2d 982

Denise A. DORRICOTT, Plaintiff, v. FAIRHILL CENTER FOR AGING, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:97-CV-1373.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

April 21, 1998.

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Beverly Ann Caley, Savren & Caley, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff.

Richard C. Haber, Reminger & Reminger, Cleveland, OH, Mark D. Katz, Thomas H. Barnard, John A. Hnat, Ulmer & Berne, Cleveland, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GWIN, District Judge.

On February 23, 1998, Defendants Fairhill Center for Aging, et al. ("Fairhill") filed a motion for summary judgement against Plaintiff Denise A. Dorricott [Doc. 24]. In their motion, Defendants seek judgment on all claims in the complaint [Doc. 1].¹ Plaintiff Dorricott sues Defendants Fairhill, her former employer, for sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge from her job. For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part, and denied in part.

I. Facts

From June 5, 1996 to November 26, 1996, Plaintiff Denise Dorricott was employed by Defendant Fairhill Center as a Chef-Manager of the Center's food service facility. During the course of her employment, Dorricott alleges that James Tillman ("Tillman"), a temporary security guard employed by the Center at the time, repeatedly made sexual comments and advances toward her. Although Plaintiff Dorricott did not immediately report all occasions of verbal harassment as directed by the Center's employment and policy manual, she did report several incidents including alleged unwelcome physical contact by Tillman in October of 1996.

On October 26, 1996, Plaintiff Dorricott filed a verbal complaint with her immediate supervisor, co-defendant Dr. Stephanie Fallcreek ("Fallcreek"), that Tillman had earlier that day allegedly grabbed or pinched the plaintiff's breast while she was carrying a tray of ice. Fallcreek instructed Dorricott to meet with Lt. Shirley Newton-Jones, the Center's director of security, to formerly report the incident. Dorricott did so, filing a written report with Lt. Newton-Jones on or near October 31, 1996. On or near October 30, 1996, Plaintiff Dorricott also reported to Mr. Robert Skeist, the Center's associate director, a series of other alleged incidents of verbal and physical assaults toward her by Tillman.

Shortly after making her complaint to Fallcreek, Plaintiff Dorricott says she began receiving negative memoranda from Fallcreek concerning poor job performance.² Dorricott says that this negative feedback was inconsistent with her prior work performance. In this regard, the plaintiff alleges that prior to the date she made her complaint about Tillman's behavior, she had received only one corrective performance memo from Fallcreek regarding her time card.

After receiving Plaintiff Dorricott's written complaint of the physical incident involving Tillman, Fallcreek directed Lt. Newman-Jones to start an investigation. This investigation began on or near October 31. The date the investigation was completed is disputed. On December 3, 1996, Lt. Newman-Jones made a final report to Fallcreek. In the report, Lt. Newman-Jones assesses the incidents between Dorricott and Tillman as being consensual "horseplay" and "teasing" by both parties. Plaintiff Dorricott says the results of the investigation were never shared or discussed with her.

Plaintiff Dorricott contends that she suffered significant emotional distress as a result of the alleged sexual harassment and corresponding negative performance memos. Dorricott exhausted her medical leave in November of 1996, yet requested additional time. On November 21, 1996, Lyle Gleason, the Center's business manager, wrote Dorricott informing her that if she did not return to work, she would be considered a voluntary quit. On November 26, 1996, Dorricott received written notice from Gleason terminating her employment with the Fairhill Center.

Plaintiff Dorricott now sues Defendants Fairhill and Fallcreek alleging that her termination was in retaliation for reporting Tillman's sexual harassment and assault and for filing a formal charge of retaliation with the EEOC and the OCRC.

II. Claims

Defendants Fairhill seek summary judgment on Counts I-IV, VI and VII, of the complaint. These claims are as follows: (I) gender discrimination violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (II) gender discrimination violating the Ohio Civil Rights Act; (III) retaliation violating Title VII and the Ohio Civil Rights Act; (IV) tortious interference with a contractual relationship; (VI) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; and (VII) defamation.

III. Discussion

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment shall be rendered when requested if the evidence presented in the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In assessing the merits of the motion, this court shall draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence presented in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Woythal v. Tex-Tenn Corp., 112 F.3d 243, 245 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 414, 139 L.Ed.2d 317 (1997). However, an opponent to a motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must set forth through competent and material evidence specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Miller v. Lorain County Bd. of Elections, 141 F.3d 252, 256 (6th Cir.1998).

A. Sexual Harassment Claims

Defendants Fairhill first seek judgment on Plaintiff Dorricott's claims for sexual harassment under Title VII and state law (Counts I and II). Defendants say they are entitled to judgment because Dorricott fails to show the alleged incidents of sexual harassment by Mr. Tillman unreasonably interfered with her work performance or otherwise created a hostile work environment. Defendants also argue that, for purposes of employer liability, Dorricott is unable to show Defendants Fairhill failed to take prompt and effective corrective action in response to Dorricott's complaints.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination "against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex created a hostile or abusive work environment. Indeed, the statute grants employees "the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Id. 477 U.S. at 65.

However, the Court emphasized in Meritor that not all workplace conduct that has sexual overtones can be characterized as harassment forbidden by the statute. See id. at 67. Rather, harassment must affect a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment in order for it to fall within Title VII's purview. Thus, for alleged harassment to be actionable, it must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive `to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Id. (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.1982)).

In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this standard and elaborated upon its contours. The Harris Court explained that the conduct in question must be judged by both an objective and a subjective standard. "The conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and the victim must subjectively regard that environment as abusive." Id. at 21-22, 114 S.Ct. 367. "This standard ... takes a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury." Id. at 21. The Court explained that all of the circumstances should be considered, and it suggested a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors. These include:

[T]he frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's performance. The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is, of course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required.

Id. at 23. The Sixth Circuit has followed the Supreme Court's direction in this regard. See Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 872 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1039, 140 L.Ed.2d 105 (1998); Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 825-26 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 172, 139 L.Ed.2d 114 (1997); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 834 (6th Cir.1996).

The Sixth Circuit has also clearly stated its position regarding the standard to be used when reviewing cases of work-place harassment between co-employees, as in the case at hand. In Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc., 123 F.3d 868 (6th Cir.1997), the Sixth Circuit outlined five elements a plaintiff must show to state a claim for sexual harassment. A plaintiff must show (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based upon her sex; (4)...