Dorris v. Detroit Osteopathic Hosp. Corp.

• Decision Date: 09 June 1999
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 108613,112711,112712,Nos. 16-17,s. 16-17
• Citation: 460 Mich. 26,594 N.W.2d 455
• Parties: Deborah DORRIS and Raymond Dorris, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DETROIT OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAL CORP., Defendant-Appellee. Eloise Gregory, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Heritage Hospital, an assumed name for Oakwood United Hospitals, Inc., a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellant, and Jane Doe, Defendant. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 455

594 N.W.2d 455

460 Mich. 26

Deborah DORRIS and Raymond Dorris, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DETROIT OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAL CORP., Defendant-Appellee.

Eloise Gregory, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Heritage Hospital, an assumed name for Oakwood United

Hospitals, Inc., a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellant,

and

Jane Doe, Defendant.

Docket Nos. 108613, 112711, 112712.

Calendar Nos. 16-17.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 22, 1999.

Decided June 9, 1999.

DeNardis, McCandless & Muller, P.C. (by William McCandless and Michael G. Latiff, and Mark F. Miller ), Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants Dorris.

Michael G. Kelman, P.C. (by Glenn A. Saltsman ), Farmington Hills, for plaintiff-appellee Gregory.

Feikens, Stevens, Kennedy, Hurley & Galbraith, P.C. (by L. Neal Kennedy ), Detroit, for defendant-appellee in Dorris.

Willmarth, Tanoury, Ramar, Corbet, Garves & Shaw (by Daniel R. Corbet, Derek S. Wilczynski, and Elizabeth L. Sokol ), Detroit, for defendant-appellant in Gregory.

OPINION

BRICKLEY, J.

We granted leave in these cases to determine if the physician-patient privilege set forth in M.C.L. § 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157 prevents the defendant hospitals from disclosing the identity of unknown third-party patients. We hold that the names of unknown patients are protected by the physician-patient privilege, and that defendant hospitals have a duty to refrain from disclosure. We also review the Gregory trial court's order that the defendant hospital provide Gregory with any investigative reports relative to the incident report; any statements made by any person with respect to the incident; and any notes, memoranda, records, and reports related to the incident. Additionally, we review the Gregory trial court's denial of the defendant hospital's motions for summary disposition for plaintiff's failure to file a notice of intent and for plaintiff's failure to file an affidavit of merit. We decline to review the Gregory trial court's partial denial of defendant's motion for partial summary disposition regarding plaintiff's express contract claim for violation of the statute of frauds and the Michigan Court Rules. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to Dorris v Detroit Osteopathic Hospital. We partially reverse the trial court in Gregory v. Heritage Hospital and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

A. Dorris v Detroit Osteopathic Hospital

This is an interlocutory appeal in a medical malpractice action. Plaintiffs Deborah Dorris and Raymond Dorris ¹ appeal the Court of Appeals reversal of the trial court's order compelling defendant Detroit Osteopathic Hospital Corporation to reveal the name of the patient who shared a hospital room with Dorris.

Plaintiff Dorris visited the Riverside Osteopathic Hospital ² emergency room on the evening of June 18, 1993, complaining of nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. The emergency room physician, Dr. Lusk, prescribed the drug Compazine, which was administered intravenously. After the Compazine was administered, Dorris had an apparent anaphylactic reaction to the drug. Dorris' condition later stabilized, and she was discharged within twenty-four hours. Dorris claimed that she had refused the Compazine because she had a history of allergic reactions to medicines. Dorris alleged that she instead requested Lomatil, which she previously had taken without incident, but Dr. Lusk refused her request. Dorris stated that she also told the nurse who put Compazine into the intravenous bag that she did not want the medicine.

Dorris filed suit in March 1994 and alleged that the hospital's employee negligently administered Compazine in violation of the standard of care for an emergency room physician and against Dorris' specific instructions. Dorris' complaint alleges damages for the allergic reaction, as well as pain, suffering, humiliation, and great emotional and mental distress. Dorris' husband alleges damages as a result of loss of consortium.

Dorris claims that the patient who shared her hospital room witnessed Dorris' refusals of Compazine. During discovery, plaintiff moved to compel defendant to disclose the name of that patient. The circuit court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed. 220 Mich.App. 248, 559 N.W.2d 76 (1996). The Court of Appeals based its holding on Schechet v. Kesten, 372 Mich. 346, 351, 126 N.W.2d 718 (1964). In Schechet, this Court stated that M.C.L. § 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157 "prohibits the physician from disclosing, in the course of any action wherein his patient or patients are not involved and do not consent, even the names of such noninvolved patients."

Plaintiff Dorris appeals the decision of the Court of Appeals. 457 Mich. 866, 581 N.W.2d 733 (1998).

B. Gregory v. Heritage Hospital

In her complaint, plaintiff Eloise Gregory alleges that she was the victim of an assault and battery occurring while she was a patient at defendant Heritage Hospital on May 13, 1997. She claims that she was awakened because of a physical altercation between her roommate and another patient from across the hall. Gregory alleges that she was grabbed by defendant Jane Doe who pushed her to the ground and beat her, causing her to lose consciousness and sustain serious injuries. Additionally, Gregory alleges breach of contract by Heritage. Gregory argues that this contract gave rise to a duty of Heritage to protect patients while under its care. Gregory also alleges that Heritage had inadequate staffing to supervise and monitor the behavior of the patients under its psychiatric care.

Gregory served Heritage with interrogatories and a request for production of documents that included: any incident/investigative reports relating to the incident; any statements made by any person with respect to the incident; and any notes, memoranda, records, and reports related to the incident.

Heritage objected to the discovery requests. In lieu of answering the complaint, Heritage filed three motions for summary disposition. Gregory subsequently filed a motion to compel discovery. Heritage's motions for summary disposition were in large part denied, and Gregory's motion to compel discovery was granted. ³ Heritage was ordered to provide Gregory with answers to her interrogatories; the incident report involving Jane Doe; Jane Doe's full name, last known address, telephone number, social security number, or date of birth; any investigative reports relative to the incident report; any statements made by any person with respect to the incident; and any notes, memoranda, records, and reports related to the incident.

Heritage applied for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, which was denied. This Court granted Heritage's application for leave to appeal and combined this case with Dorris v. Detroit Osteopathic Hosp. 458 Mich. 876, 585 N.W.2d 299 (1998).

II

We first address whether the defendant hospitals are required to provide identification information about other unknown patients to the plaintiffs. The physician-patient statute in Michigan, found at M.C.L. § 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157, provides:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a person duly authorized to practice medicine or surgery shall not disclose any information that the person has acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, if the information was necessary to enable the person to prescribe for the patient as a physician, or to do any act for the patient as a surgeon. If the patient brings an action against any defendant to recover for any personal injuries, or for any malpractice, and the patient produces a physician as a witness in the patient's own behalf who has treated the patient for the injury or for any disease or condition for which malpractice is alleged, the patient shall be considered to have waived the privilege provided in this section as to another physician who has treated the patient for the injuries, disease, or condition. If a patient has died, the heirs at law of the patient, whether proponents or contestants of the patient's will, shall be considered to be personal representatives of the deceased patient for the purpose of waiving the privilege under this section in a contest upon the question of admitting the patient's will to probate. If a patient has died, the beneficiary of a life insurance policy insuring the life of the patient, or the patient's heirs at law, may waive the privilege under this section for the purpose of providing the necessary documentation to a life insurer in examining a claim for benefits.

The physician-patient privilege was not recognized at common law, and, thus, its scope is controlled by the language of the statute. People v. Johnson, 111 Mich.App. 383, 314 N.W.2d 631 (1981).

It is well established that the purpose of the statute is to protect the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship and to encourage a patient to make a full disclosure of symptoms and condition. Domako v. Rowe, 438 Mich. 347, 354, 475 N.W.2d 30 (1991); Gaertner v. Michigan, 385 Mich. 49, 53, 187 N.W.2d 429 (1971); Schechet v. Kesten, 372 Mich. at 351, 126 N.W.2d 718; 81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses, § 438, p 392.

This Court, in Gaertner, supra at 53, 187 N.W.2d 429, summarized the purpose of the statute as follows:

The purpose of this statute is to protect the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship. In Schechet v. Kesten, 372 Mich. 346, 351 [126 N.W.2d 718 (1964) ], this Court said of the statute:

"It prohibits the physician from disclosing, in the course of any action wherein his patient or patients are not involved and do not consent, even the names of such noninvolved patients."

The privilege of confidentiality belongs to the patient; it can be waived only by the patient. Schechet v. Kesten, supra. In Storrs v. Scougale, 48 Mich. 387, 395 [12 N.W. 502 (1882) ], this Court by Justice Cooley said of this privilege of confidentiality:

"[A] privilege is guarded which does not belong to him ...