Dorrough v. Olson
| Decision Date | 15 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 16-CV-10308 |
| Parties | RAPHEL DORROUGH, #868539, Petitioner, v. KATHY OLSON, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
HONORABLE MARK A. GOLDSMITH
This is a habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner Raphel Dorrough ("Petitioner") was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing death, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625(4), and reckless driving causing death, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.626(4), following a jury trial in the Genesee County Circuit Court. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 86 months to 15 years imprisonment on those convictions in 2013. In his pleadings, Petitioner raises jury-instruction claims. For the reasons set forth, the Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability and denies leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
Petitioner's convictions arise from an impaired driving accident on June 7, 2011 in Genesee County, Michigan. The Michigan Court of Appeals described the relevant facts, which are presumed correct on habeas review, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009), as follows:
During the early morning hours of June 7, 2011, Jaryn Stevens asked his best friend, Larenzo Bradford, for help because Stevens's car had run out of gas. Bradford responded to Stevens's plight, and Stevens got out of his car as Bradford filled the gas tank for him. Bradford noticed a car approaching from behind Stevens's car "faster than normal." Bradford, concerned that the oncoming vehicle was going to hit Stevens's car, told Stevens, "[W]e got to move out of the road." Just as the oncoming car was about to hit Stevens's disabled car, it swerved into the lane where both men were standing, hitting them. Bradford was injured and Stevens was killed.
People v. Dorrough, No. 315763, 2014 WL 5361721, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2014) (unpublished).
At trial, Bradford provided an eyewitness account of the events leading up to the crash. He stated that he could see lights approaching them from a distance but "thought nothing of it." 2/13/2013 Trial Tr., pp, 223-24 (Dkt. 6-8). When he realized that Petitioner's car was traveling faster than normal, he chose to step back toward Stevens's car. Id. at 226. Bradford stated that just before the car hit the back of Stevens's car, it swerved into the curb lane hitting him and Stevens. Id. at 227. Bradford was struck in the left leg; he managed, however, to hobble over to where Petitioner's car had stopped and found Stevens laying in front of the car, near death. Id. at 228-29. Both Bradford and Petitioner called 911, and Bradford remained at Stevens's side until the paramedics arrived. Id. at 232, 234. The paramedic testified that, on arrival, Stevens exhibited no signs of life. Id. at 286. Even so, he tried to resuscitate Stevens using CPR and a cardiac monitor, but Stevens flat-lined at approximately 3:30 a.m. Id. at 285-87.
Medical testimony revealed that at the time of the crash, Petitioner's blood alcohol level was between 0.091 and 0.137. 2/14/2013 Trial Tr., pp. 131-32 (Dkt. 6-9). Petitioner's blood also tested positive for tetahydrocannabinol (THC), a compound found in marijuana, and Alprazolam(Xanax). Id. at 136, 138. A biochemistry and toxicology expert testified that Petitioner was impaired when he struck the two young men. Id. at 138.
An accident reconstruction expert testified that when he arrived on the scene, Stevens's flashers were still on. 10/17/2012 Trial Tr., p. 8 (Dkt. 6-4). Based on his calculations, Petitioner was traveling approximately 65 miles per hour and he failed to apply the brakes until the very last second before swerving into the two young men. Id. at 11-12. The expert opined that if Petitioner was traveling at the speed limit of 35 miles per hour and had applied his brakes, he would not have hit Stevens. Id. at 55-56. The expert ultimately determined that Petitioner was at fault for the crash and that speed was the main factor. Id. at 62-63.
Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner pursued an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals raising the same claim presented on habeas review. The court denied relief on his claims and affirmed his convictions. Dorrough, 2014 WL 5361721 at *1-5. Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which that Court denied in a standard order. People v. Dorrough, 497 Mich. 984, 861 N.W.2d 4 (2015).
Petitioner thereafter filed his federal habeas petition. He raises the following claims:
Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied for lack of merit.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., sets forth the standard of review that federal courts must use whenconsidering habeas petitions brought by prisoners challenging their state court convictions. The AEDPA provides in relevant part:
"A state court's decision is 'contrary to' ... clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "[T]he 'unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to 'grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n. 7); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit "precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). Pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or ... could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id.; see also White v. Woodall, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). Federal judges "are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong." Woods v. Donald, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). A habeas petitioner cannot prevail as long as it is within the "realm of possibility" that fairminded jurists could find the state court decision to be reasonable. Woods v. Etherton, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1152 (2016).
Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court's review to a determination of whether the state court's decision comports with clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Section 2254(d)"does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 'adjudicated on the merits.'" Harrington, 562 U.S. at 100. Furthermore, it "does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases-indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the...
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