Dorsey's Lessee v. Gary
| Decision Date | 05 December 1872 |
| Parties | JOHN T. B. DORSEY'S Lessee v. JAMES S. GARY. John T. B. Dorsey v. A. B. Kyle. Same v. Comfort W. Dorsey, Executrix of William H. G. Dorsey. Same v. Same. Same v. Same. Same v. A. J. Hampson. Same v. Charles Reese and Others. Same v. Alexander O. Baugher. Same v. John T. W. Dorsey. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
These several appeals were argued and decided in this court at the April Term, 1869, and are reported in 30 Md. 489, 512, 522.
By an Act of Assembly passed at the last session, (1872, ch. 310,) it was enacted as follows: " that the Court of Appeals be and they are hereby authorized and empowered to reopen and rehear" the said cases; " and upon the hearing thereof, to pass such judgments, orders and decrees in the said several cases, as right and justice may require."
Motions were made at the last Term, on behalf of the appellant, to have the several cases reinstated, in pursuance of the Act in order that they may be reheard and decided anew; the motions being resisted on the part of the appellees, leave was given to the respective counsel to file notes of argument upon the motions, which was done; but at so late a period of the Term as to not afford time or opportunity for the court to consider and decide the important questions involved before the adjournment. These have since received our careful consideration, and we now proceed briefly to express our judgment upon the motion.
The proceeding which this court is now asked to take, is based altogether upon the Act of Assembly to which we have referred. The subject-matter to which the Act relates is certain judgments and decrees in suits between private parties, rendered by this court at the April Term, 1869, and the purpose of the Act is to authorize and empower this court to reopen and rehear the cases, in order that other and different judgments and decrees may be rendered between the parties.
Have we the lawful authority or power to do this, or can the General Assembly constitutionally confer upon this court such power? These are vital and important questions which present themselves at the threshold of the case.
The effect of a final judgment is to conclude the rights of the parties litigant upon the subject-matter in controversy. The Constitution, Art. 4, sec. 15, declares that "the judgments of the Court of Appeals shall be final and conclusive." It was said in Munnickuyson v Dorsett, 2 H. & G. 374, "Judgments at law are not lightly to be interfered with;" and again, in Kemp v. Cook, 18 Md. 131, it was said that
Except for special causes, and upon equitable grounds well defined and understood in the law, and which do not exist in these cases, courts of justice have no power to interfere with or to disturb their own final judgments and decrees after the lapse of the term in which they have been rendered. The powers of this court in this respect are no greater than belong to every court of record.
Independently of the provisions of the Act of Assembly on which this motion is based, it is very clear that this court possesses no power or authority to interfere with its solemn and final judgments and decrees rendered at the April Term, 1869, or to reopen and rehear the cases then decided, for the purpose of correcting supposed errors therein, or of altering or changing the judgments and decrees then rendered.
This court is not clothed with any such arbitrary authority. Its exercise would be simply to deprive parties of their vested rights, after they have been adjudged and established by final judgment.
Can the Legislature constitutionally confer such a power upon this court? or, in other words, is the Act of 1872, ch. 310, a valid and constitutional exercise of the legislative power?
If this question were presented for the first time in Maryland, we should have little hesitation in answering it in the negative, for reasons which will be presently stated; but it is supposed to be settled by precedent. It is said that such legislation has been heretofore practiced in this State, and been sanctioned and acted upon by the Court of Appeals; and that it is too late now to question its validity. This makes it proper to refer to the several cases in which special Acts of Assembly of this kind, have been acted on by the Court of Appeals.
In Garretson v. Cole, 1 H. & J. 391, the Court of Appeals at June Term, 1801, reinstated the case which had been decided at June Term, 1799, under the Act of 1800, ch 88, which "authorized the court to reinstate the case if in their judgment and opinion under all the circumstances of the case, the same would tend to do justice between the parties." The Act was passed under peculiar circumstances, and it does not appear that any question was made or argued touching its constitutionality or validity.
In Gover v. Hall, 3 H. & J. 43, it appears that a bill had been filed in 1772, and a decree had been passed by the Chancellor therein in 1797, from which an appeal was taken, and at June Term, 1800, the Court of Appeals reversed the decree of the Chancellor, and remanded the cause with instructions, for accounts to be stated, etc.
Whereupon in the Chancery Court upon further proceedings, on the 28th of November, 1803, a decree was passed, and another appeal was taken; pending which, an Act of Assembly (1809, ch. 87,) was passed; reciting, that the Court of Appeals by which the first appeal was decided, consisted of Judges Rumsey, Mackall and Jones; that Judge Rumsey, who presided, declared himself disqualified to sit by reason of near relationship to one of the parties, etc. And doubts were entertained as to how far such decree was conclusive, and the court had ordered an argument of that question; and the Act authorized, empowered and directed, the court to hear and determine the matter of the decree of 1800, in the same manner as if that decree had not been made. The court proceeded under the Act of Assembly; but it does not appear that its validity or constitutionality, was called in question. The argument of the counsel is not reported. In the opinion delivered by the court, nothing is said on the question of the power of the Legislature to pass the Act; and as in the previous case of Garretson v. Cole, the constitutional question appears to have been waived. Neither of those cases, can, in our opinion, be relied on as any adjudication by the court upon the question of the constitutional power of the Legislature. In Gover v. Hall, supra, the Act of Assembly was by its terms mandatory upon the court directing that the case should be reheard on its merits, as if no decree had been passed; which was manifestly beyond the constitutional power of the Legislature to do, and if it had been questioned, must have been so held, as was afterwards decided in Prout v. Berry, 2 Gill, 147, where it was held, that an Act conferring upon the court the right to hear an appeal in a special case after the time allowed by the general law had passed, was null and void; because it directed the court to decide the cause in the same manner as if the appeal had been taken in time; which in view of the facts of the case, and the terms of the decree, the court considered could not be done without unsettling vested rights. Judge Archer speaking for the court, (p. 150,) says: ...
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