Dorsey v. St. Joseph Co. Jail Officials

• Decision Date: 18 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 3:91cv321 AS.,3:91cv321 AS.
• Citation: 910 F. Supp. 1343
• Parties: Reginold J. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. ST. JOSEPH CO. JAIL OFFICIALS, aka St. Joseph Co., Joseph F. Nagy, David Stafford, Robert Thompson, Paul P. Moffa, and Greg Delinski, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

910 F. Supp. 1343

Reginold J. DORSEY, Plaintiff, v. ST. JOSEPH CO. JAIL OFFICIALS, aka St. Joseph Co., Joseph F. Nagy, David Stafford, Robert Thompson, Paul P. Moffa, and Greg Delinski, Defendants.

No. 3:91cv321 AS.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

January 18, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David E. Vandercoy, Dave Welter, Ilse Masselink, Valparaiso Law Clinic, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, IN, for plaintiff.

Larry L. Ambler, Allen Fedder Herendeen and Kowals, South Bend, IN, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLEN SHARP, Chief Judge.

I. Procedural History

This cause is before the court on the defendants motion for summary judgment. Originally as a pro se plaintiff, Reginold J. Dorsey ("Dorsey") filed a complaint on June 17, 1991 alleging a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and invoking this court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3) and (4). On March 16, 1992, a telephonic pretrial conference was held upon which a written order was entered on July 23, 1992. On September 17, 1992, Dorsey's complaint was dismissed because the complaint was defective in failing to meet the pleading demands required by Monell v. Dept of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and its progeny in this circuit. Dorsey was granted leave to amend his complaint by December 1, 1992. On November 10, 1992, Dorsey was granted an extension until January 31, 1993 to file his amended complaint. On January 25, 1993, Dorsey filed the amended complaint, at which time a new cause number was assigned. On March 2, 1993, the judgment dismissing cause number S91-321 was vacated and case S91-321 was reinstated. Furthermore, cause number S93-7 was closed, and all pleadings filed in S93-7 were transferred as entries to cause number S91-321. On October 28, 1993 and November 18, 1994, second and third amended complaints were filed respectively.

II. Facts

Dorsey was a pretrial detainee at the St. Joseph County Jail from July 3, 1989 until May 14, 1990. Dorsey alleges that the defendants, St. Joseph County Jail Officials, aka Joseph F. Nagy, David Stafford, Robert Thompson, Paul P. Moffa, and Greg Delinski have violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by customs or policies which have failed to provide adequate medical treatment and have failed to provide an effective procedure upon which to obtain timely medical treatment. Upon being detained at the St. Joseph County Jail, Dorsey informed a jail official that he was a diabetic, which required a special diet to keep his blood sugar at a safe level, and that he had high blood pressure which required medication. Defendant Nagy referred Dorsey to Dr. Hansel Foley, at which time Dorsey's medical needs were made known. Defendant Nagy contracted with Memorial Hospital to provide medical services to the jails' inmates. Memorial's dietician was also consulted to provide medical dietary information concerning the inmates. Dorsey's complaint states that the defendants failed to provide a proper nutritious diet satisfying his special medical dietary needs. Dorsey was hospitalized from August 19, 1989 to August 25, 1989 at Memorial Hospital because of his uncontrolled diabetes mellitus and essential hypertension. Dr. Foley requested that Dorsey receive a diet of 2,800 calories to control these medical problems.

Dorsey's complaint states that the defendants perpetuated overcrowding and under staffing within the jail, and failed to train personnel properly, which in turn had the effect of "uncontrollable prison violence". The complaint further alleges that on September 8, 1989, Dorsey was threatened by cellmate Jerry Jones and three other inmates. On September 8, 1989, Dorsey was removed to a single man cell. While being removed to the single man cell, Dorsey alleges that defendants Stafford, Thompson, Moffa, and Delinski used excessive force against him without cause or provocation which violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Dorsey was placed in an area known as the bull pen of the St. Joseph County Jail. A number of men in this area were either waiting to go to court, or had just returned from being in court. Dorsey alleges that he was approached by inmate Jerry Jones, at which time a fight ensued and Dorsey's right arm was broken. Dorsey's arm was put into a cast. Dorsey had further problems with his arm and was then examined on December 6, 1989 at Memorial Hospital. Dorsey alleges that he has lost partial use of his arm from the unavailability of adequate medical care or procedure.

On December 18, 1989, Dorsey was transferred to Westville Correctional Center for medical treatment. Defendant states that this transfer was also for Dorsey's safety. On February 15, 1990, Dorsey was transferred to St. Joseph County Jail and placed in the single man cell. Finally, Dorsey was transferred back to Section 2-N of the jail. Dorsey alleges that this area was overcrowded, and he therefore had to sleep on the floor.

On May 9, 1990, a fight between Dorsey and another inmate occurred. Dorsey's arm was broken again and he suffered a laceration over his left eye requiring stitches. Dorsey further alleges that he also suffered a concussion. Dorsey was taken to Memorial Hospital for treatment of his injuries. Dorsey's complaint alleges that Memorial Hospital refused to admit him because there was not a bone specialist on staff; he was given a sling and returned to St. Joseph County Jail. Furthermore, Dorsey alleges that he again received improper medical treatment for his broken arm, and lost partial use of his right arm permanently.

III. Analysis and Discussion

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Russo v. Health, Welfare & Pension Fund, Local 705, 984 F.2d 762 (7th Cir.1993). A thorough discussion of Rule 56 can be found in a trilogy of cases decided in 1986 by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Celotex addressed the initial burdens of the parties under Rule 56, and Anderson addressed the standards under which the record is to be analyzed within the structure of Rule 56.

The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate, "with or without supporting affidavits," the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in the moving party's favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56). A question of material fact is a question which will be outcome determinative of an issue in the case. The Supreme Court has instructed that the facts material in a specific case shall be determined by the substantive law controlling the given case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Once the moving party has met the initial burden, the opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine material issue for trial.'" Id. The nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920-21 (7th Cir. 1994); Hughes v. Joliet Correctional Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 428 (7th Cir.1991), nor may that party rely upon conclusory allegations in affidavits. Cusson-Cobb v. O'Lessker, 953 F.2d 1079, 1081 (7th Cir.1992).

During its summary judgment analysis, the court must construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Smith v. Fruin, 28 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 735, 130 L.Ed.2d 638 (1995); Brennan v. Daley, 929 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir.1991). Furthermore, it is required to analyze summary judgment motions under the standard of proof relevant to the case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-55, 106 S.Ct. at 2512-14.

The 1986 Supreme Court trilogy was later reexamined in Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Serv., 504 U.S. 451, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992), a case born in the context of antitrust law. The most that can be said for Eastman Kodak, however, is that it did not tinker with Celotex and Anderson, and possibly involves an attempt to clarify Matsushita. This view is well-supported by an in-depth academic analysis in Schwarzer, Hirsch, and Barrans, The Analysis and Decision of Summary Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441 (1992).

A. Statute of Limitations

Originally as pro se litigant, Dorsey is owed a heightened judicial solicitude because of the difficulties a pro se litigant has in mastering the procedural and substantive requirements of the legal structure. Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214, 103 S.Ct. 1212, 75 L.Ed.2d 451 (1983) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959, 98 S.Ct. 491, 54 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977). The extent a court should be required, or permitted to go in any given case in assisting a pro se litigant is unclear and undecided. Caruth, 683 F.2d at 1050. Appropriately, the ultimate determination of whether a pro se litigant has received a fair and meaningful consideration of his claims must be made on a case-by-case basis. Id.

In the case of Woods v. Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, 996 F.2d 880 (7th Cir.1993), the Seventh Circuit dealt with a situation which closely parallels the one here in issue involving Rule 15(c): Relation Back of Amendments. Woods dealt...