Dorsey v. State

Decision Date25 June 1896
Citation111 Ala. 40,20 So. 629
PartiesDORSEY v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from criminal court, Pike county; William H. Parks, Judge.

Francis Dorsey was convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses under a written contract for labor, and appeals. Reversed.

The appellant was tried and convicted under a prosecution which was commenced by a complaint before a justice of the peace in which it was recited as follows: "Personally appeared L. F. Whitehead, who, being duly sworn, deposeth and saith on oath that he has probable cause for believing, and does believe, that the offense of obtaining money under false pretense by entering into a written contract to perform labor, and failing or refusing to perform said labor, and with intent to injure and defraud affiant, has been committed in said county by Francis Dorsey, about the 3d day of June 1895." Upon making this affidavit the justice of the peace issued the following warrant: "Complaint having been made before me by L. F. Whitehead that he has probable cause for believing, and does believe, that the offense of obtaining money under false pretense by entering into a written contract to perform labor, and failing or refusing to perform said work, and with intent to injure and defraud affiant, has been committed in said county by Francis Dorsey about the 3d day of June, 1895, you are therefore commanded to forthwith and arrest the said Francis Dorsey, and bring her before the judge of the criminal court of Pike county." The facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The defendant requested the court to give to the jury the following written charges, and separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of them as asked: (1) "If the jury believe the evidence in this case the defendant should be acquitted." (2) "The evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant received the money at the time or after the contract was entered into, or it is the duty of the jury to acquit the defendant." (3) "If Mr. Whitehead knew that the defendant was a servant of Mr. Blackman's before and at the time defendant entered into said contract or obtained the money, then the contract with Mr. Whitehead would have been illegal, and the defendant would not be liable." (4) "If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant refused to work for Mr. Whitehead because while in the employment of Mr. Blackman, through fear of Mr. Blackman, and that such fear was the only moving cause of her refusal to so work, then the defendant would not be liable for such refusal." (5) "If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant entered into the contract with Mr. Whitehead through fear of imprisonment in jail, and that this was the only moving cause of her entering into said contract, then she would not be guilty."

D. A. Baker, for appellant.

Wm. C. Fitts, Atty. Gen., for the State.

HEAD J.

While section 4204 of the Criminal Code authorizes the misdemeanor for which a warrant is sued out to be designated in the sworn complaint "by name, or by some other phrase which, in common parlance, designates it," it requires, when the offense has been committed on the person or property of another, that the name of the person injured be stated. The statute (Cr. Code, § 3812) under which the conviction was had in this case provides that: "Any person, who with intent to injure or defraud his employer, enters into a contract in writing for the performance of any act or service, and thereby obtains money or other personal property from such employer, and with like intent, and without just cause, and without refunding such money, or paying for such property refuses to perform such act or service, must on conviction be punished as if he had stolen it." It is apparent from this language that the employer is the person injured, and injured in his property, just as one whose property has been stolen, or obtained from him by a false pretense of an existing...

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7 cases
  • Goolsby v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 5 May 1925
    ... ... indulging in mere unsupported conjectures, speculations, or ... suspicions as ... [104 So. 904] ... to intentions which were not disclosed by any visible or ... tangible act, expression, or circumstance. Green v ... State, 68 Ala. 539.' See, also, Dorsey v ... State, 111 Ala. 40, 20 So. 629; McIntosh v ... State, 117 Ala. 128, 23 So. 668"--and replies ... thereto that "It is no answer to say that the jury must ... find, and here found, that a fraudulent intent existed. The ... jury by their verdict cannot add to the facts before them. If ... ...
  • Goolsby v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Appeals
    • 19 May 1925
    ...were not disclosed by any visible or tangible act, expression, or circumstance. Green v. State, 68 Ala. 539.' See, also, Dorsey v. State, 111 Ala. 40, 20 So. 629; McIntosh v. State, 117 Ala. 128, 23 668"--and replies thereto that "it is no answer to say that the jury must find, and here fou......
  • Alonzo Bailey v. State of Alabama
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 3 January 1911
    ...which were not disclosed by any visible or tangible act, expression, or circumstance. Green v. State, 68 Ala. 539.' See also Dorsey v. State, 111 Ala. 40, 20 So. 629; McIntosh v. State, 117 Ala. 128, 23 So. We pass, then, to the consideration of the amendment, through the operation of which......
  • Fox v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 26 February 1912
    ...3. Intent is the gist of the crime of false pretense. Hughes, Inst. to Juries, § 830; Underhill on Cr. Ev. §§ 436-7; 4 El. on Ev. § 2975; 111 Ala. 40; So. 629; 5 Enc. of Ev. 744. There must be an intent to defraud at the time. 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2 ed.), 824-5; 61. Ark. 157; 54 Ark. 481......
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