Dorsey v. Steele
Decision Date | 27 September 2019 |
Docket Number | Case No. 4:15-08000-CV-RK |
Parties | BRIAN J. DORSEY, Petitioner, v. TROY STEELE, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Before the Court is Petitioner Brian J. Dorsey's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 25.) Also before the Court is Petitioner's motion to expand the record to include additional affidavits and for an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 100.) For the reasons below, Petitioner's motion for leave to expand the record and for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED; the Petition is DENIED; a certificate of appealability is DENIED; and the case is DISMISSED.
Background
The Supreme Court of Missouri stated the facts as follows on postconviction appeal:
Dorsey v. State, 448 S.W.3d 276, 281-82 (Mo. banc 2014). The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed on direct appeal, State v. Dorsey, 318 S.W.3d 648, 651-52 (Mo. banc 2010), and again on appeal from the denial of postconviction relief, Dorsey v. State, 448 S.W.3d at 301.
Petitioner then filed this § 2254 Petition, and the State responded. (Doc. 25; Doc. 29.) After several briefing extensions and a stay pending further state proceedings on Claim 26 under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), Petitioner filed a traverse (Doc. 86), and counsel presented oral arguments on the issue of procedural default (Doc. 95). In a separate order, the Court denied Claim 5 as procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 98.) The remaining 27 claims are now ready for decision.
Discussion
For the reasons below, Petitioner's remaining claims either are procedurally defaulted or fail on the merits.
In Claim 1, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel failed to meaningfully contest the State's case under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) because they did not investigate guilt. Petitioner concedes this claim is procedurally defaulted because he did not raise it in state court. (Doc. 25, Pet. at 173.) To excuse the default, he must show either "cause and actual prejudice" or "actual innocence." Murphy v. King, 652 F.3d 845, 849-50 (8th Cir. 2011). Petitioner argues there is cause to excuse the default under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), because his postconviction counsel was ineffective for not raising this claim. (Doc. 25, Pet. at 173.) The Court disagrees.
To excuse a procedural default under Martinez, the underlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be "substantial," and postconviction counsel must have been constitutionally ineffective with respect to the claim. Martinez, 556 U.S. at 14. A claim is "substantial" if it has "some merit" and "insubstantial" if "it does not have any merit or . . . is wholly without factual support." Id. at 14-16; Kemp v. Kelley, 924 F.3d 489, 499 (8th Cir. 2019).
Here, Petitioner's Cronic claim does not rise to the level of a substantial claim under Martinez. Ordinarily, an ineffectiveness claim requires showing deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Cronic excuses the need to show Strickland prejudice under certain circumstances, including when counsel "failed to function in any meaningful sense as the Government's adversary." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666. To meet thisstandard, counsel's failure must have been "complete" throughout an entire proceeding, not only at various points. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-98 (2002).
Petitioner's Cronic claim is refuted by the record. Mr. Slusher, one of Petitioner's two trial lawyers, testified at the postconviction hearing that the public defender's office had already done substantial work on the case before he and Mr. McBride were retained to defend the case. (Doc. 29-11, PCR Tr. at 584-87.) The discovery file in their possession included police reports containing overwhelming evidence of guilt. (Petition Appendix ("Pet. App.") at 1-627.) Specifically, several witnesses placed Petitioner at the Bonnies' house on the night of the murders. (Id. at 7, 11-14, 21.) Darin Carel told police that only Petitioner was there with the Bonnies when he left. (Id. at 49-50.) The Bonnies' four-year-old daughter, J,3 told police that Petitioner came into her room after she fell asleep and, when she asked about her parents, told her she couldn't see them. (Id. at 55-56, 353-54.)
The next morning at 4:00 a.m., according to several witnesses' statements to police, Petitioner showed up at Patricia Cannella's home in what appeared to be Sarah Bonnie's white car. He was apparently attempting to sell the Bonnies' property to pay off his drug debt, including two guns, a ring inscribed with the names Sarah and Brian (Brian was also the name of Sarah Bonnie's ex-boyfriend), Ben Bonnie's cell phone, and Sarah's car. (Id. at 8, 45, 315-19, 340-41, 361-62, 397-401, 431, 618-19, 626-27.) Police later discovered the car abandoned with several things in it that were usually kept in the Bonnies' house—including the murder weapon. (Id. at 88-91, 266-69.) Lab reports showed Petitioner's DNA was consistent with DNA found on the steering wheel of the car, cigarette butts near where the car was found, and vaginal swabs from Sarah Bonnie. (Id. at 513-15.)
On December 26, 2018, Petitioner voluntarily turned himself in to the police. (Id. at 117, 120-21.) He had Sarah Bonnie's Social Security card in his back pocket. (Id. at 130.) In response to questioning, he told police that he was the "right man concerning the death of the Bonnies." (Id. at 119-21.)
According to Mr. Slusher, "it didn't take [him] long to review the case and feel like the guilt phase of the case was going to be difficult." (Doc. 29-11, PCR Tr. at 587.) Nonetheless, he deposed four police officers and moved to suppress Petitioner's incriminating statements. (Doc....
To continue reading
Request your trial