Dorsey v. Tompkins
| Decision Date | 29 February 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. C2-95-740.,C2-95-740. |
| Citation | 917 F. Supp. 1195 |
| Parties | Robin DORSEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Arnold TOMPKINS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
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Gary Smith, Southeastern Ohio Legal Services, New Philadelphia, Ohio, James M. Daniels, Southeastern Ohio Legal Services, Chillicothe, Ohio, William L. Archer, Jr., Ohio State Legal Services Association, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiff.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Alan P. Schwepe, Assistant Attorney General, Health & Human Services Section, Columbus, Ohio, for defendant.
This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief filed by plaintiffs Robin Dorsey and Randy Webb, who are recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") benefits, against defendant Arnold Tompkins in his official capacity as the Director of the Ohio Department of Human Services ("ODHS"). ODHS administers all federally-funded public assistance programs in Ohio, and county departments of human services ("CDHS's") operate these programs under regulations and directives issued by ODHS.
Plaintiffs assert that as AFDC recipients, they are obligated to participate in the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills ("JOBS") training program. As the result of their participation in this program, plaintiffs are eligible for "payment or reimbursement for such transportation and other work-related expenses ... as the State determines are necessary to enable such individuals to participate in such program." 42 U.S.C. § 602(g)(2). See also, 45 C.F.R. § 255.2(c)(1); Ohio Admin.Code § 5101:1-47-20. Plaintiffs allege that in calculating the amount of transportation benefits for which they are eligible, their respective CDHS's erroneously considered student financial assistance payments in the form of grants and loans received by plaintiffs in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1087uu. That section provides that student financial assistance received pursuant to Chapter 28, Subchapter IV of Title 20 of the United States Code "shall not be taken into account in determining the need or eligibility of any person for benefits or assistance, or the amount of such benefits or assistance, under any Federal, State, or local program financed in whole or in part with Federal funds."
Plaintiffs allege that defendant's policies and regulations permit consideration of student loans and grants in violation of § 1087uu. Although the benefits involved in plaintiffs' own cases are transportation allowances, plaintiffs also seek to bring this action on behalf of a class comprised of recipients of any federally funded benefits administered by ODHS who, on or after July of 1993, have been adversely affected by defendant's alleged policy of noncompliance with § 1087uu. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is currently pending before the court. Plaintiffs request this court to enter an order declaring that defendant's policies and regulations violate § 1087uu. Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief ordering defendant to comply with § 1087uu and to notify all recipients of any federally funded benefits whose benefits have been erroneously calculated in violation of § 1087uu of the administrative procedures available for obtaining a redetermination of benefits. Plaintiffs seek relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they have been deprived of rights granted to them under § 1087uu. Plaintiffs further assert that they are entitled to maintain a private cause of action against defendant under § 1087uu.
Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7) for failure to join an indispensable party. A complaint may not be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). A motion to dismiss will be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) if the complaint is without merit due to an absence of law to support a claim of the type made or of facts sufficient to make a valid claim, or where the face of the complaint reveals that there is an insurmountable bar to relief. Rauch v. Day & Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697 (6th Cir.1978).
Defendant first argues that the complaint should be dismissed because ODHS regulations demonstrate that the ODHS policy in regard to the transportation allowance is the same as that of the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary" and "HHS"). Defendant has submitted a copy of Action Transmittal No. CC-ACF-AT-93-3 ("AT-93-3"), dated July 16, 1993, which was issued to state Title IV-A agencies by the Administration for Children and Families, an agency of HHS. This transmittal discusses the Administration's interpretation of § 1087uu and the obligation of state agencies under that section. See Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit A. This transmittal instructs state agencies that student loans may not be considered in calculating other benefits, and that student grants may be considered only to the extent that funds are retained by the educational institution or voluntarily applied by the AFDC recipient toward payment for services or expenses which would be duplicated by state agency benefits. Exhibit A, pp. 3-4.
Defendant points to ODHS regulations contained in Ohio Admin.Code § 5101:1-47-20 and claims that these provisions establish that the policy of ODHS in regard to the consideration of student loans or grants in calculating the transportation allowance is consistent with HHS's interpretation of § 1087uu. Ohio Admin.Code § 5105:1-47-20(A) provides that JOBS program participants "shall not be required to use their grants or other personal resources to cover expenses associated with participation." Section 5101:1-47-20(H) allows a participant to receive the participant expense allowance, including a transportation allowance, so long as there is no duplication of payment.
However, plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the policy actually applied in their case did not comply with § 1087uu. In fact, defendant has conceded that the reduction of plaintiffs' transportation allowance was improper. The fact that an administrative agency has implemented certain regulations does not ipso facto mean that the agency has a policy of adhering to those regulations. Plaintiffs allege that ODHS and its CDHS's follow a policy of considering grants and loans in violation of § 1087uu. The issue of whether ODHS actually implements and enforces a policy consistent with § 1087uu involves factual questions which cannot be resolved by a motion to dismiss. Defendant's motion to dismiss on this ground is not well taken.
Defendant argues that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7) for failure to join an indispensable party. The question of whether a complaint must be dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party involves a three-step process. Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Michigan, 11 F.3d 1341, 1345 (6th Cir.1993). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a), a person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction shall be joined if: 1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among the existing parties, or 2) the person claims an interest in the subject matter of the action and disposition of the action in his absence may impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or create a substantial risk of double, multiple or inconsistent obligations. If the person falls within either of these categories, the court must then consider the second issue of whether personal jurisdiction is present. Keweenaw Bay, 11 F.3d at 1345. If personal jurisdiction is present, the party must be joined. Id. If personal jurisdiction is not present, the court must take the third step of analyzing the factors in Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b) to determine whether the action may proceed without that party or whether the action must be dismissed. Id. at 1345-1346.
Defendant contends that the Secretary of HHS is an indispensable party because in order to grant the relief requested by plaintiffs, this court would have to hold that the Secretary's interpretation of § 1087uu contained in AT-93-3 is erroneous, thus impacting upon HHS's procedures. Defendant asserts that HHS should be afforded the opportunity to defend its interpretation. Plaintiffs respond that they have no quarrel with AT-93-3, and that their complaint involves ODHS's failure to comply with AT-93-3.
Defendant relies on Boles v. Greeneville Housing Authority, 468 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1972). In Boles, the court held that the Department of Housing and Urban Development was an indispensable party in a case which indirectly attacked a HUD administrative decision approving a plan for an urban renewal project. Defendant also cites McCowen v. Jamieson, 724 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir.1984), where the court determined that the Department of Agriculture was an indispensable party because the judgment rested on the determination that the Department erred in a decision concerning the issuance of replacement food stamp coupons by a state agency. In Ford v. Krechbaum, Slip Op., Case No. C-2-92-352 (S.D.Ohio 1992), another case noted by defendant, the court held that the Department of Agriculture was a necessary party in an action against the ODHS challenging plaintiffs' disqualification for receiving food stamps where the USDA had ratified the position of the ODHS in the matter. The court also notes Jones v. Board of Educ. Cleveland...
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...plaintiff alleged that defendant was violating Department rule, not that Department was violating its own rule); Dorsey v. Tompkins, 917 F.Supp. 1195, 1200 (S.D.Ohio 1996) (distinguishing Boles and holding that agency is not necessary party where plaintiff is contending that defendant acted......