Dortch v. Lugar, 770S149
| Citation | 266 N.E.2d 25,255 Ind. 545 |
| Decision Date | 26 January 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 770S149,770S149 |
| Parties | Carl DORTCH, Ernest Williams, Homer P. Huesing, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Howard Platt, Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard G. LUGAR et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Erle A. Kightlinger, Mark W. Gray, Howard J. DeTrude, Jr., Kightlinger, Young, Gray & Hudson, Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellants.
Nelson G. Grills, Indianapolis, for intervening plaintiff-appellant.
Harry T. Ice, Robert D. Risch, George B. Gavit, Ice, Miller, Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, Harold H. Kohlmeyer, Jr., Corporation Counsel, Indianapolis, for defendants-appellees.
Pursuant to the provisions of Indiana's Public Lawsuit statute * (Ind.Ann.Stat. § 3--3301 to 3--3308 (1968 Repl.)), 1 plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter referred to as appellant) and intervening plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter referred to as intervenor) brought this suit challenging the constitutionality of Chapter 173 of the Acts of 1969, commonly referred to as the 'Unigov' bill. 2 The Act purports to reorganize local municipal and county government in counties containing a city of the first class to enable to consolidation of governmental functions in densely populated metropolitan communities, thus eliminating the overlapping jurisdictions of various county and municipal boards and departments, and to provide some semblance of centralized control over the metropolitan area.
The cause went to trial upon stipulated facts submitted by the parties and the trial court, upon an examination of the evidence, briefs and arguments of counsel, found the Act to be constitutional and valid in all respects.
Numerous issues have been raised for our consideration on appeal questioning the basic governmental framework resulting from the Act's provisions and involving the application of several sections of our constitution. In the interests of brevity, we have attempted to organize and consolidate our discussion of points argued by both appellant and intervenor where those arguments presented are substantially the same.
Appellant first contends that the title to Chapter 173 violates the mandate of Art. 4, § 19 of the Indiana Constitution in that it is not sufficiently broad to cover the subject matter contained in the Act. The pertinent provision of Art. 4, § 19 reads as follows:
The title to chapter 173 is worded thus:
'An act concerning reorganization of government in counties containing a city of the first class.' Acts of 1969, ch. 173, p. 357.
It is argued that the Act establishes or creates a new class of municipal corporations to be known as 'consolidated cities' and that the words 'reorganization of government in counties containing a city of the first class' neglects to describe the far-reaching quality of the Act in reorganizing the government of first class cities and destroying that class as municipal corporations, except as that class is used to determine the new class of consolidated cities.
As was recently stated in the case of State ex rel. Indiana Real Estate Comm. v. Meier (1963), 244 Ind. 12, 190 N.E.2d 191, Art. 4, § 19 was primarily designed for those titles which are narrower in scope than the actual enactment. The purpose of the provision has been recognized as two fold: first it is intended to prevent surprise or fraud by inclusion in the body of a bill matter of which the title gives no indication and which would fail to apprise the Legislature and the people as to the subject of legislation enacted or under consideration; and secondly to prevent a combination of non-related subjects in the same act. Indiana Real Estate Comm. v. Meier, supra; State ex rel. Penn. R.R. Co. v. Iroquois Conservancy District Court (1956), 235 Ind. 353, 133 N.E.2d 848; Albert v. Milk Control Board of Indiana (1936), 210 Ind. 283, 200 N.E. 688. To satisfy the requirements of Art. 4, § 19, it is not necessary that the title of an act amount to an abstract of its contents, but only that it fairly give notice of the legislative matter contained therein. Martin v. Ben Davis Conservancy District (1958), 238 Ind. 502, 153 N.E.2d 125; Board of Comm. of County of Marion v. Scanlan (1912), 178 Ind. 142, 98 N.E. 801. In applying this constitutional provision, we are permitted to indulge in a very liberal interpretation rather than a critical and strict construction calculated to defeat the act. Perry Township of Marion County, Indiana v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. (1946), 224 Ind. 59, 64 N.E.2d 296; DeHaven v. Municipal City of South Bend (1937), 212 Ind. 194, 7 N.E.2d 184.
With these principles in mind, it is our conclusion that the phrase 'reorganization of government in counties containing a city of the first class' is sufficiently broad to apprise of the nature of the Act's contents. As noted by appellee, reorganize is defined to mean 'to organize again or anew; change the organization of'. Webster's New Third World Dictionary, 1923 (1961). Clearly that is precisely what the Act here in question accomplishes--the reorganization of local government for the purposes of consolidating the governmental functions of a county and first class city therein situated. To hold that the Act's title is not sufficiently descriptive of its contents in this case would be placing an undue premium on sheer technical semantics as opposed to substantive meaning.
Appellant next asserts that the Act is violative of Art. 4, §§ 22 and 23 in that the law is special in character; a similar argument is advanced under Art. 11, § 13 by appellant's contention that the Act creates a corporation by special act. In each instance, appellant points to the fact that the Act, by its very terms, can apply only to Marion County and is therefore 'special'.
As to appellant's argument under Art. 4, §§ 22 and 23, it is there noted that the Act directly affects at least six of the areas enumerated in Art. 4, § 22 to wit: for the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors; for laying out, opening and working on highways, and for the election or appointment of supervisors; vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys and public squares; regulating the election of county and township officers and their compensation; and for the assessment and collection of taxes for state, county, township or road purposes.
The thrust of appellant's objection to the Act in this regard is that the law, affecting the above named areas, can apply only to Marion County because of the current population densities persisting throughout the state in the various counties. As a general proposition, however, it is sufficient for purposes of §§ 22 and 23 of Art. 4 if the act in question treats all persons alike under the same or similar conditions and circumstances, and the classification is reasonable and naturally inherent in the subject matter. Bennett v. Spencer County Bridge Comm. (1938), 213 Ind. 520, 13 N.E.2d 547; Kelly v. Finney (1935), 207 Ind. 557, 194 N.E. 157.
Chapter 173, by its very terms, is made applicable to any county in which, because of later increased population, there is situated a city of the first class. Acts of 1969, ch. 173, §§ 102, 1502. The mere fact that no other county presently qualifies does not render the Act unconstitutional. Groves v. Board of Comm. of County of Lake (1936), 209 Ind. 371, 199 N.E. 137; Campbell v. City of Indianapolis (1900), 155 Ind. 186, 57 N.E. 920. As was said in the Groves opinion:
'If the act is broad enough to apply to all counties of the state under the same circumstances, it cannot be condemned.' Groves v. Board of Comm. of Lake County, supra, 209 Ind. at 376, 199 N.E. at 140.
That legislative classifications may be based on population has already been established by this court as long as the classification results in a uniform operation of the law throughout the state. Evansville-Vanderburgh Levee Authority District v. Kamp (1960), 240 Ind. 659, 168 N.E.2d 208; State ex rel. Gannon v. Lake Circuit Court (1945), 223 Ind. 375, 61 N.E.2d 168; Millers National Insurance Co. v. American State Bank of East Chicago (1934), 206 Ind. 511, 190 N.E. 433. If population alone is to be the basis for the classification, nevertheless, as is here the case, it must bear some rational relationship to the subject dealt with and must be based on justifiable distinctions when considered in the context of the legislative goal sought to be obtained. Evansville-Vanderburgh Levee Authority Dist. v. Kamp, supra; Perry Civil Township of Marion County v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. (1943), 222 Ind. 84, 51 N.E.2d 371; Groves v. Board of Comm. of Lake County, supra.
We hold that the legislative qualification in the Act stipulating that there be one first class city in the county before the Act becomes effective as to that county is not an unconstitutional classification. Clearly, the population count of a city within the county has a distinct and rational relationship to the subject of the legislation, namely the reorganization of county and city government in such a populated county. Distinguishing between such a county and one with no first class city is justifiable when considered in light of the goal sought by the Legislature.
The fact that the Act was drafted with Indianapolis and Marion County in the minds of legislators, a fact of which we take judicial cognizance, does not, of itself, put it without the constitutional provisions of Art. 4, §§ 22 and 23, there being sufficient legislative reason to distinguish...
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