Doss v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 12 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 0421-17-3 |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | BRENT RAY DOSS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Alston, Chafin and Malveaux
Argued at Salem, Virginia
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY
Michael A. Nicholas (Daniel, Medley & Kirby, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Lauren C. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Brent Ray Doss (appellant) argues that the trial court erred when it convicted him of grand larceny of a motor vehicle pursuant to Code § 18.2-95. Appellant specifically contends that the trial court incorrectly concluded that William Doss had implied authority to sign a motor vehicle title in the title holder's name. Accordingly, appellant argues that title did not pass. Thus, appellant could not have committed grand larceny when he took the motor vehicle. We disagree.
The factual background of the case is difficult to follow but is critical to understand the interconnections of the individuals involved. Appellant's girlfriend, Leslie Biggs (Biggs), owned a 1975 pickup truck. Appellant expressed interest in trading Biggs' truck for a 1995 Ford Mustang owned by Kenneth Mitchem, an acquaintance. They agreed to meet to discuss a"straight swap; car for truck." On May 6, 2016, appellant, Biggs, and appellant's father, William Doss (William), arrived at Mitchem's home in Biggs' truck and another vehicle. This was going to be an "as-is" trade. Appellant took Biggs on a five-minute test-drive of the Mustang. When they returned, Mitchem asked "do you all want to trade?" Appellant replied in the affirmative.
At that point, William began to clean out the truck. Mitchem went inside his home to retrieve title to the Mustang and a pen. When Mitchem returned, he signed the title to the Mustang and handed it to William. William handed Mitchem the title to the truck, which indicated that the titleholder was Biggs. William asked Mitchem "do you need me to sign [the title]?" Mitchem replied "Yes sir, I won't trade with you unless [the truck] title is signed." Accordingly, William signed the truck title; the truck title reflected a scratched out signature, a signature of one "Leslie Biggs," and then the printed name of "Nicole Leslie Biggs." Biggs and appellant were both present during this exchange. At this point, the truck's doors were open. Mitchem stood on the driver's side of the truck and William stood on the passenger's side. Appellant and Biggs stood near the Mustang, which was about five feet behind William. The evidence established that both appellant and Biggs had an unobstructed view of the transaction. William handed the signed truck title to Mitchem. Mitchem was then given one key to the truck. At this point, appellant drove away in the Mustang with William. Biggs followed behind in the vehicle she arrived in. The truck remained parked in Mitchem's driveway.
The next day at about 4:30-5:00 p.m., Mitchem was on his way home from the store in a different vehicle. Mitchem observed appellant driving towards him in the truck. When Mitchem returned to his home, he reported the incident to the police.
Officer Hudson responded to Mitchem's report. On the way to Mitchem's home, Hudson called Mitchem. During the call, Mitchem provided an address noted on the truck title. Hudsondiverted to that address and observed a truck matching the description Mitchem gave at that address. The truck was parked behind a trailer home and was locked behind a gate.
After meeting with Mitchem at his residence, Hudson returned to the truck's location and called a cell phone number Mitchem had previously provided to him. Hudson called the cell phone number and spoke with appellant and Biggs. Appellant explained that he "felt like he could go get the truck" because Biggs did not sign the truck title; William did. Appellant also said that he believed the signature on the truck title was not good, and thus the title did not pass. After Hudson indicated he was about to execute a search warrant, appellant indicated that someone would come to the trailer home location to unlock the gate. Five minutes later, Biggs arrived, unlocked the gate, and handed Hudson a spare key to the truck. Subsequently, Hudson swore out a warrant for appellant's arrest. Appellant was indicted for grand larceny of a motor vehicle, the property of Mitchem, in violation of Code § 18.2-95.
At trial, Mitchem and Officer Hudson detailed the events as described. Mitchem further testified that the value of the truck was $3,500 and that he did not give appellant permission to take the truck.
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case, appellant made a motion to strike, arguing that the Commonwealth did not show that Biggs impliedly authorized William to sign the truck title nor that appellant had the requisite larcenous intent. Appellant also argued he had a "good-faith or reasonable belief" that no valid transfer of title occurred. The Commonwealth responded that Biggs impliedly authorized William to sign the truck title on her behalf and that appellant's intent was clear. Moreover, if the transfer was invalid, appellant's mistaken belief was not grounded in good faith. The trial court denied the motion.
Appellant testified in his own behalf. Appellant stated that he observed a conversation between Mitchem and William. He denied that anyone signed the truck title and maintained thatBiggs never exited the vehicle, that Biggs did not sign the truck title, and that Biggs never gave anyone else permission to sign the truck title. Further, appellant stated that Biggs and Mitchem did not even speak with one another. In appellant's version of events, he and William test-drove the Mustang, which broke down. Appellant then stated he called Mitchem to explain what had happened. Appellant claimed that he drove the truck off Mitchem's property the next day because "the deal was never made." On cross-examination, appellant acknowledged that he was a convicted felon and has been convicted of stealing.
Mitchem was recalled by the Commonwealth; he strongly disputed appellant's version of events and once again described the curious circumstances of the transaction.
Appellant renewed his motion to strike in closing argument. The Commonwealth reiterated its response to appellant's first motion to strike.
The trial court found that Mitchem was a credible witness and declared that this was a "successfully completed" transaction. The trial court discredited appellant's testimony, stating that his testimony made "absolutely no sense." The trial court found Biggs impliedly authorized William to sign the truck title pursuant to the doctrine of "amanuensis."1 The trial court supported this determination with the following facts: Biggs was present during the transaction—she stood five feet away, appellant and Biggs test-drove the vehicle, and appellant told Mitchem he wanted the vehicle. The trial court inferred that Biggs "was there within earshot and that she heard" appellant "expressly [telling] . . . Mitchem that he wanted the vehicle." Further, Biggs did not disagree with or object to William signing the truck title. The trial court also found that it "can and does infer that at the time [appellant] took the [truck], that he did so with the intent to deprive [] Mitchem of his property permanently." The trial courtsupported that determination with the following facts: appellant did not call Mitchem before taking the truck, and appellant "simply had a case of buyer's remorse and decided that he had gotten the raw end of the deal." Appellant took the truck "knowing full well that the deal had been consummated . . . and that the truck . . . belonged to [] Mitchem."
The trial court found appellant guilty and convicted him of grand larceny of a motor vehicle. Appellant was sentenced to ten years' incarceration with eight years suspended.
Now comes this appeal.
"In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 'we presume the judgment of the trial court to be correct, and will not set it aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Marsh v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 654, 650, 704 S.E.2d 624, 627 (2011) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 96, 99, 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002)). "The reviewing court, under this standard, does not 'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (emphasis and citation omitted)). "Instead, the reviewing court asks whether 'any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319) (emphasis omitted). "This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Baylor v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 82, 87, 683 S.E.2d 843, 845 (2009) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).
Appellant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction of grand larceny of a motor vehicle rests on his belief that the trial court erred in determining that Biggs impliedly authorized William to sign title to the truck. Absent that authority, according toappellant, title to the truck did not pass; thus, appellant could not have committed grand larceny of a motor vehicle when he took the truck from Mitchem. We disagree with appellant's contention.
Carter v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 100, 104-05, 694 S.E.2d 590, 593 (2010) (en banc) (quoting Skeeter...
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