Dotson v. Mountain Mission School, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 June 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 79-0125-B.
• Citation: 590 F. Supp. 583
• Parties: Johnny J. DOTSON and Daniel F. Bloch, Plaintiffs, v. The MOUNTAIN MISSION SCHOOL, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

590 F. Supp. 583

Johnny J. DOTSON and Daniel F. Bloch, Plaintiffs, v. The MOUNTAIN MISSION SCHOOL, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 79-0125-B.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Big Stone Gap Division.

June 21, 1984.

Johnny J. Dotson and Daniel F. Bloch pro se.

Linwood T. Wells, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va., E.K. Street, Grundy, Va., Birg E. Sergent, Pennington Gap, Va., Wade Massie, Abingdon, Va., L.T. Haynes, Roanoke, Va., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GLEN M. WILLIAMS, District Judge.

On January 26, 1974, James M. Swiney appeared before Carl Boyd, a justice of the peace of Buchanan County, Virginia, and under oath, accused the plaintiff Bloch of abducting Robert Watts, an infant of the age of thirteen years, from The Mountain Mission School, Grundy, Virginia. On May 29, 1975, Bloch was indicted by a grand jury and entered a plea of guilty to the charge of abduction. Bloch subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court: Because of the petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies, the court dismissed the petition on September 19, 1979. He then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia which, in turn, denied the petition. Bloch again filed a habeas corpus petition in this court, and again this court denied his petition on April 1, 1982; Bloch v. Grissom, et al., Civil Action Number 81-0217-B (Western District of Virginia). The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the decision by an Order entered on September 30, 1982; Bloch v. Grissom, et al., 691 F.2d 492 (4th Cir.1982).

Based on Bloch's own admissions, the underlying facts leading up to Bloch's arrest on the foregoing charges are that prior to these events, he had been charged with sexual molestation of minor boys (whose ages ranged from eleven to thirteen years) in Dayton, Ohio, in Ross County, Ohio, and in Clearwater, Florida. At the time the children were taken from The Mountain Mission School, Bloch approached the boys from under a porch as they were returning from breakfast to the boys' dormitory at about 7:15 a.m. It was dark and raining. After talking to the boys, he took them from Virginia to Beckley, West Virginia, in a rented car. From that point, he put them in his own airplane and transported them to Clearwater, Florida. Subsequently, Bloch was arrested with the two boys under both Federal and state warrants and taken before United States Magistrate Roger J. Makeley in Ohio who then returned the custody of the children back to The Mountain Mission School and returned Bloch to Virginia for trial. After serving four months of a ten-year sentence, Bloch has devoted his time to filing suits in his own behalf and on behalf of other children at The Mountain Mission School against the School and anyone connected with his arrests, trial, and conviction in Buchanan County, Virginia.

Bloch contends that Judge Persin conspired with Mr. Sublett, President of The Mountain Mission School, to intimidate him from testifying in state court proceedings in California and in Ohio; that defendant Williams, Commonwealth's Attorney of Buchanan County, Virginia, conspired with Mr. Sublett to send one Edith Justus to Ohio to murder him; that defendant McGlothlin, a member of the Virginia Legislature, conspired with Williams and Sublett to frame him in his trial in Buchanan County, Virginia; that defendant Osborne conspired with Sublett to have the plaintiff assaulted in jail by prisoners; that his two attorneys, Sawyer and Sergent, who were employed by him, obstructed justice and hindered him from testifying freely, fully and truthfully in court; and that Roger J. Makeley denied his constitutional rights to the full faith and credit of court orders guaranteed by Article IV of the United States Constitution by intimidating Robert Watts and Johnny Dotson from testifying freely, fully and truthfully. He alleges that The Mountain Mission School was an orphanage and that children were illegally abused and that he has been the subject of harm by the defendants in an effort to cover up the abuses. He specifically alleges that Dr. McDonald and the defendants Sublett and Swiney are abusing the children at the School.

This suit was brought against The Mountain Mission School and forty-two individuals, including officials of the United States, Virginia, Ohio, and Florida. This original suit contained allegations seeking a writ of mandamus, an injunction under the freedom of information act, habeas corpus relief, declaration of unconstitutionality of Virginia laws pertaining to child care institutions, and conspiracy, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

In a decision dated October 18, 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 692 F.2d 752, dismissed all of the complaints of the plaintiffs except that the court stated "given that pro se pleadings must be read liberally, we think that the plaintiffs must be afforded the opportunity to decide a claim under both halves of Section 1985(2) and under Section 1985(3) on remand in the District Court."

This case has been the subject of extensive discovery and is replete with affidavits and counteraffidavits. All parties have now moved the court for summary judgment assessing various reasons. The court now turns its attention to the legal and factual issues presented by these motions for summary judgment.

THE LAW AND THE RULINGS OF THE COURT

The purpose of the statutory provision now codified as § 1985 of Title 42 of the United States Code¹ and originally enacted as § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (and known as the Ku Klux Klan Act) was to outlaw five broad classes of conspiratorial activity. More specifically, § 1985(1), the first part of § 1985(2), and the second part of § 1985(3) proscribe conspiracies that interfere with and are related to institutions and processes of the federal government:

The statutory provisions dealing with these categories of conspiratorial activity contain no language requiring that the conspirators act with the intent to deprive their victims of the equal protection of the laws.

Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724-25, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 1487, 75 L.Ed.2d 413, 418 (1983).

On the other hand, the second part of § 1985(2) and the first part of § 1985(3) proscribe conspiracies that institutionally are not related to federal interests and usually are of primary state concerns:

Each of these portions of the statute contains language requiring that the conspirators' actions be motivated by an intent to deprive their victims of the equal protection of the laws.

460 U.S. at 725, 103 S.Ct. at 1487.

The United States Supreme Court adopted the "accurate and persuasive " discussion of the legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 presented in McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615-617 (D.C.Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983, 101 S.Ct. 2314, 68 L.Ed.2d 839 (1981). Kush, 460 U.S. at 727, n. 10, 103 S.Ct. at 1488 n. 10. Thus, the Court's opinion resolved the previous controversy among the circuits concerning the construction of § 1985(2).² Compare Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1454-1455 (9th Cir.1981) (class-based, invidious discrimination is not required under the first part of § 1985(2)), aff'd sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 74 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983), McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d at 614-617 (same), and Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 840 (3d Cir.1976) (same), with Kimble v. McDuffy, Inc., 648 F.2d 340, 345-347 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (class-based discrimination is required), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110, 102 S.Ct. 687, 70 L.Ed.2d 651 (1981) and Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir.1976) (same).

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on certain grounds and remanded this case with the following directions to the district court:

The factual allegations in the complaint do not implicate § 1985(1) and do implicate the second half of § 1985(2) and § 1985(3)....

Given that pro se pleadings must be read liberally, we think that the plaintiffs must be afforded the opportunity to develop a claim under both halves of § 1985(2) and under § 1985(3) on remand in the district court if the other prerequisites for a suit under these provisions are present.

. . . . .

The complaint clearly alleges that the conspiracy was motivated in part by animus against orphans, and we think that that is enough to invoke the portions of § 1985 that require class-based animus....

Johnny J. Dotson and Daniel F. Bloch v. The Mountain Mission School, et al. at 11-12, 14. (Emphasis in the original). In a separate opinion, the court will state its decision concerning the allegations which apply to the first half of § 1985(2); it now considers whether the plaintiffs' cause of action can lie under the second half of § 1985(2) and under § 1985(3).

After a careful review of the law applicable to this case, the court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs do not satisfy the requisite element of a racial or class-based animus. Thus, the private conspiratorial actions alleged against orphans are not the kind of conduct that triggers the proscription of § 1985.

The court's decision is based on two grounds. First, a group of orphans does not possess "common characteristics of an inherent nature" and such a group is not afforded special protection under the equal protection clause. Kimble v. McDuffy, Inc., 445 F.Supp. 269, 273 (E.D.La.1978), aff'd 648 F.2d 340, 347 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110, 102 S.Ct. 687, 70 L.Ed.2d 651 (1981). Second, even if one assumed arguendo that orphans should constitute a class, animus directed against them would be motivated by an economic status rather than by a political or racial status:³ The United States Supreme Court recently held, however, that "§ 1985(3) does not reach conspiracies motivated by economic or commercial animus." United Brotherhood of Carpenters v....