Dotson v. United States

• Citation: 30 F.4th 1259
• Decision Date: 12 April 2022
• Docket Number: 21-10401
• Parties: Robert Wayne DOTSON, Francine Maria Digiorgio, Olena Dotson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, U.S. Postal Service, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

30 F.4th 1259

Robert Wayne DOTSON, Francine Maria Digiorgio, Olena Dotson, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.UNITED STATES of America, U.S. Postal Service, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 21-10401

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Filed: April 12, 2022

Lagoa, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Robert Dotson, Olena Dotson, and Francine Digiorgio appeal the district court's order granting summary judgment for the United States on their negligence claims. Below, the district court determined that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), Plaintiffs’ action was untimely because more than six months had passed between the United States Postal Service sending a certified letter denying their administrative claims and the filing of their complaint in this case. The district court further found that Plaintiffs had failed to show entitlement to equitable tolling of the limitations period.

This appeal requires us to determine whether the USPS's final denial letter sent to Plaintiffs’ counsel of record in the administrative proceeding complied with the plain language of 39 C.F.R. § 912.9(a) after suit had been filed by a different counsel in federal district court. Plaintiffs assert that the regulation instead required the USPS to send the final denial letter to their counsel in this case—even though Plaintiffs had not notified the USPS of any change in counsel in the administrative proceedings. Plaintiffs also contend that they demonstrated entitlement to equitable tolling. For the reasons discussed below, and with the benefit of oral argument, we hold that the USPS complied with the plain language of § 912.9(a) by sending the denial letter to the legal representative most recently identified to the USPS as representing Plaintiffs for purposes of their administrative claims. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment as Plaintiffs’ FTCA claims are untimely under § 2401(b) because they were filed more than six months after the mailing of the denial letter.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On April 30, 2016, Plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident involving a vehicle operated by Sandra Delgado, a USPS employee, in Hillsborough County, Florida. On February 16, 2017, Plaintiffs each submitted a USPS Standard Form 95 "claim for damage, injury, or death" suffered in that accident. On that date, Plaintiffs were represented by the law firm of Rywant, Alvarez, Jones, Russo & Guyton, P.A. (the "Rywant firm"), which submitted the executed claim forms on behalf of Plaintiffs. On March 16, 2018, the USPS received notice from the Pawlowski Mastrilli Law Group (the "Pawlowski firm") indicating that it was now representing Plaintiffs, not the Rywant firm.

On September 27, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Federal Tort Claims Act action against the government and Delgado in the Middle District of Florida, in case number 8:18-cv-2388-T-23TGW (the "first FTCA action"). On October 16, 2018, a copy of the complaint and summons in the first FTCA action was delivered to the government at the United States Attorney's Office in Tampa, Florida. T. Patton Youngblood, Jr., and the Youngblood Law Firm (collectively, "Youngblood") filed the first FTCA action complaint on behalf of Plaintiffs, and Youngblood was the only attorney representing Plaintiffs in that action. Youngblood, however, never represented Plaintiffs in relation to the filing of their administrative claims.

On October 22, 2018, the USPS mailed a certified letter denying Plaintiffs’ administrative claims to the Pawlowski firm, which received the letter three days later. The denial letter explained that under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) and 39 C.F.R. § 912.9(a), "if dissatisfied with [USPS's] final denial of [the] administration claim[s], ... any suit filed in regards to this denial must be filed no later than six (6) months from the date of the mailing of this letter." Plaintiffs therefore had until April 22, 2019, to file their suit against the government.

At some point before the USPS mailed the denial letter, the Pawlowski firm stopped representing the Plaintiff in the administrative proceedings. Unlike the earlier change in counsel involving the Rywant firm, however, neither the Pawlowski firm nor Youngblood had provided the USPS of notice of any change in representation in relation to Plaintiffs’ administrative claims.

On March 14, 2019, the first FTCA action was dismissed without prejudice under a Middle District of Florida local rule because Plaintiffs failed to move for a clerk's default within sixty days after serving the government and Delgado. This dismissal thus occurred more than a month before the expiration of the six-month limitation period referenced in the denial letter.

The next day, Youngblood spoke with David Sullivan, an Assistant U.S. Attorney who was counsel for the government. According to Youngblood, Sullivan advised him that if he "were to forward reasonable updated demands to him that all three Plaintiffs’ claims could possibly be settled." Youngblood proceeded to update all of Plaintiffs’ medical records and bills to submit to Sullivan, but he faced delays in obtaining updated records and bills from hospitals. Youngblood finally sent written demand letters with updated records and bills on behalf of Plaintiffs to Sullivan on August 7, 2019. Shortly after, Sullivan advised Youngblood that Plaintiffs needed to file suit before the government could engage in any negotiations on their claims.

On August 30, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their second FTCA complaint, in which each Plaintiff asserted a negligence claim based on Delgado's operation of the vehicle that rear-ended their vehicle. On January 13, 2020, following a meeting between Youngblood and Sullivan to prepare the case management report, Sullivan emailed the denial letter to Youngblood. This was the first time Youngblood ever saw the denial letter.

On March 4, 2020, the government moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims were time barred under § 2401(b) because the USPS mailed the denial letter on October 22, 2018, and Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until more than six months after the mailing of the letter. The government further argued that Plaintiffs’ first FTCA action, which was filed within the statute of limitations, did not cure their current complaint's untimeliness, as the first FTC action was dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiffs opposed the government's summary judgment motion, contending that the USPS violated § 2401(b) and the regulations interpreting that statute by not sending the denial letter to Youngblood. Plaintiffs claimed that the government was on notice that Youngblood was the only attorney representing them at the time of the denial letter because Youngblood was the only attorney of record listed on the first FTCA action. Plaintiffs also argued that, because the denial letter was sent after the first FTCA action was filed, its directive was a "moot issue," and the dismissal of the first FTCA action required the government to send another denial letter to Youngblood.

In support of their opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiffs provided an affidavit from Youngblood. Youngblood attested that there was "no written referral, or other, agreement" between him and the Pawlowski firm by which the Pawlowski firm "would remain on as counsel for Plaintiffs" and that he "assumed complete and sole responsibility for all aspects of representation of the Plaintiffs" beginning in May 2018 after the Pawlowski firm referred the case to him. Youngblood also attested that the Pawlowski firm never brought the existence of the denial letter to his attention and that he was aware of the legal implications of such a letter. But there is no record evidence that Youngblood informed Sullivan that he had taken over Plaintiffs’ representation in the administrative proceedings at any time prior to receiving a copy of the denial letter from Sullivan.

On November 4, 2020, the district court held a hearing on the government's summary judgment motion. During the hearing, Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to equitable tolling, and the district court ordered supplemental briefing on the matter. On December 18, 2020, the district court granted the government's summary judgment motion, finding that the action was untimely and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to equitable tolling. This appeal ensued.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, "viewing all evidence and any reasonable inferences that might be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." McCullough v. United States , 607 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rine v. Imagitas, Inc. , 590 F.3d 1215, 1222 (11th Cir. 2009) ). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Questions of statutory and regulatory interpretation are legal issues we review de novo. Freixa v. Prestige Cruise Servs., LLC , 853 F.3d 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 2017). And the district court's interpretation and application of the statute of limitations is a legal issue that we review de novo. McCullough , 607 F.3d at 1358.

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the government failed to comply with the plain language of 39 C.F.R. § 912.9(a) when the USPS sent the denial letter to the Pawlowski firm, their former counsel, instead of Youngblood, their current counsel. They also contend that the district court erred in finding they were not entitled to equitable tolling of § 2401(b) ’s six-month limitations period.¹ We address these arguments in turn.

A. Whether the government's mailing of the denial letter complied with 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) and 39 C.F.R. § 912.9(a)

"It is well settled that sovereign immunity bars suit against the United States except to the extent that it consents to be sued" and that "statutory waivers of sovereign immunity ‘are to be...