Doty v. Martin

• Decision Date: 19 October 1875
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Edwin Doty v. Patrick Martin

32 Mich. 462

Edwin Doty v. Patrick Martin

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 19, 1875

Heard October 6, 1875

Appeal in Chancery from Clinton Circuit.

Decree of the Court affirmed, with costs.

R Strickland, for complainant.

Walbridge & Cook, for defendant.

OPINION

Marston, J.:

The bill in this case was filed to restrain the defendant from practicing his profession of physician and surgeon at Maple Rapids and vicinity contrary to the terms of an oral agreement alleged to have been entered into between the complainant and defendant in August, 1872.

Complainant in his bill alleges, that he is a physician and surgeon, and that about the eighth day of August, 1872, he entered into an agreement with the defendant, who was then a resident and engaged in the practice of medicine and surgery at Maple Rapids, whereby the defendant, in consideration of the sum of three thousand dollars, agreed to convey a certain house and piece of land to complainant, and also his practice as such physician and surgeon, and further agreed that he, the defendant, would not thereafter practice his said profession in Maple Rapids, or in that vicinity; that complainant, after entering into this agreement, removed to Maple Rapids, and immediately commenced the practice of medicine at that place and has ever since, and still continues in such practice; that upon moving to Maple Rapids, the defendant went with him to visit and introduce him to his patients; that the defendant, in pursuance of this agreement, quit his practice at that place, and soon after removed from the state of Michigan; that he has since returned and gone into practice again, and asserts and declares he will follow his business and profession in Maple Rapids and vicinity.

The defendant in his answer admits, that complainant purchased the house and land referred to, which he alleges were owned by Elvira Terwilleger; that he (the defendant) negotiated the sale thereof to the complainant, with the knowledge and consent of Mrs. Terwilleger, for the sum of three thousand dollars, and that on the 5th of August, 1872, Mrs. Terwilleger executed and delivered to complainant a warranty deed of the premises, in consideration of the sum mentioned, a part of which was paid by an assignment of certain mortgages to Mrs. Terwilleger, and by the execution and delivery to her of certain notes secured by mortgage for the balance.

The defendant further admits that prior to this purchase of the real estate, he endeavored to sell to complainant his practice, for the sum of one thousand dollars; that he informed complainant he intended to leave Maple Rapids, but that complainant refused to purchase his practice; and he denies that he ever sold his practice to complainant, or agreed with him not to return to, and continue his practice, should he at any time deem it proper to do so.

We have carefully examined the evidence in this case, from which it clearly appears that the defendant originally purchased the lots which were conveyed to complainant, and took the contract in his own name for the same, and that a portion, at least, of his means and labor went into and was used in the erection of the building situate thereon; that he afterwards made certain improvements in and around the house; that defendant's wife is the adopted daughter of Mrs. Terwilleger, and that this property was, some time in 1872, conveyed to Mrs. Terwilleger; and defendant testifies that the consideration for this conveyance was money and means supplied him by Mrs. Terwillinger and her husband during his course of studies, on condition that if he was ever able he should refund the same. The amount of money thus advanced to defendant does not appear very clearly, but it was somewhere in the neighborhood of one thousand dollars.

It is also beyond dispute, that defendant in conversation spoke of and treated this property as though it belonged to him; that he tried to sell it and his practice, asking three thousand dollars for the premises and one thousand dollars for his practice, and that he refused to sell the premises unless he sold his practice also. He testifies that he had a conversation with complainant about the sale of the premises and of his practice; that he told complainant he was going away. He says: "I stated to him (the complainant) that I was going away, sure; that I had bought a patent-right; that I wanted some good man to take my place. I told him that I wanted to sell my property if I could sell my practice; that I wanted a thousand dollars for my practice and position. * * * I told him I wanted three thousand dollars for my place and a thousand dollars for my practice." The direct evidence in this case establishes the fact to our satisfaction, that an agreement was entered into between the complainant and defendant by which the latter agreed to sell his premises and practice to complainant for the sum of three thousand dollars. To present all the facts here which lead us to this conclusion would render this opinion unreasonably long, and would be of no use or benefit to any except the parties directly interested.

The surrounding circumstances all point to the same conclusion, and would seem to place the fact of such an agreement having been entered into beyond dispute.

It is very certain that the house and lots were not worth more than two thousand dollars. Why, then, should complainant agree to pay three thousand? If he intended or desired to settle in Maple Rapids, he could doubtless have purchased other property at a fair valuation. The defendant had informed him that he (the defendant) was going to leave Maple Rapids at all events, and engage in the patent-right business, so there could be no inducement or reason for his giving defendant one thousand dollars more than the premises were worth in order that defendant might do that which he had already announced his determination to do. Defendant had repeatedly declared that he would not sell the premises unless he sold his practice, which he valued at one thousand dollars, at the same time, and we fail to find any good reason why, in dealing with complainant, he should have abandoned this his intention, and sold the premises without his practice. The consideration of three thousand dollars would be the fair value of the premises and practice, whereas, for the premises alone it would be an exhorbitant price, and one not likely to be paid under the...