Doty v. Mucci

Citation238 Conn. 800,679 A.2d 945
Decision Date13 August 1996
Docket NumberNo. 15380,15380
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
PartiesMatthew W. DOTY et al. v. Steve MUCCI.

Lori Welch-Rubin, New Haven, with whom was Joseph R. Mirrione, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Mark A. Milano, West Haven, for appellee (defendant).

Before CALLAHAN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

NORCOTT, Justice.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that the claim filed by the plaintiffs, Matthew W. Doty and Denise Doty, for reimbursement of certain containment costs pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-452, 1 was time barred. The plaintiffs appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Steve Mucci, doing business as Steve's Oil Burning Service. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

For the purposes of this appeal, the following facts are not in dispute. On September 17, 1988, the defendant installed an oil tank at the residence of Peter Silver in Sandy Hook. On June 21, 1991, the plaintiffs purchased the property from Silver. In July, 1991, the plaintiffs discovered that the well on their property had been contaminated. On June 23, 1993, the plaintiffs filed a claim against the defendant alleging that on September 17, 1988, he had negligently installed and filled an oil tank on the property, thereby causing the discharge of 200 gallons of oil. As a result, the plaintiffs alleged that their well was contaminated with petroleum hydrocarbons. The plaintiffs further alleged that they had incurred and would continue to incur costs to "obtain or otherwise mitigate the effects of the contamination." They sought, pursuant to § 22a-452, reimbursement from the defendant of the "reasonable cost expended ... to contain, remove or otherwise mitigate the contamination." 2

In his amended answer to the plaintiffs' complaint, the defendant raised a special defense alleging that the plaintiffs' claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, namely, either General Statutes § 52-577 or General Statutes § 52-584. 3 Subsequently, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of the special defense. In support of his motion, the defendant argued that: (1) because the plaintiffs' claim sounded in negligence, it was governed by § 52-584, pursuant to which it was time barred; or (2) alternatively, the claim was governed by § 52-577, pursuant to which it was also time barred. The plaintiffs argued that the applicable statute of limitations for claims brought under § 22a-452 was General Statutes § 52-577c(b), 4 pursuant to which their claim was timely. 5

Thereafter, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The trial court did not determine which of the statutes of limitations advanced by the parties was applicable, reasoning that "[r]egardless of which statute of limitations applies to actions brought pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-452, the action [in the present case] must have been brought no later than September 17, 1991," and that the plaintiffs' claim, having been brought after that date, was time barred. The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c).

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly determined that their claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that claims brought pursuant to § 22a-452 are governed by § 52-577c(b) and that, because their claim was brought within two years of their discovery of the contamination, their claim was timely. The plaintiffs appear to concede that if their claim does not fall within § 52-577c, it is time barred under either § 52-577 or § 52-584 because the defendant's actions that form the basis of their claim occurred more than three years before their claim was brought.

The defendant offers several arguments in support of his claim that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs' claim is time barred. First, he argues that § 52-577c is not applicable to claims brought for reimbursement of containment costs pursuant to § 22a-452 because such claims do not constitute claims for "damages for ... property damage" within the meaning of § 52-577c or § 52-584 and, therefore, that § 52-577 is the applicable statute of limitations, pursuant to which the plaintiffs' claim is untimely. Alternatively, the defendant argues that, if claims for reimbursement pursuant to § 22a-452 are properly considered claims for property damage, § 52-584 is the applicable statute of limitations for such claims because they are grounded in negligence, and that the plaintiffs' claim is untimely under § 52-584. Finally the defendant argues that, even if § 52-577c applies to claims brought pursuant to § 22a-452, the plaintiffs' claim does not fall within it because § 52-577c incorporates, by reference to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.; the exclusion of petroleum from the definition of hazardous substances, and the plaintiffs' claim alleges petroleum contamination. Accordingly, he argues that the plaintiffs' claim falls within either § 52-577 or § 52-584, and that under both statutes, the claim is time barred.

On the basis of our review of the record, we agree with the defendant that, even if the plaintiffs are correct that § 52-577c applies to claims brought pursuant to § 22a-452, the plaintiffs' claim falls within the petroleum exclusion, and is therefore, outside the ambit of § 52-577c. Accordingly, their claim is time barred. 6

"The standards governing our review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment are well established. Practice Book § 384 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. United Technologies Corp., 233 Conn. 732, 744-45, 660 A.2d 810 (1995). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 745, 660 A.2d 810. "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law; D.H.R. Construction Co. v. Donnelly, 180 Conn. 430, 434, 429 A.2d 908 (1980); and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Practice Book § 381." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 105, 639 A.2d 507 (1994). Summary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. See Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 566-70, 512 A.2d 893 (1986); Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984) (summary judgment affirmed on ground that suit barred by statute of limitations).

Section 52-577c(b), by its express terms, governs actions "to recover damages for personal injury or property damage caused by exposure to a hazardous chemical substance or mixture 7 or hazardous pollutant released into the environment...." "Hazardous pollutant" is defined in the statute as "any designated, specified or referenced chemical considered to be a 'hazardous substance' under Section 101(14) of [CERCLA] 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)...." General Statutes § 52-577c(a)(4). The definition of "hazardous substance" in CERCLA provides in relevant part: "The term [hazardous substance] does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph...." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994). This provision is commonly referred to as the petroleum exclusion. Wilshire Westwood Associates v. Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir.1989).

At oral argument, the plaintiffs conceded that § 52-577c incorporates the petroleum exclusion and that, to the extent that their claim is to recover costs for containing or mitigating petroleum discharge, it falls within the statutory exclusion and outside the scope of the extended statute of limitations of § 52-577c. The plaintiffs contend, however, that contamination attributable to an oil tank "bottom," that is sludge that forms in the bottom of a tank in which oil is stored by the settling of water and suspended solids in the oil; see Cose v. Getty Oil Co., 4 F.3d 700, 702 (9th Cir.1993); does not fall within the petroleum exclusion. See id.; United States v. Western Processing Co., 761 F.Sup. 713 (W.D.Wash.1991) (oil tank bottom sludge disposed of by oil company did not come within CERCLA petroleum exclusion). They further argue that it is "possible" that the contamination of their well was due in some part to sludge that could have been released when oil was spilled by the defendant and, therefore, there exists a question of fact as to whether the exclusion for petroleum in § 52-577c(b) applies to their claim and, consequently, as to whether the claim is time barred. We disagree.

"In evaluating the propriety of a summary judgment, we are confined to an examination of the pleadings and affidavits of the parties to determine whether (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 233 Conn. at 745, 660 A.2d 810. Even if we were to assume that the petroleum...

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