Doty v. Sewall, 85-1428

• Decision Date: 10 February 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1428,85-1428
• Citation: 784 F.2d 1
• Parties: 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2649, 54 USLW 2424, 104 Lab.Cas. P 11,809 Arthur DOTY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Richard SEWALL, et al., Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 1

784 F.2d 1

121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2649, 54 USLW 2424,

104 Lab.Cas. P 11,809

Arthur DOTY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Richard SEWALL, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 85-1428.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Argued Oct. 9, 1985.

Decided Feb. 10, 1986.

Mark David Stern, with whom Law Office of Mark D. Stern, P.C., was on brief, for plaintiff, appellant.

Gabriel O. Dumont, Jr., with whom Grady, Dumont & Dwyer, was on brief, for defendants, appellees Richard Sewall, Teamsters Local No. 42 and Frank Salemme.

Alan J. McDonald, with whom McDonald and Noonan, was on brief, for defendants, appellees Teamsters Local Union No. 49, Michael Platanites and Joseph Baxter.

Before COFFIN and BREYER, Circuit Judges, HILL, ^* Senior District Judge.

COFFIN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal requires us to determine the appropriate statute of limitations applicable to a "bill of rights" action brought by a union activist against two local unions under Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 411-412.

Appellant Arthur Doty brought suit against two local affiliates of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehouse Employees and Helpers (the Teamsters), and certain officers of those organizations, charging that they improperly denied him membership in the two locals. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the action was untimely, not having been brought within six months of the accrual of the claims. The court felt compelled by DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), to apply the six month statute of limitations prescribed for the filing of unfair labor practice charges under section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b).

Two other courts of appeals have followed the same approach in LMRDA cases. Davis v. United Automobile, Aerospace and Agriculture Implement Workers of America, 765 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir.1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Dec. 3, 1985) (No. 85-844); Local 1397 v. Steelworkers, 748 F.2d 180 (3d Cir.1984). Our own scrutiny of the interests and policies at stake in this case convinces us that they so differ from those in DelCostello that its underlying approach mandates adherence in this case to the normal mode of applying "the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law." 462 U.S. at 158, 103 S.Ct. at 2287. ¹ We therefore hold that the district court erred in entering summary judgment for defendants and remand for further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant, a self-proclaimed "vocal critic" of the Teamsters and some of its locals, sought entry into Teamsters Local 49 in September of 1980, submitting an application and a $200 check to cover his initiation fee. Shortly thereafter, he received a Local 49 membership card. In December 1980, appellant was informed in a note from his union steward that Local 49 could no longer accept his dues payments. He was told to call defendant Platanites, Local 49 president, about the problem. Appellant made repeated attempts to reach Platanites, but his phone calls were not returned, and a certified letter he sent went unanswered. In its brief, Local 49 claims that the membership problem arose because appellant applied as if he were a new member of the Teamsters instead of as a transfer member from another local.

In mid-January of 1981, appellant began to work in the jurisdiction of another Teamsters local, No. 42, and he submitted an application to transfer his union membership. The form was not processed, however, because Local 49 denied that he was a member. Defendant Sewall, secretary-treasurer of Local 42, told appellant that he could not transfer into Local 42 until he cleared up his past membership status.

Appellant again made repeated attempts to contact defendant Platanites of Local 49, and finally received a letter informing him that he had never been a member of that local. Appellant also contacted another local to which he previously had belonged, No. 829, which confirmed by letter that he was still on honorable withdrawal from that local. Having established that he was a member of a Teamsters local and therefore eligible to transfer, appellant again sought confirmation of his transfer into Local 42. He wrote to defendant Sewall on July 5, 1981, but received no reply. Two weeks later, on the advice of counsel, he sent a grievance letter to Local 42, but the union took no action.

Appellant filed his lawsuit against Local 42 on July 7, 1983, alleging that he was denied membership because of his active opposition to union actions and policies. He sought declaratory relief establishing his right to membership in Local 42 and injunctive relief requiring his admission. He also sought an injunction ordering defendants to refrain from any future harassment or interference with his rights as a union member. Finally, he requested monetary damages, attorney's fees and litigation costs.

On August 31, 1983, the district court denied appellant's request for preliminary relief and suggested that appellant renew his efforts to secure a resolution of the dispute within the union. Appellant did so, and the Executive Board of Teamsters Joint Council No. 10, the regional Teamsters body, ruled in December 1983 that appellant should be allowed to transfer from Local 829 into Local 42. The Council did not grant appellant retroactive membership, however, so he appealed to the Teamsters National General Executive Board. That body ruled in April 1984 that appellant would be entitled to retroactive membership in Local 42 upon his payment of back dues from April 1981.

Meanwhile, on March 26, 1984, appellant had filed an amended complaint to add Local 49 and its officers, Baxter and Platanites, as defendants, alleging that their actions regarding his membership in Local 49 caused his membership problems with Local 42. Appellant also claimed that the actions of the Local 49 officers constituted fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Massachusetts laws.

In July 1984, after the Teamsters national board had ruled that appellant was entitled to retroactive membership in Local 42, he filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming that the only issues remaining in controversy were the determinations of monetary damages, attorney's fees and costs. Defendants opposed appellant's motion and filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

On May 1, 1985, the district court granted judgment for all defendants. It concluded that, under DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), the appropriate statute of limitations in this case was six months. Because the court found that appellant's causes of action accrued more than six months before his suit was filed, the court held that his claims were time barred.

The statute of limitations is the primary issue before this court. Because we find another statute applicable, we must remand the case to the district court for consideration of a number of matters it did not reach in its original disposition of the case. We discuss some of those matters briefly below, following our discussion of the statute of limitations.

II. SEARCH FOR A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Recognizing that we are dealing with a complex if not an esoteric set of issues involving several kinds of parties, statutes, causes of action, and periods of limitation, we propose to proceed as follows. We first describe the cast of characters, i.e., the parties and statutes dealt with in the precedents we shall examine. We then attempt to extract the relevant teachings of DelCostello. Applying these teachings to the case at bar, we look first to see if there is an analogous state statute of limitations, and then endeavor to see where the balance of opposing interests lies in this case, examining, first, the impact of solitary or free standing LMRDA suits on labor-management relationships and, second, the nature and importance of the rights secured by the LMRDA. Finally, we test the persuasiveness of what we have said against the contrary precedents.

A. The Statutes Governing Economic Rights and Civil Rights

1. Economic Rights. Of older lineage is the structure erected to protect a worker's economic rights. Those rights are secured through negotiations between a union and employer, resulting in a collective bargaining agreement. Such an agreement makes provision, through dealings between employer and union in grievance and arbitration procedures, for the private settlement of issues involving an employee's economic loss. Ordinarily the result of the dispute settlement procedures will be final, but the union member may pursue his economic rights in court if the union has failed to represent the employee fairly.

"In such an instance, an employee may bring suit against both the employer and the union, notwithstanding the outcome or finality of the grievance or arbitration proceeding. [Citations omitted.] Such a suit, as a formal matter, comprises two causes of action. The suit against the employer rests on Sec. 301 [of the Labor-Management Relations Act], since the employee is alleging a breach of the collective-bargaining agreement. The suit against the union is one for breach of the union's duty of fair representation, which is implied under the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act. [Footnote omitted.] 'Yet the two claims are inextricably interdependent. "To prevail against either the company or the Union, ... [employee-plaintiffs] must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union." ' " DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164-65, 103 S.Ct. at 2290 (citations omitted).

In DelCostello, the Supreme Court observed that this suit to vindicate an...