Doty v. State

Citation170 So.3d 731
Decision Date09 July 2015
Docket NumberNo. SC13–1257.,SC13–1257.
PartiesWayne C. DOTY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender, and William Carl McLain, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Patrick M. Delaney, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Appellee.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Wayne C. Doty, who at the time of the crime was an inmate at Florida State Prison, confessed to murdering fellow inmate Xavier Rodriguez and later pled guilty to the crime. By a vote of ten to two, the jury recommended that Doty be sentenced to death, and the trial court imposed a death sentence after carefully weighing the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances. This direct appeal of the judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death follows. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Doty sought to dismiss this appeal or limit the advocacy of his appointed appellate counsel in accordance with his stated desire to be executed. After ordering responses from the State and Doty's appellate attorney, this Court denied the motion pursuant to Klokoc v. State, 589 So.2d 219, 221–22 (Fla.1991), which held that this Court has a mandatory obligation to review all death penalty cases to ensure that the death sentence is imposed in accordance with constitutional and statutory directives—a position agreed to by both appellate counsel and the State. See also Robertson v. State, 143 So.3d 907, 910 (Fla.2014) (declining to recede from Klokoc and holding that “there is simply no reason to depart from our reliable, established, and necessary procedure for requiring current counsel to proceed with diligent appellate advocacy to facilitate our mandatory review in death penalty cases where the defendant, in effect, seeks this Court's assistance in being put to death”). Doty, however, was granted permission pursuant to our precedent in Klokoc to submit a pro se brief, expressing his personal positions and interests with regard to the appeal.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm Doty's conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence of death.

FACTS

Wayne C. Doty and William Wells were indicted for the first-degree murder of inmate Xavier Rodriguez. Following a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the trial court permitted Doty to proceed pro se, but appointed standby counsel. After Doty's and Wells' cases were severed, Doty conducted his own investigation and chose to plead guilty to the murder. He represented himself during the penalty phase, with standby counsel ready to assist.

The evidence showed that Doty was, at the time of the murder, serving a life sentence for the shooting death of his former employer. Doty was transferred to Florida State Prison (FSP) and was assigned to the “K wing,” working as a runner. Each wing at the prison had four runners, who worked in pairs and assisted in numerous duties, including distributing meals to the other prisoners and cleaning common areas. In return, the runners were given certain privileges. Doty's partner as a runner was Wells, who assisted in the murder of Rodriguez, another runner on the K wing.

Doty began planning the murder after the victim, Rodriguez, called Doty names and stole some tobacco from Doty approximately two weeks prior to the incident. In exchange for tobacco, Doty convinced another inmate to make him a knife that he could use to murder Rodriguez. On the evening of May 17, 2011, Doty obtained the homemade knife, which was hidden in a newspaper, when he assisted in picking up inmate food trays after dinner. Doty deposited the knife into a trashcan, which he later retrieved and brought to the third-floor interview room that the runners were permitted to use. Doty then placed the weapon in the duct work there so he could easily retrieve it.

That evening, Doty and Wells carefully watched when the officers made their rounds to determine the best time to kill Rodriguez. After convincing Rodriguez to meet them in the third-floor interview room, Doty and Wells tricked Rodriguez into letting them bind his hands by betting him some tobacco that he could not get out of “Coast Guard handcuffs.” After his hands were bound, Doty approached Rodriguez from behind and placed him in a rear chokehold. At first, Rodriguez thought it was a joke but, as Doty explained in his confession, “Once I really got that chokehold locked down, he knew the game was over.” After Doty felt Rodriguez “go slack,” Doty let Rodriguez's body drop to the floor, and Doty later commented that the body made a “hollow thud” as it hit the floor.

Wells ensured that nobody else entered the room, while Doty pulled the body around the desk and began to stab Rodriguez with the homemade knife. Although Doty admitted that he was hoping to pull out Rodriguez's heart “to make sure he was really dead,” the knife was too dull and did not work for that task. Doty and Wells then tied a ligature around Rodriguez's neck, smoked a cigarette, took showers, and, after they were sure that Rodriguez was really dead, called a sergeant working at the prison and confessed to the crime.

Dr. William Hamilton, the medical examiner, testified that the victim died from strangulation and multiple stab wounds. According to Dr. Hamilton, the victim likely lost consciousness within 45–50 seconds, but if the chokehold was expertly applied, the victim could have lost consciousness in as little as 10–20 seconds. Dr. Hamilton further testified that he believed the victim was still alive when he was stabbed, but was unconscious and close to death, because the victim lost a small amount of blood from the stab wounds and all of the wounds were located very close together, indicating that the victim was not moving during the stabbing.

To establish the aggravating circumstances it sought in arguing for the death penalty, the State presented evidence that Doty was convicted of a prior violent felony based on a previous first-degree murder conviction for shooting his former employer in the face during a robbery—the crime for which he was imprisoned at the time of this murder. The State then called various prison employees to whom Doty had confessed and admitted that he had been planning the murder for weeks, which supported that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). The State relied on Dr. Hamilton's testimony regarding the manner of death to urge that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). In addition, the State presented victim impact testimony.

In an attempt to establish nonstatutory mitigation, Doty called two inmates at FSP to explain why an inmate may attempt to resolve a dispute with another inmate instead of requesting prison officials handle the problem. Inmate Clinton Powers testified about prison life and how prisoners could not afford to have a reputation for being weak or vulnerable. Leo Boatman, another inmate at FSP, testified that Doty was always a respectful person, but in prison, an inmate must appear to be as tough as possible, which is quite different from regular society.

Doty then called Lieutenant Dennis Cauwenberghs, an employee at FSP who supervised the inmates and other prison guards. After a discussion with the trial court, Doty specifically chose to ask Lieutenant Cauwenberghs whether he believed that Doty would be a future threat in the prison—despite the fact that the trial court, his standby counsel, and the prosecutor all warned Doty that he should not elicit this information. Lieutenant Cauwenberghs responded by saying, “I think you've already proven that you could be a threat to other inmates,” but also acknowledged that Doty was a good worker.

Dr. Clifford Levin, a licensed psychologist, testified to establish mental health mitigation. Dr. Levin diagnosed Doty with major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and antisocial personality disorder, explaining that Doty sees things as black and white, makes poor decisions, fails to conform, can be aggressive, and shows a great deal of irritability and poor judgment. Dr. Levin testified that three main categories of nonstatutory mitigation existed: (1) Doty's adverse childhood, during which Doty was exposed to physical and emotional abuse by his father and his various stepmothers; (2) numerous untreated psychological disorders that Doty developed over the years; and (3) the failure of the social and governmental systems on a global scale to treat Doty for his disorders, from school and child protective services to the prison system.

Doty next called numerous family members, who testified regarding Doty's upbringing. Ann Hertle, his former stepmother, testified that Doty's father was physically and mentally abusive to her and that Doty witnessed this abuse. Hertle also admitted that one time, Doty tried to light the carpet on fire so she spanked Doty and then burned his fingers on the stove to teach him the dangers of playing with fire. Shelley Ann Conner, another of Doty's stepmothers, testified that Doty suffered a lot of emotional abuse as a child and was exposed to frequent instances of domestic violence, although Doty himself was not abused.

Doty's father, Randall Doty, admitted that after he returned from his military service in Vietnam, he became an alcoholic and was abusive towards women. Before Doty was two years old, Randall separated from Doty's mother and took Doty with him. Randall did not like how Doty was disciplined by some of his stepmothers and would “get into a tussle” with his former wives. Randall was also concerned when Doty was sent to an alternative school because that school had a “bad environment” that he did not believe was good for Doty.

Other testimony established that Doty had a stepbrother who died after being hit by a semi-truck—a death that Doty asserted affected him greatly. Shortly after that...

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