Doty v. State, 380S61

Decision Date08 April 1981
Docket NumberNo. 380S61,380S61
PartiesRobert DOTY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Gregory D. Ball, Wayne County Public Defender, Richmond, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Frank A. Baldwin, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DeBRULER, Justice.

Appellant, Robert Doty, was convicted following a trial by jury of the crime of murder pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1(1). He received a sentence of forty years' imprisonment. On appeal the following issues are raised:

(1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict.

(2) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit a defense witness to testify that five years before the offense alleged, appellant accidentally discharged a gun.

(3) Whether the trial court erred in permitting cross-examination of appellant beyond the scope of his direct examination.

(4) Whether the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to first present proof of motive on rebuttal.

Appellant was charged with having "knowingly" killed Willie Eaton by shooting him with a shotgun. He contends that the evidence serving to show that he had the requisite culpability at the time the gun was discharged causing the mortal wounds to Mr. Eaton was insufficient. In determining this question we do not weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility, but look to the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which support the verdict. Smith v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 401, 260 N.E.2d 558. The conviction will be affirmed if from that viewpoint there is evidence, direct or circumstantial, of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Glover v. State, (1970) 253 Ind. 536, 255 N.E.2d 657.

An examination of the evidence presented at trial from this viewpoint shows that on January 22, 1979, at about 2:00 p. m. appellant was riding alone about the city of Richmond in his auto. His path crossed that of the victim Eaton who was also driving about the city accompanied by his son, one Charles Patterson, and one other person. Eaton was driving Patterson to a television supply house to get a tube. Appellant and Eaton exchanged pleasantries. Eaton invited appellant to come to church where he was preacher. Appellant's reply was not understood by the other occupants of the Eaton car; however, it was not made in an angry or threatening manner. As the cars continued on appellant fell in behind the Eaton car and as it slowed to turn, appellant struck the rear end of it. Mr. Eaton continued driving until he stopped in front of the television supply company and let Mr. Patterson out, whereupon appellant again struck the car from behind.

According to the testimony of at least three persons present at that point on the street at that time, including that of Teresa Stone, appellant emerged from his car carrying a shotgun. He pointed it at Teresa Stone, a passerby on the sidewalk who was carrying her two year old child and told her to stand still and not move. He then told Patterson as he was entering the supply house not to call the police. He then opened the driver's door of the Eaton car with his left hand and pointed the shotgun at Mr. Eaton who was behind the wheel saying, "Get your fat ass out of that car, you have fucked up." He then asked Eaton whether he was scared to which Eaton replied, "Yes", whereupon appellant shot him at point blank range, inflicting a wound in the abdomen from which he soon bled to death.

Appellant then walked back to his car, threw the gun in the front seat, got in, and drove off.

Appellant then drove to a nearby lounge, where he induced his uncle to get in the car, and held the shotgun on him while they drove off. As appellant drove along he almost struck another car, and his uncle yelled at him, and then in the excitement of the moment grabbed the gun away from appellant. The gun was loaded with five shells. Appellant then drove his uncle's home. The gun belonged to the uncle who had loaned it to appellant for hunting rabbits. Appellant said, "I blowed two away and you're next." When his uncle got out of the car, appellant said, "Take the gun and go on and I hope you get caught with it."

The uncle also testified that he had been hunting with appellant two or three times and that appellant knew how to handle firearms in a safe manner. When he recovered the gun from appellant in the car, it had the safety on.

Appellant was charged with having the "knowing" state of mind, which is defined by statute in the following manner:

"(b) A person engages in conduct 'knowingly' if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so." Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2.

Appellant testified in his own defense that he intended to give Eaton the shotgun so that he could return it to his uncle, and that in presenting Eaton with the gun, it accidently discharged causing the mortal wounds to Eaton. He also testified that he had unloaded the gun and thought that it was still unloaded, although admitting that he had been reckless in failing to check that out before giving it to Eaton. It is upon this testimony which appellant urges is uncontradicted and corroborated that he rests his claim that the evidence of culpability was insufficient. This was direct proof presented under oath by appellant which along with corroborative matters could have been accepted by the trier of fact at face value. However, it does not stand uncontradicted, as it is directly opposed by the inference arising from the proof presented by the State that appellant, knowing the gun to be loaded, took it from his car for the purpose of using it to kill Eaton. This opposing inference arises from the proof of his angry threats against bystanders and Eaton and the manner in which he aimed it at the person of Eaton and then discharged it. It was for the jury to choose which of these two versions of appellant's state of mind at the time of the shooting it would credit.

The question before this Court is not whether the jury could reasonably have...

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4 cases
  • Bryan v. State, 1181S327
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • June 28, 1983
    ...time of the occurrence of an incident is a basis for exclusion of evidence regarding the incident on grounds of relevancy. Doty v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 653; Stacks v. State, (1978) 175 Ind.App. 525, 372 N.E.2d 1201. Appellant argues remoteness in time, however, is ordinarily a con......
  • Wells v. State, 282S63
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • November 12, 1982
    ...has been stated many times by this Court. On appeal we do not reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Doty v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 653. Where the evidence is all circumstantial we do not have to find the evidence is adequate to overcome every reasonable hypoth......
  • Oates v. State, 181S8
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • January 13, 1982
    ...105. was knowing or intentional as those terms are defined in Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2 (Burns 1979), which we cannot do. Doty v. State (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 653, 655. Mrs. Washington testified that her daughter had been living with Defendant but had terminated the relationship on March 17, 19......
  • English v. State, 48S00-8907-CR-519
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • July 25, 1991
    ...conveyed to a third person are admissible to show intent. Drollinger v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 5, 408 N.E.2d 1228. In Doty v. State (1981), Ind., 422 N.E.2d 653, this Court held that threats which had been made two months prior to the attack were not too remote. The trial court did not err ......

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