Double Lion Uchet Express Tr. v. United States

• Decision Date: 31 July 2020
• Docket Number: No. 20-577C,20-577C
• Parties: DOUBLE LION UCHET EXPRESS TRUST et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

DOUBLE LION UCHET EXPRESS TRUST et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.

No. 20-577C

United States Court of Federal Claims

July 31, 2020

Pro Se Plaintiffs; Motion to Dismiss; Subject Matter Jurisdiction; RCFC 12(b)(1); In Forma Pauperis

Ra Nu Ra Khuti Amen Bey and Delma Andrews-Powley, Tampa, FL, pro se.

Sosun Bae, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

SWEENEY, Chief Judge

Plaintiffs Double Lion Uchet Express Trust ("Double Lion"), Ra Nu Ra Khuti Amen Bey,¹ and Delma Andrews-Powley,² proceeding pro se in this matter, allege that a bank unlawfully foreclosed on their property.³ As a result, plaintiffs assert that they have suffered a number of "negligence tort[s]; intentional tort[s]; and strict liability tort[s]." Compl. 8. Plaintiffs have also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a "Motion / Affidavit for Adverse Judgment" ("motion for judgment"). Currently before the court is defendant's motion to dismissfor lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC"). As explained below, the court grants defendant's motion, denies plaintiffs' motion for judgment, and denies plaintiffs' application to proceed in forma pauperis.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs state that they have suffered injuries under a long list of legal authorities, including the United States Constitution; the 1787 Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the United States of America, and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Morocco ("Treaty of Peace and Friendship"); the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"); the Administrative Procedure Act; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985-1986;⁴ 18 U.S.C. § 241;⁵ and Executive Order 13,818.⁶ The specific injuries plaintiffs allege, and how those injuries relate to these sources of law, are less clear. In short, plaintiffs assert that a bank foreclosure of their property was unlawful. Following a lengthy discussion of previous litigation related to the foreclosure of their property, plaintiffs indicate that they seek "reversal of the state and district court." Compl. 41; see also id. at 76-252 (providing copies of orders, filings, and docketing information related to proceedings in other courts). As a result of this unlawful foreclosure, plaintiffs claim that they have suffered a number of negligent, intentional, and strict-liability torts, as well as civil rights violations such as denial of due process. The complaint lists a wide variety of entities as "defendants," including private individuals, state court judges, federal district court judges, federal bankruptcy court judges, and officers of various banks and loan servicing entities.

In addition, throughout their complaint, plaintiffs make vague allusions to concepts associated with Moorish sovereign citizens or similar movements. They assert, for instance:

As living physical biological, sentient beings we are real and we exist on as aspects of existence. The system, on the other hand, is an abstract creation of the mind. As investors in the bankrupt corporation called the United States, as well as the USA, the parent corporation, we, as real people, are the true creditors and source of wealth, as such, we are exempt from taxation from the public side. We are not contractually amalgamated nor are our ens-legis' amalgamated into the court's jurisdiction.

Id. at 40; see also id. at 51-52 (asserting that "[i]n the context of International law the Washitaw has established itself as a sovereign independent nation"), 55 (using the heading "THE MOORISH NATIONAL REPUBLIC" and "THE MOORISH DIVINE AND NATIONAL MOVEMENT OF AMERICA"), 346 (asserting that "Muurs cannot be indigent, insolvent nor UNITED STATES CITIZENS"). Taken together, these features suggest an effort by plaintiffs to associate themselves with the movement and its legal tenets. See generally Bey v. State, 847 F.3d 559, 560-61 (7th Cir. 2017) (extensively chronicling the historical heritage and legal efforts of the movement). It is not immediately clear how these concepts relate to the relief plaintiffs seek.

Plaintiffs also indicate that this matter is directly related to Amen Bey v. United States, which was dismissed for failure to prosecute. No. 17-617C, slip op. (Fed. Cl. Oct. 30, 2017). Mr. Bey was the lone plaintiff in that matter, but plaintiffs do not explain the relationship between the two cases.

On June 9, 2020, plaintiffs followed up their complaint with a motion for judgment, in which they allege that defendant failed to respond to the complaint in a timely manner and that judgment should therefore be entered in their favor. Defendant filed a response to this filing, along with a motion to dismiss, on June 22, 2020. After correctly noting that it had responded to plaintiffs' complaint well before the expiration of the sixty days allotted for the purpose by RCFC 12(a)(1)(A), defendant urges the court to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on a number of independent grounds. Plaintiffs did not file a response to defendant's motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Pro Se Plaintiffs

Pro se pleadings are "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and are "to be liberally construed." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, the "leniency afforded to a pro se litigant with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements." Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007); accord Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The fact that [the plaintiff] acted pro se in the drafting of his complaint may explain its ambiguities, but it does not excuse its failures, if such there be."). In other words, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from his burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the court possesses jurisdiction. See Banks v. United States, 741 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Whether the court possesses jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case is a "threshold matter." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited because it "involves a court's power to hear a case."United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506, 514 (1868). Therefore, it is "an inflexible threshold matter that must be considered before proceeding to evaluate the merits of a case." Matthews v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 274, 278 (2006); accord K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 778 F.3d 1000, 1004-05 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Either party, or the court sua sponte, may challenge the court's subject matter jurisdiction at any time. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); see also Jeun v. United States, 128 Fed. Cl. 203, 209-10 (2016) (collecting cases).

In determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, the court generally "must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiff's complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). With respect to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the court possesses subject matter jurisdiction. Id. If the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, RCFC 12(h)(3) requires the court to dismiss that claim.

C. The Tucker Act

The ability of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("Court of Federal Claims") to entertain suits against the United States is limited. "The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). The waiver of immunity "may not be inferred, but must be unequivocally expressed." United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Tucker Act, the principal statute governing the jurisdiction of this court, waives sovereign immunity for claims against the United States, not sounding in tort, that are founded upon the United States Constitution, a federal statute or regulation, or an express or implied contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2018); White Mountain, 537 U.S. at 472. However, the Tucker Act is merely a jurisdictional statute and "does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages." United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). Instead, the substantive right must appear in another source of law, such as a "money-mandating constitutional provision, statute, or regulation, the violation of which supports a claim for damages against the United States." James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs' meandering complaint makes a wide variety of allegations, against a wide variety of parties. The court, however, can find no basis on which to exercise jurisdiction over any of them.

A. The United States Is the Only Proper Defendant in the Court of Federal Claims

The long list of defendants identified in plaintiffs' complaint presents a critical jurisdictional flaw: in the Court of Federal Claims, "the only proper defendant . . . is the United States, not its officers, nor any other individual." Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003); accord RCFC 10(a). Because "the United States itself" is the only...