Doucette v. State

• Decision Date: 30 May 2008
• Docket Number: CR-06-1712.
• Citation: 10 So.3d 117
• Parties: Ronald Slater DOUCETTE v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

10 So.3d 117

Ronald Slater DOUCETTE v. STATE of Alabama.

CR-06-1712.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

May 30, 2008.

Rehearing Denied August 22, 2008.

Talitha Powers Bailey, Birminghan, for appellant.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Michael G. Dean, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Ronald Slater Doucette, pleaded guilty to possession of a precursor substance with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a violation of § 13A-12-217, Ala.Code 1975; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a violation of § 13A-12-260, Ala.Code 1975. Doucette was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for his conviction of possession of a precursor substance. That sentence was suspended, and Doucette was placed on five years' probation. He was sentenced to 12 months in jail for his conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia. That sentence was also suspended.

Doucette specifically reserved his right to appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his car.

The evidence presented at the hearing on Doucette's motion to suppress was not disputed. "This Court reviews de novo a circuit court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence when the facts are not in dispute." State v. Skaggs, 903 So.2d 180, 181 (Ala.Crim.App.2004). "A trial court's ultimate legal conclusion on a motion to suppress based on a given set of facts is a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal." State v. Hargett, 935 So.2d 1200, 1204 (Ala.Crim.App.2005).

At the suppression hearing, Deputy Aarion Powell of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department testified that on the night of November 6, 2004, he was dispatched to a neighborhood in Bessemer to investigate a complaint of criminal mischief. A witness had reported that a person or persons in a red vehicle had knocked over four mailboxes in her neighborhood, including her mailbox. Deputy Powell went to the scene and met the witness outside her house. The witness identified a house in the neighborhood where the red vehicle had stopped. However, the red vehicle was gone by the time Deputy Powell arrived in the neighborhood.

For several minutes Deputy Powell patrolled the neighborhood looking for the red vehicle. While Deputy Powell was still in the neighborhood the witness telephoned the sheriff's department again and reported that a brown Ford Taurus automobile was now at the house where she had previously seen the red vehicle stop. She also said that two white males were loading brown bags into the trunk of the Taurus.

Deputy Powell further testified that as he returned to the area he passed a Taurus; the occupants were two white males. He turned around to follow the Taurus, and it was parked at a nearby gasoline service station. Deputy Powell said that he drove into the service station with the intent to identify the people in the Taurus in connection with his investigation into who had knocked over the mailboxes. He said that he drove up behind the parked Taurus and activated his lights when he saw that the driver was putting the car in reverse. He said that he wanted to ensure that the driver saw him. Deputy Powell testified twice that the driver, later identified as Doucette, voluntarily got out of the vehicle with his hands raised before Deputy Powell could get out of his patrol car. Deputy Powell did say once that he told the "driver" to exit the vehicle; however, after reading his entire testimony it appears that he was referring to the passenger. The passenger appeared to be intoxicated, Deputy Powell said, or "on some type of drugs," and Doucette had a "little smell of alcohol to him." (R. 10.) Deputy Powell said that he asked Doucette and the passenger to come to the rear of the vehicle, and he asked for their identification. He then patted them down to determine if they had any weapons and walked to the driver's side to look inside the car. He observed plastic baggies and a small scale sitting on the console. Deputy Powell then arrested the driver for possession of drug paraphernalia and the passenger for public intoxication.

During the inventory search of Doucette's vehicle, law-enforcement officers discovered a brown bag in the trunk. The bag apparently contained the precursor substances; however, the specific items found in the bag were not disclosed at the suppression hearing.

Doucette contends on appeal that the stop of his vehicle at the gasoline service station constituted an illegal detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, Doucette argues that Deputy Powell had no reasonable suspicion to believe that he had committed a crime; therefore, Deputy Powell's decision to detain him was unlawful.

"The Fourth Amendment comes into play only if the police have made a `seizure.' `[I]nterrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.' I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (emphasis added). Not every encounter between an individual and a police officer is a seizure. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3082, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976)."

Worthy v. State, 473 So.2d 634, 636 (Ala. Crim.App.1985). "[C]haracterizing every street encounter between a citizen and the police as a `seizure,' while not enhancing any interest secured by the Fourth Amendment, would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).

In this case, Deputy Powell approached a parked automobile in the course of investigating a crime.

"`"The mere approach and questioning of . . . persons [in a parked vehicle] does not constitute a seizure." W. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure § 9.2(h) (2d ed.1987), and cases cited therein. Thus, the officers needed no probable cause to initially approach the appellant in his parked car.'

"Christmas v. State, 624 So.2d 684, 685 (Ala.Crim.App.1993)."

Johnson v. State, 784 So.2d 373, 375 (Ala. Crim.App.2000).

In Atchley v. State, 393 So.2d 1034 (Ala. Crim.App.1981), this Court addressed whether there had been a "seizure" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when police approached an individual who was sleeping in his parked vehicle. We stated:

"The most recent pronouncement of the Court on the precise issue of whether a seizure has in fact occurred is found in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), a plurality decision in which the Court overturned the Sixth United States Circuit Court of Appeals' reversal of a drug possession conviction. It appeared that the defendant had alighted from a passenger airliner at the Detroit airport and was then observed by two agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), who had noticed that defendant exhibited characteristics consistent with a DEA drug courier `profile.' At some point, while defendant was walking through the airport terminal, the two agents approached her, identified themselves, and asked to see her ticket and some identification, which defendant then produced. Upon finding that the names on the ticket and identification did not match, and after defendant failed to satisfactorily explain the discrepancy, the agents asked her to accompany them to a nearby DEA office, where they then asked her if she would consent to a search of her person and effects. The defendant apparently complied, and in the ensuing search, narcotics were discovered. As a part of its ruling, the Court expressly determined that the initial approach of and questioning by the agents had not constituted a `seizure' within the mandates of Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)] and Sibron [v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)], supra:

"`We adhere to the view that a person is "seized" only when by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3081, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 [(1976)]. As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification.

"`Moreover, characterizing every street encounter between a citizen and the police as a "seizure," while not enhancing any interest secured by the Fourth Amendment, would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices. The Court has on other occasions referred to the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool in the effective enforcement of the criminal laws.'

"446 U.S., at 553, 100 S.Ct., at 1877."

393 So.2d at 1041-42.

Later, the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Betterton, 527 So.2d 747 (Ala. 1988), further addressed this issue and stated:

"While it is clear that the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 42, 66 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980), in the present case the car was already stopped and parked in a public park. We must therefore ask whether the officer's actions amounted to such an implied restraint or show of authority that `a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' Mendenhall, 446...