Doud v. Hines

• Citation: 112 A. 528,269 Pa. 182
• Decision Date: 14 February 1921
• Docket Number: 40,41
• Parties: Doud et ux. v. Hines, Director General, Appellant
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

112 A. 528

269 Pa. 182

Doud et ux. v. Hines, Director General, Appellant

Nos. 40, 41

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

February 14, 1921

Argued January 3, 1921

Appeals, Nos. 40 and 41, Jan. T., 1921, by defendant, from judgments of C.P. Crawford Co., Sept. T., 1918, Nos. 64 and 65, on verdict for plaintiffs, in cases of William A. Doud v Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads, and Edith Doud and William A. Doud, her husband, v. Walker D. Hines Director General of Railroads. Affirmed.

Trespass for personal injuries. Before PRATHER, P.J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Verdict and judgment for Edith Doud for $6,000 and for William A. Doud, her husband, for $3,500 in No. 65, and for William A. Doud for $2,109.50 in No. 64. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned were, among others, (1, 2, 8) instructions, quoted in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

The judgment is affirmed.

S. Y. Rossiter, for appellant.

Albert L. Thomas, for appellee.

Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE FRAZER:

Plaintiffs were injured on February 6, 1918, by the derailment of a train, operated by defendant, on which they were passengers. The defense relied upon was that the accident was not due to defendant's negligence but was the result of extraordinary weather conditions, consisting of extreme cold weather followed by a sudden thaw, resulting in the roadbed first expanding and later settling unevenly and causing the derailment and overturning of the water tank attached to the engine, and the car in which plaintiffs were riding. The trial judge submitted the case to the jury who found in favor of plaintiffs and defendant has appealed, assigning as error various parts of the charge and refusal of binding instructions for defendant or of entry of judgment non obstante veredicto.

The first assignment complains that the trial judge erred in charging, "So you will see that the railroad company does not insure the safe transportation of the person riding on its road, but it does guarantee that it has done the utmost that human reason would require, to avoid just such conditions that give rise to accidents; and therefore that it has attempted to comply with the contract by the exercise of extreme diligence as to anything that human reason would suggest as necessary under the circumstances to make the condition of safety that the law requires." The argument is that the language quoted substitutes, for the standard of highest degree of practical care and diligence, as laid down by former decisions of this court, a standard limited only by the possibilities of human reason. When we consider the language complained of in connection with that immediately preceding and in which the court defined the measure of care imposed on defendant by quoting from the opinion of this court in Meier v. R.R., 64 Pa. 225, it is apparent that all the trial judge undertook to do was to repeat in his own language the substance of the rule laid down in that case which placed on defendant "the highest degree of practicable care and diligence" in avoiding accidents to passengers. At the end of the charge the trial judge affirmed points to the effect that defendant was not responsible for extraordinary conditions it could not foresee or over which it had no control, and charged the burden was on defendant to account for the accident by showing it was the result of a condition or happening beyond its control and ability to prevent or provide against. Viewed as a whole, the language of the trial judge could not have been construed by the jury as placing a greater burden on defendant than was already fixed by the decision referred to by him, as well as by other decisions of this court, holding a carrier...