Doud v. Hines

Citation112 A. 528
PartiesDOUD v. HINES, Director General of Railroads. DOUD et al. v. SAME.
Decision Date14 February 1921
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
112 A. 528

DOUD
v.
HINES, Director General of Railroads.

DOUD et al.
v.
SAME.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Feb. 14, 1921.


Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Crawford County; Thomas J. Prather, Judge.

Actions by William A. Doud and by Edith Doud and husband against Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads. From a judgment for plaintiff in each action, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before MOSCHZISKER, C. J., and FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER, and SCHAFFER, JJ.

S. Y. Rossiter, of Erie, for appellant.

A. L. Thomas, of Meadville, for appellees.

FRAZER, J. Plaintiffs were injured on February 6, 1918, by the derailment of a train, operated by defendant, on which they were passengers. The defense relied upon was that the accident was not due to defendant's negligence, but was the result of extraordinary weather conditions, consisting of extremely cold weather, followed by a sudden thaw, resulting in the roadbed first expanding and later settling unevenly and causing the derailment and overturning of the water

112 A. 529

tank attached to the engine, and the car in which plaintiffs were riding. The trial judge submitted the case to the jury, who found in favor of plaintiffs, and defendant has appealed, assigning as error various parts of the charge and the refusal of binding instructions for defendant or of entry of judgment non obstante veredicto.

The first assignment complains that the trial judge erred in charging:

"So you will see that the railroad company does not insure the safe transportation of the person riding on its road, but it does guarantee that it has done the utmost that human reason would require, to avoid just such conditions that give rise to accidents, and therefore that it has attempted to comply with the contract by the exercise of extreme diligence as to anything that human reason would suggest as necessary under the circumstances to make the condition of safety that the law requires."

The argument is that the language quoted substitutes, for the standard of highest degree of practical care and diligence, as laid down by former decisions of this court a standard limited only by the possibilities of human reason. When we consider the language complained of in connection with that immediately preceding and in which the court defined the measure of care imposed on defendant by quoting from the opinion of this court in Meier v. Railroad, 04 Pa. 225, 3 Am. Rep. 581, it is apparent that all the...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT