Dougherty v. Boyken
Decision Date | 09 January 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 52442,52442 |
Citation | 261 Iowa 602,155 N.W.2d 488 |
Parties | Roger DOUGHERTY, Appellant, v. Edward BOYKEN, Administrator of the Estate of Gerhard Bruns, Deceased, Appellee. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Hansen, Wheatcraft & McClintock, Des Moines, and Westfall, Laird & Burington, Mason City, for appellant.
Linnan, Lynch & Straub, Algona, and Alan Loth, Fort Dodge, for appellee.
This is the aftermath of an automobile accident which occurred on Highway 18 in Hancock County, near Garner, Iowa, on July 7, 1964. Plaintiff sustained serious personal injuries and instituted this action for damages against Edward Boyken, administrator of the estate of Gerhard Bruns, owner and driver of the other vehicle, who was fatally hurt in the collision. The administrator in turn counterclaimed for the wrongful death of his decedent. For convenience the decedent, Gerhard Bruns, will be referred to herein as defendant.
A jury denied recovery on both claims, finding against plaintiff on his petition and against defendant on the counterclaim. Only plaintiff appeals to us.
The facts upon which this appeal depends may be stated very briefly. Plaintiff and defendant were driving in opposite directions on Highway 18, plaintiff proceeding west and defendant east. As they were about to pass each other, they collided almost headon. Both cars were extensively damaged at the left front and along the left side. The pleadings level several allegations of negligence against each driver, but it is undisputed that the vital question is the charge of failure to yield one-half the traveled way, as required by section 321.298, Code, 1962. Each party accuses the other of having violated this statutory provision.
No one saw the accident, nor were those directly involved of any help in establishing the circumstances immediately preceding it. Defendant made only fragmentary statements before he died. His brother, Henry, who was a passenger in the car, was killed instantly. Plaintiff's recollection was so hazy and undependable that his testimony is of no value.
Both sides necessarily relied heavily on the physical facts, including damage to the vehicles; where they finally came to rest and their relative positions; debris on the highway; gouges and marks on the pavement; and stains from radiator fluids. Each sought to fix the point of impact by the use of expert testimony and to thereby establish responsibility for the accident.
The pivotal issue before us is the propriety of the trial court's rulings on the admission and exclusion of certain opinion evidence as to the course of the vehicles, both before and after their collision, and the point at which, and manner in which, they collided. Except for claimed misconduct on the part of the jury, all of the assignments of error deal with this matter in one way or another.
An expert has been defined as one who is qualified by study, training, or experience in a particular subject or field of endeavor which gives him special knowledge and permits him to form a definite opinion of his own on matters persons lacking such knowledge or training cannot correctly decide. 31 Am.Jur.2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence, section 26, page 523; 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 457, page 98.
The use of expert testimony is not new, but the conditions under which it may be used are the subject of endless litigation. This whole subject is exhaustively discussed in Grismore v. Consolidated Products Company, 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646. As pointed out there, all expert opinion testimony is admitted as a matter of necessity; it must first appear that a jury needs assistance on issues it is unable to intelligently and correctly determine alone. Once this is shown, expert opinions may be admitted to help the jury reach a true determination.
In the present controversy each party (exclusive of medical testimony with which we are not concerned) called one witness upon whom he relied as an expert to sustain his theory of the case. Plaintiff used Sergeant Elmer Angle, a member of the Iowa Highway Patrol for some 14 years; defendant produced Dr. Ronald Nelson, professor in physics and engineering at Augustana College in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.
Since this appeal revolves almost entirely around the testimony of these two men, we outline in detail their background and qualifications before discussing the problem now confronting us.
Sergeant Angle during his 14 years of service had investigated approximately 750 accidents of which three-fourths had involved collisions between two vehicles. He had training in accident investigation at Northwestern University and Cornell Research Institute. He also received training from the Highway Patrol before being assigned to a territory and he had taken refresher courses each year since joining the patrol. These courses included study to determine point of impact in two-vehicle accidents.
Sergeant Angle arrived at the scene of this accident before the cars or victims had been moved. He testified to his observations, including position of the vehicles, debris on the highway, marks on the surface of the road, distances separating the vehicles, damage to the cars, and then stated he had an opinion as to the point of impact. He was not permitted to give that opinion. The question was posed in several ways aimed at disclosing 'what side of the center line' the impact occurred and 'whether the impact occurred on the north or south side of the highway.' Each time the opinion was excluded by rulings sustaining objections thereto.
An offer of proof was made and the officer's answer, if allowed, would have placed the point of impact on the north side of the highway, the side on which plaintiff was traveling as he proceeded west toward defendant's eastbound vehicle.
Defendant's expert, Dr. Ronald Nelson, is head of the Physics Department at Augustana College in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. He is also head of a testing and investigation laboratory at the college. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Augustana College and his Master's and Doctor's degrees from the University of Colorado. Subsequently he did further study at the University of Iowa, Princeton University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Colorado and Michigan College of Engineering. He now works largely in the field of physics and engineering as well as in the investigation of accidents of all types. He also teaches subjects dealing with these matters. Dr. Nelson has had considerable experience in the field of accident reconstruction, which he says is now a generally recognized and accepted area of scientific study and work. After testifying to these qualifications, Dr. Nelson was permitted to express his opinion to various matters which we discuss in detail later.
The exclusion of Sergeant Angle's opinion testimony and the admission of Dr. Nelson's are assigned as error.
I. The admission or exclusion of expert opinion testimony rests largely in the judgment of the trial court. Its ruling will be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. McCormick on Evidence, page 23; 31 Am.Jur.2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence, section 3, page 497; 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 449, page 85; Grismore v. Consolidated Products Company, supra; Marean v. Petersen, 259 Iowa 557, 144 N.W.2d 906, 910; Long v. Gilchrist, 251 Iowa 1294, 1297, 105 N.W.2d 82, 84; Brower v. Quick, 249 Iowa 569, 577, 88 N.W.2d 120, 125.
However, despite Professor Wigmore's argument that the trial court's ruling should not be subject to review, such discretion is not unlimited. 2 Wigmore, Third Ed., section 561, page 641; Hardwick v. Bublitz, 254 Iowa 1253, 1259, 119 N.W.2d 886, 890; Jacobsen v. Gamber, 249 Iowa 99, 102, 86 [261 Iowa 608] N.W.2d 147, 149; Luse v. City of Sioux City, 253 Iowa 350, 112 N.W.2d 314; Jones v. O'Bryon, 254 Iowa 31, 116 N.W.2d 461; Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680.
The discretion exercised by the trial court must be a legal one based on sound judicial reasons. 'Abuse of discretion' means simply no discretion to do what was done. Jacobsen v. Gamber, supra; State v. Koeppel, 250 Iowa 1052, 1054, 97 N.W.2d 926, 927; Hardwick v. Bublitz, supra; 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 449, pages 85--87; 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, section 774, pages 216--217.
For reasons hereinafter set out we conclude there was an abuse of discretion here in the trial court's ruling, both in rejecting the opinion testimony of Sergeant Angle and in admitting that of Dr. Nelson.
II. We discuss first the exclusion of Sergeant Angle's opinion that the impact occurred on plaintiff's side of the road. Defendant objected to this testimony on grounds that there was no proper qualification or foundation shown for the witness to give such opinion; that the matter inquired into was not a proper subject of expert testimony on the record made because the jury was able to pass upon the matter themselves; and that the opinion of the officer 'in his official regalia proclaimed as his official opinion, backed by his position with the State, is not sufficiently important to outweigh the likelihood that the jury would exaggerate or blindly follow it' and be misled, rather than led, by it.
Defendant's objection was sustained generally. We disagree with this ruling. Under our holdings, it is indisputable both the qualifications and the foundation were sufficient to permit Sergeant Angle to give his opinion as to the point of impact. Hamdorf v. Corrie, 251 Iowa 896, 903, 101 N.W.2d 836, 840; Nielsen v. Wessels, 247 Iowa 213, 229, 73 N.W.2d 83, 92; Lucas v. Duccini, 258 Iowa 77, 82, 137 N.W.2d 634, 637; Mickelson v. Forney, 259 Iowa 91, 143 N.W.2d 390, 395. In all of these cases the qualifications of the police officer were substantially the same as those of Sergeant Angle, the foundation upon which the opinion was based was not materially different from the foundation in this case, and in each instance we held the opinion of the investigating...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Conner
...and demonstrate their reliability, they are recognized as fields of proper opinion evidence subject matter. See Dougherty v. Boyken, 261 Iowa 602, 611, 155 N.W.2d 488, 493 (1968); Nelson v. Nelson, 249 Iowa 638, 87 N.W.2d 767 (1958). The vast weight of state authority continues to hold eith......
-
Adams v. Deur
...consideration, such as the matter of hearsay, it still remains, in this case, defendants' complaints are without merit. In Dougherty v. Boyken, Iowa, 155 N.W.2d 488, we held an Accident reconstruction expert could not express his Factually based opinion as to point of impact of two vehicles......
-
Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc.
...249 Iowa 569, 576--578, 88 N.W.2d 120, 124--125; Long v. Gilchrist, 251 Iowa 1294, 1297--1298, 105 N.W.2d 82, 84; and Dougherty v. Boyken, Iowa, 155 N.W.2d 488, 490--493, and citations in these opinions. Lear had an opportunity to investigate the scene reasonably soon after the accident and......
-
State v. Davis
...77, 137 N.W.2d 634; Mickelson v. Forney, 259 Iowa 91, 143 N.W.2d 390; Lessenhop v. Norton, 261 Iowa 44, 153 N.W.2d 107; Dougherty v. Boyken, 261 Iowa 602, 155 N.W.2d 488; Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, 170 N.W.2d 632 (c) Defendant objected to testimony as to defendant's intoxication given ......