DOUGHERTY v. COLE

• Decision Date: 29 April 2010
• Docket Number: No. 4-09-0658.,4-09-0658.
• Citation: 343 Ill.Dec. 16,401 Ill.App.3d 341,934 N.E.2d 16
• Parties: Alycia L. DOUGHERTY, as Administratrix of the Estate of Jane Ann Cole, Deceased, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Jack Jason COLE, Jr., Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

401 Ill.App.3d 341

934 N.E.2d 16

343 Ill.Dec. 16

Alycia L. DOUGHERTY, as Administratrix of the Estate of Jane Ann Cole, Deceased, Petitioner-Appellee, v.Jack Jason COLE, Jr., Respondent-Appellant.

No. 4-09-0658.

Appellate Court of Illinois,Fourth District.

April 29, 2010.

Thomas E. Griffith and Chris Siudyla(argued), both of Erickson Davis Murphy Johnson Griffith & Walsh Ltd., of Decatur, for appellant.

Jeff Justice(argued), of Decatur, for appellee.

Justice POPEdelivered the opinion of the court:

In October 2008, petitioner, Alycia L. Dougherty, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Jane Ann Cole, filed a three-count complaint concerning the estate of her deceased mother.Count I sought a determination of (1) whether respondent, Jack Jason Cole, Alycia's brother, caused Jane's death and if so, (2) whether Jack was barred from receipt of Jane's property pursuant to section 2-6 of the Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act)(755 ILCS 5/2-6(West 2008)), commonly referred to as the “Slayer Statute.”Count II alleged Jack wrongfully caused the death of the decedent under section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act(740 ILCS 180/2(West 2008)) and sought damages therefor.Count III requested attachment of Jack's property pursuant to section 4-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure(735 ILCS 5/4-101(West 2008)).Jack raised insanity as an affirmative defense to each count of the complaint.

In August 2009, the trial court(1) found Jack was excluded from taking property from Jane's estate pursuant to the Slayer Statute, (2) awarded Alycia $200,000 on the wrongful-death count, and (3) attached Jack's interest in two accounts for which his mother named him a beneficiary.Jack appeals each of the court's determinations.We affirm.

I.BACKGROUND

On June 7, 2008, Jack suffered a severe manic episode and beat and stabbed his mother to death in her home, where he had been living with her.Jane died intestate, leaving Jack and Alycia as her only heirs.In July 2008, Alycia was issued letters of administration for her mother's estate.

In June 2008, Jack was charged by the Macon County State's Attorney with first degree murder in case No. 08-CF-770.An August 2008 psychiatric evaluation revealed that at the time of the killing, Jack suffered a severe manic episode with psychotic features and, as a result of those symptoms, was incapable of appreciating the criminality of killing his mother.In November 2008, Jack was found not guilty of first degree murder by reason of insanity.

In October 2008, Alycia filed a petition pursuant to the Slayer Statute.755 ILCS 5/2-6(West 2008).Specifically, Alycia sought to bar Jack from recovering his half of their mother's assets, which amounted to approximately $114,000 and included a thrift savingsplan and Federal Employee's group life insurance policy under which he was a 50% beneficiary.

In May 2009, both parties provided the trial court with memoranda of law.Alycia argued the Slayer Statute precluded Jack from any recovery because he intentionally and unjustifiably caused the death of his mother.Alycia contended the question for the court was whether Jack killed his mother intentionally despite his insanity.Jack argued applying the Slayer Statute to a criminally insane person does not further the purpose of the statute or have any legitimate public-policy objectives.In July 2009, the court determined Jack was barred from receiving any property from his mother's estate under the Probate Act, found Jack liable in the wrongful-death action, and attached any of Jane's assets for which Jack was named a beneficiary.

This appeal followed.

II.ANALYSIS

A.Slayer Statute

Issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo.Weather-Tite, Inc. v. University of St. Francis, 233 Ill.2d 385, 389, 330 Ill.Dec. 808, 909 N.E.2d 830, 833(2009).In construing a statute, our main objective is to ascertain and give effect to our legislature's intent.Weather-Tite, Inc.,233 Ill.2d at 389, 330 Ill.Dec. 808, 909 N.E.2d at 833.Alycia identifies a Washington case holding that the Washington's version of the slayer statute there was invoked to bar an insane, murderous beneficiary from taking in the absence of a criminal conviction.SeeIn re Estate of Kissinger,166 Wash.2d 120, 122, 206 P.3d 665, 666(2009)(a person who participates in the “wilful and unlawful” killing of person is prohibited from receiving any benefit resulting from his act).Jack identifies several cases from other jurisdictions finding an insane, murderous beneficiary may inherit from his victim absent a criminal conviction.SeeIn re Estate of Brumage,460 So.2d 989, 990(Fla.App.1984), citingFla. Stat. § 732.802(1979)(“A person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not be entitled to inherit from the decedent or to take any part of his estate as a devisee”(emphasis added);see alsoFla. Stat. Ann. § 732.802, Amendment Note, at 306(West 2005));Turner v. Estate of Turner,454 N.E.2d 1247, 1249 n. 4(Ind.App.1983)(A person who shall have been legally convicted of intentionally causing the death of another (emphasis added) shall not take from the estate of the decedent for whose death that person caused), quotingInd.Code Ann. § 29-1-2-12(Michie 1979)(repealed by Pub. L. 147-1984, § 2,eff.May 1, 1984), now Ind.Code Ann. § 29-1-2-12.1(Michie 2000);In re Estate of Vadlamudi,183 N.J.Super. 342, 349, 443 A.2d 1113, 1117(1982)(codifying New Jersey case law on the effect of a homicideof a decedent and holding “under N.J.S.A. 3A:2A-83[ (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3A:2A-83(West 1977))(recodified by1981 N.J. Laws 405(N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:7-1(West 1981))(repealed by 2004 N.J. Laws 132)), (now N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:7-1.1(West 2007)),] the perpetrator of a homicidal act committed while legally insane cannot be, as a matter of law, one ‘who intentionally kills' within the meaning of that section”).While we find other jurisdictions' treatment of the same issue interesting, those cases are not on point as they apply differently worded statutes or, as in the case of the New Jersey statute, specifically adopted New Jersey case law on the topic.The split among courts leaves us to determine how our own legislature intended the statute to be interpreted.

When the intent of the legislature is unclear, we may use aids of construction to ascertain the meaning of a statute.O'Casek v. Children's Home & Aid Society of Illinois,229 Ill.2d 421, 446, 323 Ill.Dec. 2, 892 N.E.2d 994, 1010(2008).To resolve the competing interpretations of the Slayer Statute presented by the parties, we consider the legislative history of the statute.SeeO'Casek,229 Ill.2d at 446, 323 Ill.Dec. 2, 892 N.E.2d at 1010.

We initially provide a brief history of the Slayer Statute.In 1939, the Laws of the State of Illinois provided “[a] person who is convicted of the murder of another shall not inherit from the murdered person”(Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, ch. 3, par. 167), and a “devise or legacy to a person who is convicted of the murder of the testator * * * is void”(Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, ch. 3, par. 200).These rules were adopted in sections 2-6and4-12 of the Probate Act(Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 3, pars. 2-6, 4-12)(effective January 1, 1976) and then recodified in 1977(Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110 1/2, pars. 2-6, 4-12).In 1983, Public Act 83-271 amended the law to read as follows:

“A person who intentionally and unjustifiably causes the death of another shall not receive any property, benefit, or other interest by reason of the death, whether as heir, legatee, beneficiary, joint tenant, survivor, appointee or in any other capacity and whether the property, benefit, or other interest passes pursuant to any form of title registration, testamentary or nontestamentary instrument, intestacy, renunciation, or any other circumstance.”Pub. Act. 83-271, § 2-6, eff. September 9, 1983(1983 Ill. Laws 1986, 1987)(amendingIll.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110 1/2, par. 2-6 and repealing par. 4-12).

The statute applies to deaths occurring on or after September 9, 1983.

Whether an insane killer was barred from taking from his victim's estate was originally a matter of common law.In 1961, the First District held the estate of a husband found to be insane when hekilled his wife was not precluded from taking the proceeds of the wife's insurance policy.Blair v. Travelers Insurance Co.,30 Ill.App.2d 191, 197-98, 174 N.E.2d 209, 212(1961).

In 1987, the federal District Court of the Northern District of Illinois reasoned Illinois's murderous beneficiary rule did not apply if the murderer was insane when he killed.Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson,669 F.Supp. 201, 203(N.D.Ill.1987).The court recognized the insured in that case died in 1982, prior to the September 9, 1983, effective date of the statutory amendment, but noted the statute as it read after the amendment was not significantly different.We strongly disagree with the court's interpretation ofthe legislature's amendment.The statute originally excluded a person who was convicted of murder, whereas the amendment disposed of the conviction requirement and only required the intentional and unjustifiable cause of another's death.This change significantly broadened the scope of beneficiaries who fell under the statute from only those convicted of murder to anyone who intentionally and unjustifiably causes a death, without regard to whether a criminal conviction results therefrom.In addition, it significantly broadened the types of transfers covered by the statute from inheritances and legacies to any transfer of property resulting from intentionally and unjustifiably causing the death of another.

Jack argues this court should interpret the Slayer Statute as adopting the common-law rule established in Blair, similar to the federal court's interpretation in Lincoln National Life.SeeWinnebago County Citizens for Controlled Growth v. County of Winnebago,383 Ill.App.3d 735, 746, 322...