Dougherty v. Dupes
| Decision Date | 15 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-01541-JFC |
| Parties | KEITH DOUGHERTY, et. al, Plaintiffs, v. JARED DUPES, et. al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Presently before the court is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) with a supporting brief filed by the Commonwealth Court Clerk and the Pennsylvania Unified Judiciary (collectively, the "Commonwealth defendants"). (ECF Nos. 78, 79). The Commonwealth defendants seek to dismiss the complaint filed by pro se plaintiff Keith Dougherty ("plaintiff" or "Dougherty") for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 78). In response, plaintiff filed a motion to strike the Commonwealth defendant's motion and a supporting brief. (ECF Nos. 80, 81). For the reasons explained herein, the Commonwealth defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted, plaintiff's motion to strike will be denied, and plaintiff's complaintagainst the Commonwealth Court Clerk and the Pennsylvania Unified Judiciary will be dismissed with prejudice.
On August 28, 2017, plaintiff instituted this action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against "Jared Dupes PA Department of Revenue Bureau of Compliance In his 'individual and Supervisory Capacity;'" "Commonwealth Court Clerk In its Executive and Official Capacity;" "Christopher Conner IN his Executive Function;" "Caldwell, Jones, Carlson, Blewit, Welsh, 'in their official capacity;'" and "PA Unified Judiciary" "IN their 'official capacity,'" by paying the filing fee. (ECF No. 1). The Civil Cover Sheet completed by Dougherty indicates in section IV with respect to the nature of the suit that this is an action to challenge "the constitutionality of state statutes." (ECF No. 1-2). Under section VI with respect to the claim, it indicates that the claim also is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 28 U.S.C. § 1654, and notes under the "description of cause" that the action asserts a claim for "[c]onspiracy to deny access to all courts 'definition of person.'" (ECF No. 1-2). It is difficult, however, to perceive the legal claims and factual allegations raised by plaintiff within his 140-page pro se complaint. In what appears to be an allegation of conspiracy against the Commonwealth defendants, the plaintiff writes:
Although it is difficult to discern plaintiff's claims against any of the defendants within the complaint, it appears that plaintiff contests various prior actions, decisions, and rulings by individuals, judges, and courts stemming from his attempted representation in various courts of Docson Consulting, LLC, ("Docson Consulting") of which he is the sole member and which was not permitted because Dougherty is not a licensed attorney. (ECF No. 1). The complaint states:
In all claims "Keith Dougherty incorporates by Reference all 22+ Cases referred to in 16-9425 [all defendants] including "pending state claims" in PA, MD and NJ; Keith Dougherty "demands" whistle Blower Protections as to "Judicial Misconduct and Disability Act Law" where in each instance "the Chief Judges have conspired to deny any declaratory relief" in their efforts to protect "former current and future chiefs of the 3rd Cir" (Preliminary Injunction as to "entry of default") and declaratory relief as to "all Rules of Court" (referenced) by a 7th Amendment Jury:
(ECF No. 1-1 at 2 [complaint at 102]).
It is also difficult to distinguish the legal authority referenced within the complaint because of plaintiff's extensive edits to quotations purporting to be from those cited legal authorities and the lack of use of any standard form of legal citations. (ECF No. 1).
It appears that Dougherty is seeking declaratory relief from previous judgments:
Keith Dougherty "et al" demand "declaratory judgment as to "person" as protected "under 28 USC § 1654" [as one of the Unique "necessary an proper Federal Statutes" protecting [any] Constitutional Values (such As RFRA and 28 USC § 1738) [declaratory judgment (requiring)] a referring to 1 USC § 1 as required under Burwell v. Hobby Lobby [for all Federal Statues] "to compel the correction and completion [BWO preliminary injunction] against the criminal delay" in YCCP, DCCP, and CCCP;
(ECF No. 1 at 37-38). Dougherty is also seeking damages against the defendants, stating "[i]t will now cost $200,000,000 to settle but you can go back to 'your corruption' undaunted 'until the end.'" (ECF No. 1 at 78).
By way of background, Dougherty is a litigious plaintiff who has filed multiple unsuccessful actions on behalf of himself, Docson Consulting, and other individuals inPennsylvania state court and multiple United States District Courts.2 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has described plaintiff as "a frequent and frequently vexatious litigator." In re Dougherty, 563 F. App'x 96, 97 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoted in Dougherty v. Carlisle Transp. Prods., Inc., 610 F. App'x 91, 92 (3d Cir. 2015); Dougherty v. Advanced Wings LLP, 611 F. App'x 752, 752 (3d Cir. 2015)). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also stated with respect to another one of plaintiff's complaints, "[a]s with many of Dougherty's filings, the complaint is largely unintelligible." Best v. U.S. Foods Inc. De. Div., 612 F. App'x 636, 637 (3d Cir. 2015). District courts have characterized Dougherty's communications with those courts as "unintelligible and rambling, fraught with snide asides and personal attacks." Dougherty v. Advanced Wings, LLC, Civ. Action No. 1:13-cv-447, 2013 WL 4041589, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2013). For example, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey observed that "[i]t is not easy to decipher Plaintiff's blend of arguments, insults, and diatribe." Dougherty v. Adams-Dougherty, 2017 WL at *2. Dougherty's complaint and filings in this action are no different.
No court to date has enacted an injunction with respect to his vexatious litigant status. See, e.g., Chipps v. United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989) (); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982) ().
In accordance with this court's memorandum opinion, , the court by an order dated April 6, 2018 dismissed the action against Jared Dupes in his individual capacity for failure of timely service of original process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). (ECF No. 93). As part of that order, this court ordered plaintiff to show cause for failure of timely service of process upon all defendants other than the Commonwealth defendants. Id. The court denied plaintiff's multiple motions and requests for default and default judgment because plaintiff had not properly served any of the defendants. Id. The court did not enter a show cause order for failure of timely service of process against the Commonwealth defendants, however, because the Commonwealth had filed a Rule 12(b) motion on March 9, 2018. Dougherty v. Dupes, Civ. Action No. 1:17-CV-01542-JFC, 2018 WL 1696651, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2018). The court's April 6, 2018 memorandum opinion indicated that because the Commonwealth defendants had filed the motion without "asserting insufficiency of service of process in it, they now have waived any challenge to the service of process, FED R. CIV. P. 12(h), as of the date of that filing and will be required to answer the complaint if their motion is denied in accordance with Rule 12." Id. As a result, the court must now decide whether to grant or deny the Commonwealth defendants' motion to dismiss.
Before addressing the applicable standards, this court must be mindful of plaintiff's pro se status. Pro se plaintiffs are held to a less stringent standard than individuals represented by counsel. Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) (). Pleadings filed by pro se litigants are to be liberally construed, and courts should be flexible when applying procedural rules. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333,339 (3d Cir. 2011)). A pro se plaintiff, however, is still required to adhere to standard rules of civil procedure. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), "a court must grant a motion to dismiss if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a claim." In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). Jurisdictional challenges may be treated as either "facial" or as "factual." Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014). A facial attack asserts that a claim "is insufficient to invoke the...
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