Dougherty v. Golden Gate Bridge

• Decision Date: 07 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. C 97-2994 SBA (ARB).,C 97-2994 SBA (ARB).
• Citation: 31 F.Supp.2d 724
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: Pauline DOUGHERTY, Plaintiff, v. GOLDEN GATE BRIDGE, Highway and Transportation District Defendant.

31 F.Supp.2d 724

Pauline DOUGHERTY, Plaintiff, v. GOLDEN GATE BRIDGE, Highway and Transportation District Defendant.

No. C 97-2994 SBA (ARB).

United States District Court, N.D. California.

July 7, 1998.

Thomas J. Boyle, Law Offices of Thomas J. Boyle, San Francisco, CA, for Pauline Dougherty, Plaintiff.

Thomas M. Buckley, Sterling & Clack, San Francisco, CA, for Golden Gate Bridge and Transportation District, Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ARMSTRONG, District Judge.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought this action for injuries allegedly sustained while she was employed by defendant Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transportation District. Plaintiff filed her complaint under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688, and general admiralty law, asserting that her injuries were caused by defendant's negligence and the unseaworthiness of defendant's sea vessels.

Defendant now moves for summary judgment arguing that plaintiff's claims are precluded by the California Torts Claim Act ("CTCA"), through which defendant contends that it enjoys sovereign immunity. Defendant does not claim Eleventh Amendment immunity; rather, it claims a different type of immunity — immunity conferred by the state. It asserts that it did not waive its immunity under the CTCA in this case, as plaintiff failed to file notice of her claim with defendant as required by the CTCA.

In addition, defendant asserts that plaintiff's unseaworthiness claim should be summarily adjudicated because it is a nonstatutory cause of action premised on strict liability and, as such, it is not cognizable under the CTCA.

Plaintiff counters, however, that state sovereign immunity in federal court must arise through the Eleventh Amendment, and that, because defendant does not qualify for immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, defendant cannot invoke the CTCA claims requirement.

Because the Court agrees with plaintiff's argument that the CTCA claims requirement does not apply in this action without a showing that defendant qualifies for Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court need not reach plaintiff's alternate arguments that: (1) even if defendant were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, federal law, specifically the Jones Act, preempts the use of administrative claims requirements; (2) even if the CTCA applies, plaintiff has substantially complied with the administrative claims requirement, and thus defendant must waive any defense based on plaintiff's failure to comply; (3) defendant should be estopped from claiming that there was a claims requirement in this case; (4) the California legislature intended to exempt employment-related suits from the administrative claims requirement of the CTCA; and (5) even if defendant were entitled to sovereign immunity from Jones Act claims, California's mandatory special duty doctrine preserves plaintiff's unseaworthiness rights.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is warranted against a party who "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the "absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 2553. If the movant meets this burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts demonstrating a genuine factual issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus an opposition which fails to identify and reference triable facts is insufficient to preclude the Court's granting of a properly supported summary judgment motion. See Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1545 (9th Cir.1988) (per curiam). Nonetheless, any inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita, 106 S.Ct. at 1356.

DISCUSSION

A. California Torts Claim Act

While defendant does not claim to enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity, it does argue that it enjoys state-conferred sovereign immunity under the CTCA.

The CTCA provides that no suit may be brought against the state or a "public entity" for money or damages until a written claim has been presented and either acted upon or deemed rejected. Cal. Gov.Code §§ 905, 905.2, 910, 945.4. Thus, the CTCA constitutes a conditional waiver of California's state sovereignty in personal injury actions brought against the state's "public entities." Cal. Gov.Code § 811.2.

The CTCA definition of "public entity" includes districts. Thus the defendant, Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transportation District, contends that it is a "public entity" under the CTCA. See id.; see also United States v. Golden Gate Bridge and Highway Dist. of Cal., 37 F.Supp. 505 (N.D.Cal.1941), aff'd 125 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.1942), cert. denied 316 U.S. 700, 62 S.Ct. 1298, 86 L.Ed. 1769 (1942) (holding that the District is an agency of the state).¹

Defendant argues that because the plaintiff failed to file a notice of her claim, defendant, as a "public entity" under the CTCA, did not waive its immunity, and that plaintiff's case must, therefore, be summarily adjudicated in defendant's favor. Plaintiff, however, contends that the CTCA and its claims requirement do not apply in federal court unless a defendant qualifies for protection under the Eleventh Amendment. Because defendant does not qualify for Eleventh Amendment protection, plaintiff argues, the claims against defendant should stand.

B. Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."

The Eleventh Amendment applies only to actions brought in federal court, not to actions initiated in state court. Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 112 S.Ct. 560, 565, 116 L.Ed.2d 560 (1991) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2308, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)); Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 710 (D.C.Cir.), opinion reinstated and rehearing en banc denied, 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C.Cir.1987) (state courts offer forum to hear most constitutional claims against states which are barred in federal court by the Eleventh Amendment, as the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to state court actions).

To qualify for Eleventh Amendment immunity, a state instrumentality must be found to be an "arm of the state," and therefore "one of the United States." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 117 S.Ct. 900, 904 and fn. 5, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997) (quoting Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 572, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)).²

If a defendant does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity in an action based on federal law, the Supremacy Clause makes the law "fully enforceable" in every state. Hilton, 112 S.Ct. at 566; see Brown v. Western Ry of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 70 S.Ct. 105, 106, 94 L.Ed. 100 (1949) (a federal right to pursue a cause of action "cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice").

But if a state or "arm of the state" does enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity, no actions can be brought against it in federal court unless the immunity is overcome in one of two ways: (1) by Congressional abrogation of the immunity; or (2) by voluntary waiver by the state. Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 2946, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987).

The Supreme Court has held that Congress, by enacting the Jones Act, did not abrogate states' immunity. Id. at 2947. But California conditionally waived its immunity by enacting the CTCA. See Cal. Gov.Code §§ 905, 905.2, 945.4; see also Kamani v. Port of Houston Auth., 702 F.2d 612, 613 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that similar Texas Tort Claims Act amounted to state's conditional waiver of sovereign immunity).

In this case, although defendant might be considered a "public entity" under the broad CTCA, defendant likely is not an "arm of the state" under the more narrow Eleventh Amendment,³ and defendant has specifically not claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of this Motion. Accordingly plaintiff argues that, because defendant is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in the first instance, the question of the CTCA's waiver of that immunity is irrelevant. In other words, defendant cannot rely on the CTCA claims requirement because that claims requirement only applies in actions where the defendant is an "arm of the state" under the Eleventh Amendment.

The issue before this Court, therefore, is whether a defendant which is neither a state nor an "arm of the state" under the Eleventh Amendment may rely on a state claims requirement to avoid liability in federal court.

C. Relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and the CTCA

Plaintiff cites Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994), in support of its contention that the CTCA's claims requirement does not apply to the instant case. In Hess, the plaintiffs sued the defendant bistate railway of New York and New Jersey under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA).⁴ The plaintiffs initiated their actions within the FELA's three year statutory period, but not within the one year limit imposed as a condition of New York's and New Jersey's conditional...