Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 July 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-3482,86-3482 |
| Citation | 824 F.2d 1477 |
| Parties | 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3226, 107 Lab.Cas. P 10,016, 2 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 808, 1987 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 28,007 William DOUGHERTY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PARSEC, INC.; Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local Union # 100; Budco Group, Inc., Seaboard System Railroad, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Paul H. Tobias (argued), David Torchia, Tobias & Kraus, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.
Harold S. Freeman (argued), Dinsmore & Shohl, Jonas Katz, George E. Yund, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendants-appellees.
Before ENGEL and KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judges, and GILMORE, * District Judge.
Plaintiff William Dougherty appeals a summary judgment entered against him and in favor of defendant Seaboard System Railroad, and certified as final under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In certifying the appeal, Senior United States District Judge David S. Porter made a thorough statement in support of his finding that there was "no just reason for delay." See Solomon v. Aetna, 782 F.2d 58 (6th Cir.1986); COMPACT v. Metropolitan Prior to the underlying litigation, Mr. Dougherty had been employed as a crane operator by the defendant Parsec, Inc. Parsec and the defendant Local 100 of the Teamsters Union were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which was applicable to Dougherty's employment and provided that plaintiff could be terminated only for "just cause." The agreement contained the usual provisions for processing of grievances, including the usual steps requisite to proceeding to a hearing before a joint committee of the Teamsters and members of the trucking industry.
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 786 F.2d 227 (6th Cir.1986).
In his complaint, Dougherty asserted that on or about June 27, 1985, Parsec discharged him from his employment at the request of Seaboard. He alleged that Seaboard brought about his discharge because he had complained to OSHA concerning certain unsafe work conditions which Seaboard allowed to exist on its premises. Plaintiff at the time had been required to carry on part of his duties on Seaboard's premises. Parsec denied that it was in any way motivated by any complaint of Seaboard, denied that his discharge was motivated by a retaliation for his "ringing the bell" on Seaboard, and instead asserted that he had been properly discharged for just cause.
A grievance protesting plaintiff's discharge was taken to a hearing before the joint committee, and the committee upheld the discharge. Plaintiff alleges that the committee was biased against him and that the union was negligent in presenting his grievance. The complaint requests relief under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, for breach of the collective bargaining agreement on the part of the employer, and also for breach by the union of its duty of fair representation. Plaintiff also appended a claim against Seaboard for tortious interference with his contractual relationship with Parsec.
In its motion for dismissal Seaboard argued first that the tortious interference claim was preempted by section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 660(c). This section, which prohibits retaliatory actions against individuals who make complaints to OSHA, does not create a private right of action. Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir.1980). As a backup position, Seaboard also contended that under Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985), the tortious interference claim was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Judge Porter accepted Seaboard's second argument, and we fully agree. A copy of Judge Porter's memorandum and order of May 9, 1986 is attached hereto as Appendix A.
While acknowledging that the issue was not free from doubt, Judge Porter concluded that a fair reading of Allis-Chalmers was that a tort claim under state law is preempted by section 301 if that claim is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." Id. at 213, 105 S.Ct. at 1912. Judge Porter observed that some of the public policies served by preemption would not necessarily be endangered by permitting plaintiff to proceed on the pendent claim, and Judge Porter also acknowledged that such a cause of action can exist under Ohio law, see Heheman v. E.W. Scripps Co., 661 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir.1981); Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Bergey, 453 F.Supp. 129 (S.D. Ohio 1974). However, Judge Porter also stated: "Regardless of how the tortious interference with a contract claim is defined, the terms of the labor agreement will have to be scrutinized to determine if Seaboard induced its breach." We agree with Judge Porter that his conclusion is reinforced by the cases cited by Seaboard, such as Satterfield v. Western Electric Co., 758 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir.1985). He concluded that even if plaintiff had filed separate actions in state and federal courts, such a procedure would have an improper impact upon national labor policy and the interest of Congress in the speedy and uniform administration of national labor law under the National Labor Relations Act. Again, we agree. The only contract with which any interference could be charged is For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
the collective bargaining agreement. An interference claim could not exist in the absence of such agreement, which in turn is exclusively to be interpreted under federal law.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. In this case, William Dougherty appeals a summary judgment entered against him in favor of one of the defendants, Seaboard System Railroad. The district judge certified the judgment as final pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The issue is whether Dougherty can maintain an action against Seaboard Railroad System in light of the preemption provisions of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185.
This is a labor dispute arising out of the firing of William Dougherty by his employer, Parsec. He has charged Parsec with violation of the collective bargaining agreement; his union, the Truck Driver, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 100 (Teamsters), with violation of the duty of fair representation, and a third-party customer of Parsec, Seaboard System Railroad (Seaboard), the appellee, with tortious interference with a labor contract. The district court granted Seaboard's motion to dismiss, ruling that Dougherty's tort claim was preempted by federal labor law, and that the claim could not be maintained under federal law because Seaboard was not a signatory to the labor contract between Parsec and the Teamsters.
Parsec performs services for Seaboard by loading and unloading railroad cars. Dougherty, a Teamster, was employed by Parsec as a crane operator. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with Parsec and the Teamsters, Parsec could fire Dougherty only for just cause. Seaboard was not a party to this contract, and was not Dougherty's employer. In April 1985, Dougherty complained to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) about allegedly hazardous working conditions at Seaboard. In June 1985, Parsec fired him.
Dougherty alleges that Seaboard requested he be fired in retaliation "for filing a complaint with OSHA, and for exercising his right of free speech and his right to complain concerning Seaboard's unwarranted interference with Company (Parsec)-Union relations." Complaint, p 11 Joint Appendix p. 5. 1 Dougherty claims he was fired by Parsec in violation of the "just cause" clause in the contract, and that Seaboard's alleged request that he be fired was a major factor in Parsec's decision.
Seaboard moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the alternative grounds that (1) private parties cannot enforce OSHA's prohibition on retaliatory discharges against individuals who complain to OSHA and (2) that the tortious interference with contract claim is preempted by federal labor law. The trial judge ruled in Seaboard's favor on the preemption issue, and did not address whether Dougherty's claims against Seaboard were barred by OSHA. Dougherty appeals the preemption decision. Seaboard argues on appeal that even if the state tort claim is not preempted by labor law it is barred by OSHA.
The District Court properly ruled that Dougherty could not bring a tortious interference with contract claim under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, which provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties ...
29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a). A district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction under Section 301 over a nonsignatory to a collective bargaining agreement where the rights or duties of the nonsignatory party The Supreme Court has held that, where the resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent on the analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the claim must be treated either as a Section 301 claim or dismissed as preempted by federal labor law. Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). The central issue in this case is whether a state law claim of tortious interference with a labor contract against a party who has not signed the contract is preempted. I do not think it is.
are not stated in the terms and conditions of the contract. Service, Hospital, Nursing Home and Public Employees Union, Local No. 47 v. Commercial Property Services, Inc. 755 F.2d 499, 506 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850, 106 S.Ct. 147, 88 L.Ed.2d 122 (1985) (S.E.E.U.). S.E.E.U. held that a district court...To continue reading
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...intentional interference with contractual relations is preempted by sec. 301 has given rise to some disagreement. In Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc., 824 F.2d 1477 (6th Cir.1987), the plaintiff alleged that Seaboard System Railroad ("SSR"), induced his employer, Parsec, to discharge him, thus int......
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