Doughty v. Grills

Decision Date18 February 1952
Citation260 S.W.2d 379,37 Tenn.App. 63
PartiesDOUGHTY et al. v. GRILLS et al.
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

Myron R. Ely, Thomas Thomson, Frank Flynn, Frank Creekmore and Richard Carson, Knoxville, for appellants.

Ward Hudgins, Nashville, Taylor & Badgett, Knoxville, for appellees.

ANDERSON, Presiding Judge.

The original bill seeks an injunction against the defendants, R. E. Grills and T. W. Wooten, restraining them from acting as 'runners' and solicitors of personal injury claims against railroads on behalf of certain attorneys, particularly one by the name of Joseph B. McGlynn, of East St. Louis, Illinois.

Pursuant to a demand by the defendants, a jury was empaneled to try the issues of fact. To questions propounded, the jury answered that neither defendant had 'solicited or recommended employment to any of the injured persons shown in the proof with respect to the settlement of their claims'.

The Chancellor approved the verdict of the jury, and construing it as an exoneration of both defendants of the charges in the bill, entered a decree, dismissing the bill and dissolving the temporary injunction theretofore issues. From this decree the complainants appealed.

The evidence in the case consists solely of testimony of witnesses introduced by the complainants. Neither defendant testified, nor did either offer any evidence in his behalf.

The complainants' first and principal contention is that the facts being uncontroverted, the Chancellor should have withdrawn the issues from the jury and decided the case himself, and, further, that since the undisputed evidence sustained the charges of the bill, he should have granted the relief sought by making the temporary injunction perpetual.

The defendants filed separate answers, in which they generally denied that they were guilty of any wrongful conduct in connection with the personal injury claims, or otherwise. The theory of the defense of the defendant Grills was that his activities in connection with personal claims against railroads were solely as the salaried representative of the Railroad Brotherhood and that he went no further than to advise injured members or the surviving relatives of deceased members of the fact that the Brotherhood maintained a Legal Aid Department, the services of which were available to the member or his said relatives, as it was his duty to do.

In his answer, the defendant Wooten denied that he had been guilty of any wrongful activities connected with the matters alleged in the bill, and answering further, said that from time to time he had been approached by injured members of the Brotherhood for advice as to what course they should take in the settlements of their claims against the railroad by which they were employed; that he had for many years known of the existence of the Legal Aid Department of the Brotherhood and when so approached he advised the injured party or the relatives of the services available to them by reason of their membership in the Brotherhood; that 'he has advised and encouraged the members of the Brotherhood to seek legal advice from the Legal Aid Department of the Brotherhood through the Brotherhood's regional counsel, Joseph B. McGlynn, East St. Louis, Illinois'. He denied that he ever received any type of compensation from anyone seeking advice from him or from Joseph B. McGlynn, or any other person, and averred that his advice was given gratuitously because he considered it to the best interest of 'his injured friends to seek the services of the Department (the Legal Aid Department of the Brotherhood).'

It was stipulated by the parties 'that there had been no lawsuits filed in the circuit courts of Knox County, Tennessee, or in the Federal Court in Knox County, Tennessee, wherein a member of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen had been injured, within the past ten years.'

There was also a stipulation relative to a special circular issued by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, under date of August 15, 1930, requesting each lodge to designate a member whose duty it would be to submit to the Legal Aid Department preliminary reports on all cases of accidental injury or death to members of the Brotherhood, occurring in the course of their employment by the Railroad. The circular further called attention to the fact that it was the duty of the secretaries of all lodges to report on a form provided for the purpose to the Legal Aid Department each case where a member of their respective lodges was accidentally injured or killed while engaged in railroad service, giving if available the facts of the case, including the name and address of the member concerned, names and addresses of his dependents if the member were killed, the name of the railroad, the time and place of the accident. It was further stated that 'promptness in making these reports is very essential and therefore they should not be delayed awaiting the development of facts other than above stated'.

A summary of the testimony of the material witnesses introduced by the complainant is as follows:

Mrs. John McMahan, widow of George Robertson, who was killed in 1947 while employed by the Southern Railroad, was manifestly a very hostile witness; so much so that the Chancellor allowed one of the counsel for the complainants to cross-examine her, notwithstanding that she was put on the stand by the complainants. She first testified that the defendant Wooten had come to her home to see her on one or two occasions; that prior to his first visit she had not known him; that he brought clothes and gifts for the children and advised her that she could get free legal advice, but that she did not remember the name of the lawyer he gave her. When counsel for the complainants was allowed to cross-examine her, the witness admitted, manifestly with great reluctance, that Wooten had told her to go to an attorney in St. Louis, from whom she could obtain free legal advice. Asked what was the purpose of a trip to St. Louis, the witness said, 'I reckon I was supposed to see a lawyer for advice or something'. Later in her testimony she said that Wooten told her about 'the existence of this attorney' (in St. Louis), and that if she needed legal advice she could go there and get it for nothing. She also testified that Wooten said her expenses in going to St. Louis would be paid but he did not say who would pay them.

Carlyle Rader, former employee of the Southern Railroad, sustained an injury to his leg, and he went to East St. Louis, Illinois, and consulted Joseph McGlynn in that city, and was sent by McGlynn to a doctor. He testified that neither of the defendants had anything to do with his going to East St. Louis; that he made that trip to see McGlynn because he understood that by virtue of his membership in the Railroad Brotherhood he was entitled to the free advice of one of its regional attorneys; that he paid his own expenses. Asked whether there was any arrangement as to his being reimbursed for his expense, the witness answered, 'No arrangement at all unless I let them have the case'. By 'them' he said he meant McGlynn; that McGlynn advised him that he had been made a good offer of settlement and should accept it; that McGlynn made no charge for this service and did not take his case against the railroad.

J. H. Pinkston while working for the Southern Railroad sustained an injury to his leg. He testified that the defendant Wooten visited him while he was in the hospital; that he employed Joseph McGlynn of East St. Louis to represent him as his attorney in the prosecution of his claim against the railroad; that he did not talk to any lawyer in Knoxville about the claim; that before he went to East St. Louis he had a conference with the defendant Wooten and probably some others at the Andrew Johnson Hotel in Knoxville; that he did not remember for sure whether Wooten was there, but the others were 'Mr. Allen Richey and Ed Hensley out of Chicago'; that Richey was a regional investigator for the Brotherhood and Hensley was a regional counsel 'out of Chicago', but that he did not employ him; that McGlynn as his lawyer filed a suit in his behalf against the railroad, which was settled without a trial; that while in East St. Louis he consulted a doctor recommended by McGlynn; that he made four trips to East St. Louis to see McGlynn; that those trips were made in Mr. Richey's car; that the witness further testified that he did not know any attorneys in Knoxville and asked his brother to have the defendant Wooten come to see him or send somebody to see him, and that was how he got in touch with Mr. Richey; that he knew about the Legal Aid Department of the Brotherhood and, being a member, he felt 'they could give me advice, and they did, and they gave me a fair settlement and I was satisfied'; that the defendant Wooten never recommended any attorney to him, but that Richey did 'after so long a time'.

The witness further testified that while his suit was pending and before the settlement was effected, McGlynn gave him $100.00 a month 'for a few months'; that McGlynn was reimbursed when the settlement was made; that he had a written contract with McGlynn to represent him for 25% of the amount recovered; that neither of the defendants solicited his claim against the railroad on behalf of McGlynn or anyone else.

L. B. Steele was injured while working for the Southern Railroad. He testified that he lived in Knoxville but employed Joseph McGlynn of East St. Louis, Illinois, to represent him as his attorney in the prosecution of his claim against the railroad; that he had known the defendant Wooten for a number of years and Grills for about a year, and knew the latter was a local investigator for the Brotherhood; that after his injury Grills came to see him at his request; that prior to his injury he did not know McGlynn but knew of him; that he went to East St. Louis twice,...

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