Douglas Streeter v. People of State

• Citation: 69 Ill. 595,1873 WL 8523
• Parties: DOUGLAS STREETERv.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
• Decision Date: 30 September 1873
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

69 Ill. 595

1873 WL 8523 (Ill.)

DOUGLAS STREETER

v.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1873.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. EDWIN S. LELAND, Judge, presiding.

Mr. J. C. CHAMPLIN, and Mr. E. W. DEWEY, for the appellant.

Mr. JAMES K. EDSALL, Attorney General, Mr. H. K. BOYLE, and Mr. T. S. BOWEN, for the People.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was a prosecution commenced before a justice of the peace, against appellant, for selling intoxicating liquors without a license. The justice found him guilty, and assessed a fine of $20 against him, and rendered judgment accordingly. On an appeal taken to the circuit court, the cause was submitted on an agreed state of facts, and the court, pro forma, found appellant guilty, and entered a judgment against him of $20 and costs of suit.

From the statement of facts, it appears appellant resides near the city of Ottawa, in LaSalle county, but not within the limits of any incorporated town or city; that he has never given the requisite bond and obtained a license to keep a grocery, as required by the first section of an act entitled “An act to provide against the evils resulting from the sale of intoxicating liquors in the State of Illinois,” approved January 13, 1872, and at his residence, as stated, he has repeatedly sold intoxicating liquors in a less quantity than one quart, to any person who desired to purchase, to be drank on his premises by the glass, and the liquors so sold were drank by the persons purchasing, on his premises, by his permission.

It is provided in the first section of the act under which this prosecution was commenced, it shall be unlawful for any person, not having obtained a license to keep a grocery, to sell, in any quantity, intoxicating liquors, to be drank on the premises where sold, or in any adjoining room, or any place of public resort connected therewith, and no person shall be granted a license without first giving a bond to the municipality or authority authorized by law to grant licenses, in the penal sum of $3000, with two sufficient securities, which bond shall be conditioned and for the purposes as therein directed.

The second section provides, it shall be unlawful for any person to sell intoxicating liquors to minors, unless upon the written authority of their parents or guardians, or family physician, or to persons intoxicated, or who are in the habit of getting intoxicated.

In the third section it is provided, all places wherein intoxicating liquors are sold in violation of the act, shall be taken, held and declared to be common nuisances, and all such places shall be shut up and abated on the conviction of the keeper thereof.

The sixth section declares what penalties shall be inflicted on the persons violating the provisions of the first and second sections of the act.

The admitted facts show a clear violation of the first section of the statute, but not of the second. It is insisted, a conviction can not be maintained unless the evidence shows a violation of the first and second sections. The objection seems hypercritical. It is founded on the peculiar phraseology of the sixth section, which imposes the penalties, and which provides that every person guilty of violating the provisions of the “first and second sections,” shall forfeit and pay certain penalties. The penalties imposed by that section are for the violation of either section, and it is not indispensable a party should be guilty of a violation of both before he can be subjected to the forfeitures enumerated. This is the obvious meaning of the words used, and is the construction given to the same language in the statute of Ohio on the same subject, in Miller v. The State, 3 Ohio, 475. Our statute, in many respects, is a substantial, and, in other parts, a literal transcript of the Ohio law, and it is a rule that, when the legislature adopts substantially the statute of another State, it is presumed to adopt also the construction previously given it by the courts of that State, unless such construction is inconsistent with the spirit and policy of our laws. Rigg et al. v. Wilton et al. 13 Ill. 15; Campbell v. Quinlin, 3 Scam. 288.

It is urged, the clause of the third section, which declares all places where intoxicating liquors are sold in violation of the act, to be common nuisances, and shall be shut up and abated, authorizes the destruction of private property, and therefore contravenes constitutional law.

The construction of this section is not involved directly in the decision of this case. Counsel, however, are in error in supposing it authorizes the summary destruction of private property. It authorizes no such thing. It simply declares...