Douglas v. Chem Carriers Towing, LLC

Decision Date23 August 2019
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 18-5529
Citation409 F.Supp.3d 570
Parties Anthony DOUGLAS v. CHEM CARRIERS TOWING, LLC
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

Berney Leopold Strauss, Rhett Emerson King, Strauss & King, New Orleans, LA, for Anthony Douglas.

Georges M. LeGrand, Adam P. Sanderson, Michael Thomas Neuner, Trevor Matthew Cutaiar, Mouledoux, Bland, LeGrand & Brackett, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Chem Carriers Towing, LLC.

SECTION "R" (3)

ORDER AND REASONS

SARAH S. VANCE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is the motion for partial summary judgment from defendant Chem Carriers Towing, LLC ("Chem Carriers"), to dismiss plaintiff Anthony Douglas's Jones Act negligence and general maritime unseaworthiness claims.1 Because the Court finds that no disputed issues of material fact exist and the law supports the defendant's position, the Court grants the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from a slip and fall on a boat.2 On November 1, 2017, Douglas was serving, under the employ of Chem Carriers, as the captain and pilot of the M/V MISS DANIELLE, an inland pushboat.3 While on the ship, Douglas suffered an injury exiting the shower.4 Specifically, his right foot caught on the shower's threshold as he was stepping over it.5 The interior threshold is 9.5 inches high.6 The shower has no grab bars,7 and the tile floor is not covered by a mat.8 The vessel was docked and tied up at the time of the accident.9

Douglas brings claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, general maritime law's warranty of seaworthiness, and general maritime law's doctrine of maintenance and cure.10 Specifically, he argues that his employer was negligent by providing a shower that amounted to an unsafe condition, which caused his accident.11 He also argues that his employer's failure to allow him sufficient rest caused him to be fatigued, which contributed to his injury.12

Chem Carriers now moves for partial summary judgment on Douglas's negligence claim under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claim under general maritime law.13 Douglas opposes the motion.14

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). "When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, [the Court] consider[s] all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co. , 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but "unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment." Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp. , 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 (2d ed. 1983) ); see also Little , 37 F.3d at 1075. "No genuine dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd. , 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014).

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party "must come forward with evidence which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’ " Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc. , 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Lease , 755 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991) ). The nonmoving party can then defeat the motion by either countering with evidence sufficient to demonstrate the "existence of a genuine dispute of material fact," or by "showing that the moving party's evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party." Id. at 1265.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex , 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for resolution. See, e.g. , id. ; Little , 37 F.3d at 1075 (" Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’ " (quoting Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (emphasis added))).

III. DISCUSSION

Chem Carriers moves for summary judgment in its favor on two of Douglas's claims: (a) his negligence claim under the Jones Act and (b) his unseaworthiness claim under general maritime law.15 The Court grants summary judgment on both claims for Chem Carriers.

Plaintiff first asserts a negligence claim under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104.16 The Jones Act affords a remedy to a "seaman injured in the course of employment." 46 U.S.C. § 30104 ; see also Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis , 515 U.S. 347, 354, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995). A Jones Act employer has a "duty to provide a safe place for the seaman to work." Colburn v. Bunge Towing, Inc. , 883 F.2d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 1989). Consequently, "[a] seaman is entitled to recovery under the Jones Act ... if his employer's negligence is the cause, in whole or in part, of his injury." Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc. , 107 F.3d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 1997). But the Jones Act does not impose upon "employers a higher duty of care than that required under ordinary negligence"; the standard of care is that of a reasonable person under the circumstances. Id. at 339.

Additionally, "the employer must have notice and the opportunity to correct an unsafe condition before liability attaches." Colburn , 883 F.2d at 374. And shipowners do not have a responsibility to warn seamen of "open and obvious" dangers. See Patterson v. Allseas USA, Inc. , 137 F. App'x 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, a seaman's burden to prove causation between his employer's negligence and his injury is "very light." O'Neill v. Seariver Mar., Inc. , 246 F. App'x 278, 280 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc. , 819 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1987) ).

Plaintiff also asserts a cause of action for unseaworthiness under general maritime law.17 "A shipowner has an absolute nondelegable duty to provide a seaworthy vessel." Brister v. A.W.I., Inc. , 946 F.2d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1991). "For a vessel to be found unseaworthy, the injured seaman must prove that the owner has failed to provide a vessel, including her equipment and crew, which is reasonably fit and safe for the purposes for which it is to be used." Jackson v. OMI Corp. , 245 F.3d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 2001).

Additionally, to recover under a theory of unseaworthiness, "the plaintiff must establish a causal connection between his injury and the breach of duty that rendered the vessel unseaworthy." Id. at 527. The standard of causation for an unseaworthiness claim is "more demanding" than the Jones Act standard, "and requires proof of proximate cause." Chisholm v. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., Inc. , 679 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir. 1982). To show proximate cause, "a plaintiff must prove that the unseaworthy condition played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury and that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the unseaworthiness." Brister , 946 F.2d at 355 (quoting Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc. , 845 F.2d 1347, 1354 (5th Cir. 1988) ).

The plaintiff broadly contends that the defendant bears liability for two reasons:

(1) the shower on the MISS DANIELLE was unsafe, and (2) the plaintiff was suffering from fatigue attributable to the defendant's actions.18 The Court will address each argument in turn.

A. The MISS DANIELLE's Shower

The plaintiff contends that the MISS DANIELLE was not reasonably safe as a consequence of the shower's threshold, lack of grab bars, and flooring.19 The Court finds, though, that construing the facts in the plaintiff's favor, no genuine issues of material fact exist with regard to the shower's safety that would support the plaintiff's claim. The shower is reasonably safe for use by a seaman, and the plaintiff does not have a basis either for contending that the defendant was negligent or that the defendant provided an unseaworthy vessel.20

The plaintiff presents no admissible evidence to substantiate his conclusion that the design of the shower is unsafe. The Court has excluded the opinion of the plaintiff's expert under a separate order.21 Neither the plaintiff nor his excluded expert identified any applicable regulations or standards that apply to an uninspected towing vessel—or if so, that apply specifically to the design of a shower—which might substantiate the plaintiff's claim.22

For instance, the plaintiff's expert contended that the defendant violated regulations established by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).23 But the Court has neither been furnished with nor independently discovered authority that the ADA applies to the design of this shower. Similarly, the plaintiff's expert contended that the defendant violated regulations established by the Occupational Safety...

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