Douglas v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 04 September 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13–1758 PLF
• Citation: 67 F.Supp.3d 36
• Parties: Jayshawn Douglas, Plaintiff, v. District of Columbia, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

67 F.Supp.3d 36

Jayshawn Douglas, Plaintiff

v.District of Columbia, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 13–1758 PLF

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 4, 2014

Steve Nabors, Moran and Associates, Charles Anthony Moran, Law Offices of Charles A. Moran, Jehan A. Patterson, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Michael T. Kirkpatrick, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Laura George, Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Court

This action was filed under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the rights of plaintiff Jayshawn Douglas under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. This Court previously entered a “stay-put” order, granting relief on plaintiff's Section 1415(j) claim. Pursuant to the IDEA, plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees and costs incurred in pursuing the “stay-put” order, totaling $25,499.65. The District of Columbia opposes the motion, arguing that plaintiff is not a “prevailing party” and thus is not entitled to fees and costs; and, in the alternative, it argues that the fees should be substantially reduced. Upon consideration of the parties' papers, the relevant legal authorities, and pertinent portions of the record in this case, the Court will grant plaintiff's motion in part and deny it in part, and will award attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $17,009.62, representing $16,034.00 in attorneys' fees and $975.62 in costs.¹

I. BACKGROUND

The facts are summarized as relevant. The Court's prior memorandum opinions provide more detail. See Mem. Op. at 3–5; MTD Op. at 2–3. Jayshawn Douglas is an eighteen-year old resident of the District of Columbia. Compl. ¶¶ 5–6, 8. He is a student with disabilities who has been classified as “Other Health Impaired” under the IDEA. Compl. ¶ 8. Mr. Douglas' individualized education program (“IEP”) states that his current placement is the Twilight Program at Dunbar Senior High School (“Dunbar”), an extended school day program for qualifying at-risk students. IEP at 17; see also Compl. ¶ 17.

Prior to the 2013–2014 school year, staff of the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”), Mr. Douglas, and Mr. Douglas' parent discussed changing Mr. Douglas' assignment from Dunbar to another school or program. Resolution Sess. Tr. 8–9. Although DCPS proposed transferring him, no transfer was completed. When Mr. Douglas attempted to attend classes at Dunbar several times in Fall 2013, Dunbar staff did not permit him to enter the school. Compl. ¶¶ 18–21.

On October 28, 2013, Mr. Douglas filed an administrative due process complaint challenging, among other things, Dunbar's refusal to admit him. Compl. ¶ 22; Due Process Compl. Although his administrative complaint was assigned to a hearing officer, Mr. Douglas filed the instant complaint in this Court on November 7, 2013. The complaint alleges that the District's refusal to allow Mr. Douglas access to his educational placement violated the “stay-put” provision of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.² Mr. Douglas simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion for a temporary restraining order, both also seeking the “stay-put” order sought in Count One of his complaint. On November 14, 2013, this Court granted Mr. Douglas' motion for a preliminary injunction, issuing a “stay-put” order, and denying the motion for a temporary restraining order as moot. Mem. Op. at 5–6. The District since has allowed Mr. Douglas to return to Dunbar and attend the “Twilight Program.” Fee Opp. at 3.

Mr. Douglas now moves for an award of $25,499.65 in attorneys' fees and costs associated with obtaining the “stay-put” order.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court previously has set forth the appropriate analytical framework for determining the award of attorneys' fees and costs in special education cases like this one. See Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 59 F.Supp.2d 37, 42–44 (D.D.C.1999). To recover reasonable attorneys' fees, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she is a prevailing party in the litigation. Id. at 40–41 ; see also Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 328 F.Supp.2d 36, 42–45 (D.D.C.2004). For a party to be a prevailing party, it must have succeeded on a significant issue raised in the litigation and secured some of the benefit sought. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). In addition, this benefit must reflect a change in the legal relationship between the parties, and that change must be judicially sanctioned in some way. Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 328 F.Supp.2d at 45 (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604–05, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) ). Once it has determined that the plaintiff is a prevailing party, the Court then must determine whether the fees sought are reasonable by calculating “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate”—the so-called “lodestar” fee. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. See e.g., In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415, 1423 n. 13 (D.C.Cir.1989) ; Sierra Club v. Jackson, 926 F.Supp.2d 341, 346 (D.D.C.2013).

On the issue of reasonableness, a plaintiff must submit supporting documentation with the motion for attorneys' fees, providing sufficient detail so that the Court can determine “with a high degree of certainty ” that the hours billed were actually and reasonably expended, that the hourly rate charged was reasonable in view of the attorney's reputation and level of skill and experience with respect to this type of case, and that the matter was appropriately staffed to do the work required efficiently and without duplicative billing. In re Olson, 884 F.2d at 1423, 1428–29 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation omitted); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 397 F.Supp.2d 12, 14 (D.D.C.2005). At a minimum, a fee applicant must provide some information about the attorney's billing practices, hourly rates, and skill and experience, as well as the nature of the attorney's practice as it relates to this kind of litigation and the prevailing market rates in the community. Rooths v. Dist. of Columbia, 802 F.Supp.2d 56, 60 (D.D.C.2011) ; Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 397 F.Supp.2d at 14–15.

Once a plaintiff has provided such information, there is a presumption that the number of hours billed and the hourly rate are reasonable, and the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's showing of reasonable hours and reasonable hourly rates for attorneys of the relevant level of skill and expertise.SeeWatkins v. Vance, 328 F.Supp.2d 23, 26 (D.D.C.2004). “[I]n the normal case the Government must either accede to the applicant's requested rate or provide specific contrary evidence tending to show that a lower rate would be appropriate.” Covington v. Dist. of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1109–10 (D.C.Cir.1995) (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec'y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C.Cir.1982) ); see also Rooths v. Dist. of Columbia, 802 F.Supp.2d at 60.

III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Douglas seeks to recover the fees and costs for three attorneys: Charles A. Moran, Steve Nabors, and Tanjima Islam. In support of Mr. Douglas' motion, each attorney has submitted a declaration attesting to his or her experience and billing practices. See Declaration of Charles A. Moran, Esq. (“Moran Decl.”), Fee Mot. Ex. 4; Declaration of Steve Nabors, Esq. (“Nabors Decl.”), Fee Mot. Ex. 5; Declaration of Tanjima Islam, Esq. (“Islam Decl.”), Fee Mot. Ex. 6. Attached to the motion are also invoices documenting the hours billed and the costs incurred. See Fee Mot. Ex. 1–3.

The District opposes the fee motion on the grounds that (1) Mr. Douglas is not a “prevailing party” and thus not entitled to attorneys' fees and costs under the IDEA; (2) plaintiff's attorneys' hourly rate should be capped at $90 per hour pursuant to D.C.Code § 11–2604(a) ; and (3) the claimed hourly rates and number of hours should be reduced. The Court finds the District's arguments largely unpersuasive for the reasons that follow.

A. Mr. Douglas is a Prevailing Party

On November 14, 2013, this Court issued a “stay-put” order, awarding Mr. Douglas full relief on his Section 1415(j) claim and corresponding motion for a preliminary injunction. As a result, Mr. Douglas was reenrolled at Dunbar and the District was halted from transferring him to another program, unquestionably altering the parties' legal relationship. In these circumstances, the Court finds that Mr. Douglas is the prevailing party as to the Section 1415(j) claim and that he therefore is entitled to associated attorneys' fees and costs. See Laster v. Dist. of Columbia, 2006 WL 2085394, at *3 (D.D.C. July 25, 2006) (party who obtains “stay-put” order is a prevailing party because “the court awarded plaintiffs the relief they sought”).

The District argues that Mr. Douglas is not a prevailing party because there has been “no permanent material change [to] his legal relationship with DCPS and the merits of his pending claims have not been decided.” Fee Opp. at 4–5. It relies relying on decisions from the Third Circuit holding that “ ‘stay put’ orders which merely serve to maintain the status quo pendente lite do not afford meaningful relief on the merits of the underlying claims and will not suffice [to establish a prevailing party].” People Against Polic e Violence v. City of Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226, 232–33 (3d Cir.2008) (citing John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558, 559 (3d Cir.2003) ); see also J.O. ex rel. C.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 267, 272–73 (3d Cir.2002). These cases are inapplicable because the Third Circuit applies restrictions above and beyond Buckhannon, barring the recovery of attorneys' fees for any “interim” relief that...