Douglas v. Farrow
Decision Date | 11 April 1960 |
Docket Number | No. 47438,No. 1,47438,1 |
Citation | 334 S.W.2d 234 |
Parties | Anna Lee DOUGLAS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ed FARROW, Defendant-Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Adolph K. Schwartz, St. Louis, Chapman, Schwartz & Chapman, St. Louis, of counsel, for appellant.
Gerhard and Padberg, St. Louis, for respondent.
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff, a married woman and a passenger in an automobile operated by her father, when it collided with the rear of an automobile that had stopped in traffic ahead of it at an intersection, and it was struck in the rear by an automobile that was following it. The action is against the operators of the two automobiles. Verdict and judgment were for plaintiff for $15,000 against defendant Farrow (plaintiff's father) and defendant Kramer, the operator of the automobile that was following. Only defendant Farrow has appealed.
The cause was submitted against defendant Farrow on primary negligence in permitting his automobile to overtake and collide with the rear-end of the Lammers automobile. The first assignment presented on appeal is that the court erred in failing to direct a verdict for defendant Farrow at the close of all the evidence. The vital issue is whether there was substantial evidence to show that the Farrow automobile in which plaintiff was riding struck the automobile ahead of it before it was itself hit in the rear and knocked into the automobile ahead of it. Appellant concedes that the Kramer automobile struck the Farrow automobile and that there was a collision between the Farrow and Lammers vehicles. We shall state the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff and disregard defendants' evidence unless it aids the plaintiff's case or unless a statement of it is necessary to a better understanding of the issues presented. Evidence bearing upon the credibility, weight and value of plaintiff's personal testimony will be reviewed when ruling the specific issues presented for consideration. We shall not review the evidence concerning the extent of plaintiff's injuries, since no issue of excessiveness is presented. It is sufficient to say that plaintiff's evidence tends to show that she sustained a neck and back injury, including a herniated intervertebral disc; and that the injuries from which she suffers were caused by the mentioned collisions.
We shall also omit plaintiff's personal testimony about the occurrence, until after we have reviewed other evidence favorable to her, because it is appellant's theory that the Farrow car had completely stopped and did not collide with the Lammers car until after it was hit in the rear with great force by the Kramer automobile; and that the only evidence upon which plaintiff's cause could have been submitted against defendant Farrow was the testimony of plaintiff herself, which testimony the appellant contends 'cannot be considered to be substantial evidence * * * because her testimony as to this accident is absolutely false and she admitted to perjury concerning the same.' Appellant insists that the verdict should be set aside because it was procured by false or perjured testimony.
Plaintiff and her husband resided near her father's residence, near Potosi, Missouri, and, as stated, she was riding in the front seat of his 1954 Buick Roadmaster automobile on a trip with him, intending to visit relatives in St. Louis, when she was injured. The collisions occurred about 4:30 p. m. January 7, 1957, on Gravois Road, near Weber Road, in the City of St. Louis. At least five automobiles were involved, all were eastbound and traveling in the inside or left lane of the three eastbound lanes. An unidentified eastbound automobile had stopped in this lane, signaling for a left turn into a driveway. At that time it was being followed by the Zinzer, Lammers, Farrow and Kramer automobiles, in that order, and what happened, after the first automobile stopped, was referred to by State Highway Patrolman Upton as 'a series of rear-end collisions.' Neither Zinzer nor Lammers struck the automobile ahead of him prior to the collisions occurring to the rear and they all awaited the arrival of a State Highway Patrolman. The patrolman interviewed the drivers of each of the automobiles. He reviewed his report without objection at the trial. Zinzer said: 'There were two cars ahead of me, and the first car was making a left turn, so I had to stop behind, and the guy behind me stopped, and then all of a sudden somebody plowed into him and pushed him into me.' Lammers said: 'The first car was standing still, and I noticed it, and I can't say whether I was fully stopped, and just about that quick, bang, bang, I was hit in the rear.' Farrow (defendant-appellant) said: 'The guy in front stopped, and I bumped him, and then the fellow behind hit me.' Kramer said: 'I was proceeding down the street at normal speed, and cars in front of me came to an immediate stop, and I put my brakes on clear to the floorboard, and that's about it.' Kramer said he was driving 30 miles per hour and admitted colliding with the Farrow car. No one was arrested, but plaintiff was taken to a hospital.
The 'largest portion' of the damage to defendant Farrow's car was on the front end, including the front bumper face bar, front bumper guards and back bars, the grille, the upper bar on the right and left grille extension, the radiator support, front fender skirting, molding and hood. The left front fender had to be straightened and the 'front end' aligned. Concerning his car, defendant Farrow said: 'The bumpers was torn off, the grille was torn off, the fender and the lights.' At the rear, 'the fender was tore out like that and the bumper and I believe some of the lights.' Other evidence showed certain damage to the transmission and that the rear bumper and the tailpipe had to be replaced and the left rear panel had to be straightened.
Defendant Farrow, age 77, a witness for defendants, testified: 'Beginning, we was all driving along about forty miles per hour, we gradually slowed down.' Traffic conditions were not too bad and he was traveling 'not very fast', when he noticed the Lammers car stopping. Farrow was 'not too far behind him.' 'We were all driving close * * * we wasn't very far apart.' He didn't think it was 15 feet, but believed it was closer. Before 'Lammers and the guy in front slowed down,' Farrow was driving 'closer than fifteen feet to Lammers" car. He was then driving less than 20 miles per hour, perhaps less than 10 miles per hour. He didn't give the patrolman a statement ('I say he come and took it down'). He could not say that he was asked how the accident happened, but he denied that he said he hit Lammers first. He said he had come to a complete stop without hitting Lammers; that he had good brakes and had his foot on the brake, when he was hit by Kramer and pushed into collision with the Lammers car. Farrow said his car did not skid, that his taillights were working perfectly before the collision and would light up if you stepped on the brake. The front and back ends of the Lammers car were badly damaged and the 'bumpers were pushed kind of into the body and back.' It was not repaired by the owner, but was traded in.
Defendant Kramer (plaintiff's witness), traveling behind the Farrow car, was driving a 1955 Buick in perfect condition. The weather was clear, no rain or snow, and he was driving approximately 50 feet behind the Farrow car. It was proceeding in a normal manner, both cars traveling at the same pace, 28 to 30 miles per hour, and then all of a sudden it (the Farrow car) came to an immediate halt and Kramer 'noticed that there was emergency conditions going on.' The rear-end of the Farrow car was in an 'upward attitude and coming back in a bounce, the rear bounced.' Its bumper level was higher than normal and it was coming back toward him. This indicated to him that the Farrow car was in a collision ahead. He was then in about 20 feet of the Farrow car and had his brakes fully applied. His car slid approximately eight feet and was already skidding when he saw the Farrow car 'with its rear-end in the air.' He had reduced his speed to 20 miles per hour and had applied his brakes 'at the instant he saw the Farrow car bouncing backward.' He admitted he knew that, when brakes are applied, the front end of a car goes down and the rear-end comes up, but he didn't see any taillights go on on the Farrow car. While he hit the Farrow car, he didn't think he could have knocked it into the car ahead. The only damage he observed to the rear of the Farrow car was two scratches on the rear bumper and the broken glass in the left back-up light. He did notice extensive damage to the front end of the Farrow car.
We shall not stop to determine whether the facts hereinbefore reviewed and the reasonably favorable inferences to be drawn therefrom are entirely adequate to sustain the verdict of the jury, but shall proceed to review plaintiff's own testimony, which appellant insists is false and perjured. Plaintiff testified that, as her father's car was proceeding east in traffic in the eastbound lane, next to the center line of Gravois Avenue, several cars up ahead stopped. Her father, not noticing the Lammers car stopping immediately in front of him, collided with it and the Kramer car behind him collided with his car and she was thrown forward and backward in the seat and was injured. She said: 'I noticed the car in front of dad being stopped, and I glanced to see if he had noticed it, and it seemed he was glancing out to the left, and I said, 'Dad, dad, watch it." He immediately applied the brakes, but the front of his car struck the center rear of the Lammers car. Only a few seconds later the Kramer car struck the rear of the Farrow car. She didn't notice the second jolt like she did the first, but she was made dizzy and numb and her back was hurting and she was rubbing the back of her head. She saw the...
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