Douglas v. N.Y. State Adirondack Park Agency

• Citation: 895 F.Supp.2d 321
• Decision Date: 11 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. 8:10–CV–0299 (GTS/RFT).,8:10–CV–0299 (GTS/RFT).
• Parties: Leroy M. DOUGLAS; and the Douglas Corp. of Silver Lake, Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK STATE ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY; Paul Van Cott, individually and as an emp. and attorney for N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency; Douglas Miller, individually and as an emp. of the N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency; Mark Rooks, individually and as an emp. of the N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency; John Banta, individually and as an emp. and attorney for N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency; Curt F. Stiles, individually and as a comm'r of the N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency; Cecil Wray, individually and as a comm'r of the N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency; Adirondack Council, Inc.; Brian Houseal, individually and as a dir. of the Adirondack Council, Inc.; Scott M. Lorey, individually and as an emp. and officer of the Adirondack Council, Inc.; Brian Ruder, individually, and as member and Chairman of the bd. of dir. of the Adirondack Council, Inc., and as a member, dir. and officer of Hawkeye Conservationists, Inc.; Hawkeye Conservationists, Inc.; and John Does 1 through 10 (representing as of yet unknown and unidentified emp. or officers of N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency or emp. or officers of the Adirondack Park Agency or emp. or officers of the Adirondack Council, Inc., or Hawkeye Conservationists, Inc.), Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

895 F.Supp.2d 321

Leroy M. DOUGLAS; and the Douglas Corp. of Silver Lake, Plaintiffs,

v.NEW YORK STATE ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY; Paul Van Cott, individually and as an emp. and attorney for N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency; Douglas Miller, individually and as an emp. of the N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency; Mark Rooks, individually and as an emp. of the N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency; John Banta, individually and as an emp. and attorney for N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency; Curt F. Stiles, individually and as a comm'r of the N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency; Cecil Wray, individually and as a comm'r of the N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency; Adirondack Council, Inc.; Brian Houseal, individually and as a dir. of the Adirondack Council, Inc.; Scott M. Lorey, individually and as an emp. and officer of the Adirondack Council, Inc.; Brian Ruder, individually, and as member and Chairman of the bd. of dir. of the Adirondack Council, Inc., and as a member, dir. and officer of Hawkeye Conservationists, Inc.; Hawkeye Conservationists, Inc.; and John Does 1 through 10 (representing as of yet unknown and unidentified emp. or officers of N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency or emp. or officers of the Adirondack Park Agency or emp. or officers of the Adirondack Council, Inc., or Hawkeye Conservationists, Inc.), Defendants.

No. 8:10–CV–0299 (GTS/RFT).

United States District Court,

N.D. New York.

Sept. 11, 2012.

Briggs Norfolk LLP, Matthew D. Norfolk, Esq., of Counsel, Lake Placid, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, Gregory J. Rodriguez, Esq., Susan L. Taylor, Esq., Assistant Attorneys General, of Counsel, Albany, NY, for the State of New York Counsel for the APA Defendants.

Bond Schoeneck & King, PLLC, Edward R. Conan, Esq., of Counsel, Syracuse, NY, for the AC Defendants.

Bousquet Holstein PLLC, Lawrence M. Ordway, Jr., Esq., Cecelia R. Cannon, Esq., James L. Sonneborn, Esq., of Counsel, Syracuse, NY, for Defendant Ruder.

Brennan & White, L.L.P., Daniel J. Stewart, Esq., of Counsel, Queensbury, NY, for Defendant Hawkeye.

MEMORANDUM–DECISION and ORDER

GLENN T. SUDDABY, District Judge.

Currently pending before the Court, in this civil rights action filed by Leroy M. Douglas Corporation of Silver Lake (“Plaintiffs”) against the New York State Adirondack Park Agency and six of its employees (“APA Defendants”), ¹ the Adirondack Council, Inc., and two of its members (“AC Defendants”),² Brian Ruder, Hawkeye Conservationists, Inc., and ten John Does, are the following five motions: (1) the APA Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to state a claim and/or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and/or 12(b)(1), or, in the alternative, to disqualify Plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to the New York Rules of Professional Conduct ( Dkt. No. 40); (2) the AC Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 42); (3) Defendant Hawkeye's motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 43); (4) Defendant Ruder's motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 52); and (5) Plaintiffs' cross-motion for leave to amend their Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (Dkt. No. 56). For the reasons set forth below, the APA Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part; the AC Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part; Defendant Hawkeye's motion to dismiss is granted; Defendant Ruder's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part; and Plaintiffs' cross-motion for leave to amend is granted in part and denied in part.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

Generally, Plaintiffs' Complaint, filed on March 15, 2010, asserts the following 13 claims against Defendants arising from Defendants' alleged treatment of Plaintiffs in response to Plaintiffs' attempt to subdivide certain tracts of land that Plaintiffs own on Silver Lake in the Adirondack State Park, and Plaintiffs' speech regarding environmental policies promulgated by Defendants, between approximately 2005 and 2009: (1) a claim against all Defendants for selective treatment in an APA enforcement proceeding, denial of due process and/or denial of equal protection under the law (in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985); (2) a claim against all Defendants for unlawful search and seizure (in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (3) a claim against all Defendants for malicious prosecution of an APA enforcement proceeding (in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (4) a claim against all Defendants for malicious prosecution of an APA enforcement proceeding (in violation of state law); (5) a claim against all Defendants for abuse of process in an APA enforcement proceeding and criminal action (in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (6) a claim against all Defendants for abuse of process in an APA enforcement proceeding and criminal action (in violation of state law); (7) a claim against the APA Defendants for intentional/reckless supervisory misconduct (in violation of state law); (8) a claim against all Defendants for conspiracy (pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985); (9) a claim against all Defendants for intentional/reckless infliction of emotional distress (in violation of state law); (10) a claim against all Defendants for prima facie tort (in violation of state law); (11) a claim against the APA Defendants for breach of contract (in violation of state law); (12) a claim against the APA Defendants for malicious prosecution of a criminal action (in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983); and (13) a claim against all Defendants for retaliation (in violation of the First Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983). (Dkt. No. 1.)

Because the parties have (in their memoranda of law) demonstrated an accurate understanding of the factual allegations giving rise to these claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint, the Court will not summarize those factual allegations in this Decision and Order, which is intended primarily for the review of the parties. Rather, the Court will reference those factual allegations only when necessary in Parts III.A. through III.D. of this Decision and Order.

Plaintiffs' proposed Amended Complaint reasserts the 13 claims asserted in their original Complaint, expands somewhat on the thirteenth claim, and asserts the following two new claims: (1) a claim against the AC Defendants, Defendant Hawkeye and Defendant Ruder for tortious interference with contract (in violation of state law); and (2) a claim against all Defendants for failure to prevent a conspiracy and wrongful acts (pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986). (Dkt. No. 56, Attach. 18–19.) Again, because the parties have (in their memoranda of law) demonstrated an accurate understanding of the proposed amendments to Plaintiffs' original Complaint, the Court will not summarize those proposed amendments in this Decision and Order, but will merely reference them when necessary in Part III.E. of this Decision and Order.

II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDSA. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

In their memoranda of law, the parties have demonstrated an accurate understanding of the legal standard governing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). ( See, e.g.,Dkt. No. 40, Attach. 1, at 24–25 [attaching pages “15” and “16” of APA Defs.' Memo. of Law]; Dkt. No. 42, Attach. 2, at 16 [attaching page “8” of AC Defs.' Memo. of Law]; Dkt. No. 52, Attach. 1, at 11 [attaching page “4” of Def. Ruder's Memo. of Law]; Dkt. No. 56, Attach. 3, at 13–15 [attaching pages “1” through “3” of Plfs.' Memo. of Law].) As a result, the Court will not repeat that standard in this Decision and Order, which (again) is intended primarily for the review of the parties.

Rather, the Court will add only a few words regarding what documents are considered when a dismissal for failure to state a claim is contemplated. Generally, when contemplating a dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the following matters outside the four corners of the complaint may be considered without triggering the standard governing a motion for summary judgment: (1) documents attached as an exhibit to the complaint or answer, (2) documents incorporated by reference in the complaint (and provided by the parties), (3) documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the complaint, or (4) any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.³

B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject–Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), the court must accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint. Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir.1998). However, unlike the procedure when reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the procedure when reviewing a motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction does not involve “draw[ing] inferences from the complaint favorable to Plaintiffs.” J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir.2004).⁴ This is because,as explained more fully below, “when the question to be considered is one involving the jurisdiction of a federal court, jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively [by the party asserting such jurisdiction], and that showing is not made by drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting it.” Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir.1998). Similarly, unlike...