Douglas v. Payne
| Decision Date | 16 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:19-cv-1061 |
| Parties | COURTNEY JERRELL DOUGLAS PETITIONER v. DEXTER PAYNE, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation filed by the Honorable Barry A. Bryant, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Arkansas. ECF No. 10. Judge Bryant recommends that Petitioner Courtney Jerrell Douglas's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254 be denied. Petitioner has responded with objections. ECF No. 14. Respondent has filed a response to Petitioner's objections. ECF No. 19. The Court finds the matter ripe for consideration.
After a jury trial in Union County, Arkansas, Petitioner Douglas was convicted of first-degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced as a habitual offender and received a term of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction with a consecutive fifteen-year enhancement for using a firearm to commit the murder. He was sentenced to a forty-year term of imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm to run consecutively with the first-degree murder and enhancement sentences.[1]
After trial, some of Douglas's family members and friends alleged that they were excluded from the courtroom during voir dire. Upon learning this information, Douglas represented by postconviction counsel, moved for a new trial, claiming that his First and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when several of his relatives and friends were excluded from the courtroom during voir dire. After a hearing, the Union County Circuit Court denied the motion for new trial, finding that there was freedom of access to the courtroom.
Douglas filed a direct appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial and denying his request to instruct the jury on manslaughter and justification. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed Douglas's convictions. Douglas v. State, 2017 Ark. 70, 511 S.W.3d 852 (2017).
Douglas then filed a timely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the proper jury instructions on manslaughter and justification. Douglas's Rule 37.1 petition was denied. The Union County Circuit Court concluded that because Douglas armed himself, went to the victim's home to confront him, and then shot him multiple times, there was no rational basis for giving jury instructions on justification and manslaughter.
Douglas appealed the denial of his Rule 37.1 petition, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Douglas's ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to the justification instruction. Douglas v. State, 2018 Ark. 89, at 5-9, 540 S.W.3d 685, 690-91 (2018).[2]In a later opinion, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Douglas's ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to the manslaughter instruction. Douglas v. State, 2019 Ark. 57, at 7-14, 567 S.W.3d 483, 490-93 (2019).
Douglas then filed in this Court a timely Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is the matter currently before the Court. ECF No. 1. In the instant petition, Douglas raises five claims: (1) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial; (2) officers of the Union County Circuit Court improperly destroyed video evidence; (3) his postconviction counsel was ineffective because he did not seek forensic analysis to retrieve the video record; (4) his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not request the appropriate affirmative defense jury instruction; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first-degree murder because the deadly force was justified. Judge Bryant has issued a Report and Recommendation in which he recommends that the Court deny the instant petition. ECF No. 10. Petitioner has responded with specific objections. ECF No. 14.
A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the state court's decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; . . . or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
A state court acts contrary to clearly established federal law if it applies a legal rule that contradicts the Supreme Court's prior holdings or if it reaches a different result from one of the Supreme Court's cases despite confronting indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court violates the “unreasonable application” clause of 2254(d)(1) if it “identifies the correct governing legal rule from Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case.” Id. at 407. “[I]t is not enough for [the court] to conclude that, in [its] independent judgment, [it] would have applied federal law differently than state court; the state court's application must have been objectively unreasonable.” Rousan v. Roper, 436 F.3d 951, 956 (8th Cir. 2006).
When reviewing whether a state court decision involves an “unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings, state court findings of basic, primary, or historical facts are presumed correct unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Collier v. Norris, 485 F.3d 415, 423 (8th Cir. 2007). “[E]ven erroneous fact-finding by the [state] courts will not justify granting a writ if those courts erred ‘reasonably.'” Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024, 1030 (8th Cir. 2001).
Douglas raises five claims in his pro se petition, and the Court has conducted a de novo review of each claim in light of Douglas's objections to the Report and Recommendation.
Douglas claims that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when a court security officer prevented his family members and friends from entering the courtroom during voir dire. ECF No. 1, pp. 4-8. Based on this claim, Douglas moved for a new trial, and the circuit court held a hearing on the motion. The circuit court heard testimony from Douglas's family members and court security officers and reviewed video surveillance from inside the courtroom. The circuit court concluded that no court security officer prevented Douglas's family members from entering the courtroom.
Douglas raised this issue on direct appeal, and the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed it as follows:
Here, the circuit court, after hearing the testimony of Douglas's family members and court security, and after reviewing video surveillance from inside the courtroom, concluded that there was no closure, not even a de minimus one. A circuit court's finding of fact will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Strom v. State, 348 Ark. 610, 74 S.W.3d 233 (2002). The court affirmatively stated that it did not close the courtroom, and there is nothing in the record to suggest otherwise. Some family members claimed court security kept them from entering the courtroom. However, the court found the testimony of the family members was “without credibility,” stating their version of events was “just not believable.” In its written order, the circuit court further stated that court security “did not prevent the public or defendant's family or friends from access to and/or entry into the courtroom during the voir dire/jury selection process.” Accordingly, the circuit court's findings were based primarily on its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. As the circuit court is in a superior position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, we defer to its assessment of the witnesses' testimony. See Johnson v. State, 2015 Ark. 387, 472 S.W.3d 486. Because the court's finding that the courtroom was not closed is not clearly erroneous, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Douglas's motion for new trial.
Douglas, 2017 Ark. 70, at *3-4, 511 S.W.3d at 854-55.
In his Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 10), Judge Bryant, citing the Arkansas Supreme Court's analysis of the issue, found that the circuit court's decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Douglas argues that Judge Bryant erred by not analyzing the circuit court's findings to determine if they were unreasonable. However, Judge Bryant did briefly analyze the circuit court's factual findings and concluded that the circuit court's decision was entitled to substantial deference and that the findings of facts concerning the credibility of the witnesses were reasonable. The Court agrees with Judge Bryant. The circuit court's findings were based primarily on its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, and the circuit court found that the testimony of Douglas's family members that they were prevented from entering the courtroom was without credibility. The circuit court was in a superior position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, and its interpretation of the facts was reasonable given the testimony and evidence presented. Accordingly, the Court finds that Douglas's claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial should be denied.
Douglas claims that security officers at the Union County Circuit Court either “destroyed evidence or allowed the destruction of...
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