Douglas v. State

• Decision Date: 30 December 1987
• Docket Number: No. 71A04-8709-CR-268.,71A04-8709-CR-268.
• Citation: 517 N.E.2d 116
• Parties: Lloyd H. DOUGLAS, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

517 N.E.2d 116

Lloyd H. DOUGLAS, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.

No. 71A04-8709-CR-268.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.

December 30, 1987.

Charles W. Lahey, South Bend, for defendant-appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Amy Schaeffer Good, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.

HOFFMAN, Judge.

Lloyd Douglas appeals from his conviction of battery, a Class A misdemeanor, after a bench trial in St. Joseph County Superior Court.

The facts pertinent to this appeal can be gleaned from the testimony offered at trial: David Stevens testified that on June 10, 1983, he lived next door to Douglas' sister. On that date, he and Douglas had an argument over Stevens' driving of his car too close to Douglas' nieces, and the argument escalated into an altercation where Douglas cut Stevens with a knife. Douglas' sister, Doris Jean Douglas, testified that she observed this altercation but that Douglas was not the man who cut Stevens with a knife, nor was Douglas even present at her house on that date. Douglas testified in his own defense that he did not cut Stevens, nor was he at his sister's house on June 10, 1983. Douglas further testified that if he had been able to prepare his defense to this charge at an earlier time than when he became aware of these charges after his arrest in 1986, he would have been able to produce additional witnesses to testify in support of his alibi defense.

Douglas was charged with battery by an Information filed on June 27, 1983. A warrant was issued on June 27, 1983, but no further action was taken until a second warrant was issued on June 5, 1986. Trial was ultimately held on February 26, 1987.

Douglas alleges here that the delay in the prosecution of this case violated his constitutional rights to due process and a speedy trial, and prejudiced him in his presentation of a defense to this charge. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a right to a speedy trial, and that right is applied to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Marion (1971), 404 U.S. 307, 313, 92 S.Ct. 455, 459, 3 L.Ed.2d 468. The United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, discussed the approach that should be taken to review a criminal defendant's claim of prejudice resulting from the delay in bringing his case to trial:

"Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a

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