Douglass v. State
Decision Date | 16 March 1926 |
Docket Number | 8 Div. 402 |
Parties | DOUGLASS v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Franklin County; C.P. Almon, Judge.
William J. Douglass was convicted of assault with intent to rob, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Williams & Chenault, of Russellville, A.H Carmichael, of Tuscumbia, and Mason Douglass, of Dayton Ohio, for appellant.
Harwell G. Davis, Atty. Gen., and Robert G. Tate, Asst. Atty. Gen for the State.
The indictment contained three counts, and there was a general verdict returned by the jury, "Guilty as charged in the indictment."
Numerous insistences as to the sufficiency of the several counts of the indictment were made in the court below, and the rulings of the court on these questions are here urged as being error.
The offense charged was "assault with intent to rob." There is no statutory robbery in this state. The common law prevails in Alabama as to this offense; and robbery, at common law, is an offense against both person and property, and is briefly defined as the felonious taking of money, or goods of value, from the person of another, or in his presence, by violence to his person, or by putting him in fear. The only statute on the subject of robbery in this state is section 5460 of the Code of 1923, and this statute merely prescribes the punishment for the commission of the common-law offense.
Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment follow the form prescribed in Code 1923, p. 480 (form 16), and were sufficient.
By elaborate briefs of counsel it is earnestly insisted that count 2 of the indictment was fatally defective, in that said count charges an assault upon James Hester, who was at the time acting as cashier of the First National Bank of Russellville, Ala., a corporation, with the felonious intent, by violence to his person or by putting him in fear of some serious and immediate injury to his person, to rob said First National Bank of Russellville, Ala., a corporation. The contention is "that an indictment which charges an assault upon 'A.' with intent to rob 'B.' would be absolutely bad." We cannot accede to this proposition as relating to the count of the indictment here. This court judicially knows that a cashier of a bank is the officer thereof who is intrusted with, and whose duty is to take care of, the cash or money of such bank; or, in other words, that the cashier of a bank is the custodian of the funds of such bank, and, by the great weight of authority, the words "taking from the person of another," as used in connection with the common-law definition of robbery, are not restricted in application to those cases in which the property taken is in actual contact with the person of the one from whom it is taken, but include within their meaning the taking by violence or intimidation from the person wronged, in his presence, of property which either belongs to him or which is under his personal protection and control. To constitute robbery it is necessary, of course, that the property taken should be that of some other person than him who takes it, but it is not necessary that it should be the property of the person from whom it is taken. Thus a felonious taking by force has been held to be robbery where the property taken was in the lawful possession of a bailee, agent, or employee of the owner. We regard what has been said as being a sufficient answer to the insistences made in connection with the alleged invalidity of the indictment.
In addition to the plea of "not guilty," the defendant interposed the special statutory plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity."
The following "statement of facts" is quoted from briefs of counsel, and the essential part thereof appears to be borne out by the record:
The further "statement of facts" is quoted from brief of associate counsel for appellant:
There are two prevailing presumptions in this case: (1) The innocence of the defendant. This presumption is evidentiary in its nature, and attends the accused throughout the trial or until his guilt is proven by the required measure of proof and the established rules of evidence. (2) The sanity of the...
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Parsons v. State
... ... There ... is no statutory definition of robbery, but the common law ... definition is the felonious taking of money or goods of value ... from the person of another or in his presence, by violence to ... his person, or by putting him in fear. Douglass v ... State, 21 Ala.App. 289, 107 So. 791; 46 Am.Jur. 141, ... section 5. This requires an absence of voluntary consent on ... the part of the person robbed. 46 Am.Jur. 150, section 22; ... Davis v. State, 159 Ala. 104, 48 So. 694; Allen ... v. State, 40 Ala. 334, 91 Am.Dec. 476 ... ...
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Goldin v. State
...evidence on rebuttal is addressed largely to the trial court's discretion. Caldwell v. State, 203 Ala. 412, 84 So. 272; Douglass v. State, 21 Ala.App. 289, 107 So. 791. It is true as argued by appellant a witness cannot be impeached by contradicting him on an immaterial matter. Smith v. Sta......
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DeFranze v. State, 5 Div. 17
...taking of money or valuable goods from the person of another or in his presence by violence or putting him in fear. Douglass v. State, 21 Ala.App. 289, 107 So. 791; Hardis v. State, 28 Ala.App. 524, 189 So. 216; Parsons v. State, 251 Ala. 467, 38 So.2d 209; Cobern v. State, 273 Ala. 547, 14......
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Beverly v. State
...law robbery since there was no statutory robbery in this state before January 1, 1980, and the Criminal Code. Douglass v. State, 21 Ala.App. 289, 291, 107 So. 791 (1926); Alabama Code Section 13A-1-11 "(A) conviction based upon a record wholly devoid of any evidence of a crucial element of ......