Douthwright v. Champlin

• Decision Date: 08 March 1917
• Citation: 100 A. 97,91 Conn. 524
• Parties: DOUTHWRIGHT v. CHAMPLIN et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

100 A. 97

91 Conn. 524

DOUTHWRIGHT

v. CHAMPLIN et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 8, 1917.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; William S. Case, Judge.

Proceedings by Alfred Douthwright for workmen's compensation, opposed by Frank A. Champlin, employer, and another. Compensation was awarded by the commissioner, and the employer appealed to the superior court. The appeal was sustained, and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss, and the claimant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Thomas J. Spellacy, of Hartford, for appellant. William B. Ely, of New Haven, for appellee Champlin.

WHEELER, J. From the finding of the commissioner it appears that a contract of employment existed between the claimant, Douthwright, and the respondent Champlin on March 5, 1915, and for about two years prior thereto. Both the parties lived and Champlin's principal place of business was in Massachusetts, and the contract was made there.

Shortly before March 5, 1915, Champlin instructed the father of the claimant to go to Hartford, Conn., and sink a shaft for an elevator, and the claimant went with his father as his assistant in this work. On March 5, 1915, the claimant sustained an injury in Hartford which arose out of and in the course of this employment.

Both the claimant and respondent has accepted part B of chapter 138, P. A. 1913, and Champlin had insured his full liability in insurance companies authorized to take such risks.

The trial court found that the commissioner had no jurisdiction in the matter at issue, and therefore sustained the appeal and remanded the case to the commissioner, with directions to dismiss the proceedings for want of jurisdiction.

We have held that our state might provide in a workmen's compensation act compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of the employment under a contract made in Connecticut, but performed outside our state. We held that our act, not by direct expression, but by reasonable implication, when read in the light of its purpose, subject-matter and history, indicated an intent that contracts of employment made here might operate outside our jurisdiction. As a necessary corollary we held that:

We would "give similar effect to contracts of like character to those before us, though made under a compensation act of another jurisdiction, provided they did not conflict with our law or public policy, and the machinery provided for the ascertainment and collection of the compensation could be used in our jurisdiction." Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 381, 94 Atl. 372, 378, L. R. A. 1916A, 436.

We can enforce only such contracts as are enforceable in the jurisdiction of their origin. So we apply to this somewhat novel contract the usual rules for the construction and enforcement of all contracts. The practical difficulties of enforcing the foreign contract, at least where the act is contractual, will not be as a rule insuperable if it is kept in mind that the right of compensation given by the act and the venue are totally different concepts. The act cannot create, and at the same time destroy, the right to sue upon a transitory action.

The only actions to secure compensation under a foreign statute which we cannot enforce are those "where right and remedy are so united that the right cannot be enforced except in the manner and before the tribunal designated by the act." Tenn. Coal Co. v., George, 233 U. S. 354, 34 Sup. Ct. 587, 58 L. Ed. 997, L. R. A. 1916D, 685.

Nor does our act provide compensation for residents alone. Its language is not that of restriction or limitation, but all-embracing. For example, it applies to "all contracts of employment," and this was intended to mean wherever and by whomsoever made. It gives compensation for "any injury," and this was intended to furnish to nonresident and resident alike the new remedy. It defines an employer and an employé as "any person." It excepts certain classes, and the designation of these exceptions marks the only limitation upon the definition.

When we turn from the substantive provisions determining the cause of action to those provisions affecting the venue we come upon terms and language of generality and not of restriction. Every contract of employment not excepted by the act and to be performed within our state will automatically have incorporated in it the provision for compensation for injury unless one or the other party to the contract shall indicate his refusal to accept the provisions of part B of the act. The act applies to every natural or artificial person who enters upon a contract of employment.

When such a contract made in another state is entered upon here, the act does not attempt to make a new contract for the parties. It merely makes provision for the incorporation of an additional term, either by the voluntary acceptance of the parties, or by the laws assuming an acceptance in the absence of notice of refusal to accept. If the contract had been made in New Jersey, and the parties had accepted its terms, the contract; itself would have included the feature of compensation. We would then have enforced the contract unless the special terms of the act made its enforcement in this jurisdiction impracticable; for their act, like ours, is voluntary and contractual, and our declared public policy favors an enactment of this kind. If the contract had been made in South Carolina, where there is no compensation act, and the parties had upon entering upon its performance here accepted our act or failed to indicate a refusal to accept it in the manner called for by the act, it is not contended that the contract of hiring would not have been enlarged by the addition of our provision of compensation...