Dover Elevator Co. v. Arkansas State University

• Decision Date: 31 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-3677,94-3677
• Parties: 103 Ed. Law Rep. 49 DOVER ELEVATOR COMPANY, Appellant, v. ARKANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY; John Mangieri, President of ASU; AR State University Board of Trustees; Charlotte Bradbury, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Trustees of Arkansas State University; Wayne Hartsfield, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Trustees of Arkansas State University; Larry Ross, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Trustees of Arkansas State University; Harold Thomas, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Trustees of Arkansas State University; William R. Phillips, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Trustees of Arkansas State University; Bill Fisher; Metro Elevator Company, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 442

64 F.3d 442

103 Ed. Law Rep. 49

DOVER ELEVATOR COMPANY, Appellant, v. ARKANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY; John Mangieri, President of ASU;

AR State University Board of Trustees; Charlotte Bradbury,

Individually and as a Member of the Board of Trustees of

Arkansas State University; Wayne Hartsfield, Individually

and as a Member of the Board of Trustees of Arkansas State

University; Larry Ross, Individually and as a Member of the

Board of Trustees of Arkansas State University; Harold

Thomas, Individually and as a Member of the Board of

Trustees of Arkansas State University; William R. Phillips,

Individually and as a Member of the Board of Trustees of

Arkansas State University; Bill Fisher; Metro Elevator

Company, Inc., Appellees.

No. 94-3677.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted April 14, 1995.

Decided Aug. 31, 1995.

David A. Orsini, Little Rock, AR, argued, for appellant.

Lucinda McDaniel, Jonesboro, AR, argued (Richard Lusby, on the brief), for appellees Arkansas State University, et al.

W. Scott Davidson, Jonesboro, AR, argued, for appellee, Metro Elevator.

Before MAGILL and HANSEN, Circuit Judges, and STROM, ^* District Judge.

MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

Dover Elevator Company appeals from the final judgment of the district court ¹ dismissing its Sec. 1983 action against Arkansas State University and its trustees, and dismissing Dover's state law claims against the trustees and Metro Elevator Company. Dover argues that the district court erred in granting in part ASU's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and in denying Dover's motion to amend its complaint. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 1, 1988, Arkansas State University (ASU) contracted with Dover Elevator Company, a Delaware corporation, for elevator maintenance and service on the ASU campus. The contract included an automatic renewal clause providing that the contract would renew on July 1, 1993, unless either party gave written notice of cancellation ninety days prior to July 1, 1993. The provision applied at the end of each five-year period during which the contract continued.

In June 1992, as the end of the five-year period covered by the original contract approached, ASU began the bidding process for an elevator service contract to be awarded when the five years expired. Dover knew of, and participated in, the bidding process without informing ASU that it believed its contract would continue beyond the initial five-year period. At the end of the bidding process, Metro Elevator Company had entered the lowest bid, and was awarded the contract starting on July 1, 1993.

Dover then brought an action against ASU and its president, trustees and purchasing agent ("trustees") in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging that it was deprived of its property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, and seeking injunctive relief or, in the alternative, money damages. Dover also sought a declaratory judgment that the contract was valid and enforceable, and presented state law claims of breach of contract and tortious interference with business relations.

In lieu of an answer, ASU filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). On January 20, 1994, in a written order, the district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The order concluded that ASU and its trustees were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and that Dover had not presented a valid constitutional claim, because Dover did not have a property interest in the renewal of the contract. The court therefore dismissed Dover's constitutional claims. The court further concluded that Dover's state law claim of breach of contract was only applicable to ASU, not to the other defendants, because only ASU was a party to the contract, and therefore the other defendants could not be liable for breach of contract. Because ASU was immune, the court dismissed the breach of contract claim. The remaining state law claim, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, was not dismissed and was retained for trial.

Following this order, and denial of review by this Court pending a final judgment, Dover moved to amend their complaint one month before trial, seeking to add a state law claim of civil conspiracy among ASU, its trustees and Metro Elevator. In September 1994, the court denied the motion.

Dover then chose to voluntarily dismiss the tortious interference claim so that the Rule 12(b)(6) rulings, and the denial of their motion to amend the complaint, would convert to final judgment and become reviewable. On October 14, 1994, judgment was entered, finalizing the dismissal of the Sec. 1983 claims and the breach of contract claim in the January 1994 order and dismissing the remaining tortious interference claim.

This appeal followed. In their notice of appeal, Dover stated that they appeal from the judgment of October 1994, the order of January 1994, and the order of September 1994.

II. DISCUSSION

This appeal presents a series of interrelated issues. We begin by addressing ASU's argument that Dover's request for injunctive relief is not before this Court. We then will address Dover's claims that the court erred in dismissing the Sec. 1983 claims against ASU and its trustees, Dover's claim that the court erred in dismissing the state law breach of contract claim against ASU and its trustees, and finally Dover's claim that the court erred in denying Dover's motion to amend its complaint.

A. Scope of Appeal

ASU asserts that Dover's appeal is limited to a claim for money damages and that injunctive relief is not available, because the district court denied Dover's motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, and Dover has not appealed from the orders denying these motions. We disagree.

ASU is correct in that Dover did not appeal the denial of its motions for preliminary injunctive relief, and cannot now assert a claim for preliminary relief. See Berdella v. Delo, 972 F.2d 204, 208 (8th Cir.1992) (failure to specify order appealed from in notice of appeal bars appeal of that order). The notice of appeal does not cite the orders denying preliminary injunctive relief, or the order denying reconsideration of the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, and Dover cannot now assert those claims.

Failure to appeal the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, however, does not preclude appeal of a later denial of a permanent injunction. Cf. 19 The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., Federal Procedure Secs. 47.64-47.66 (1983) (discussing consolidation of motion for preliminary injunction and trial on the merits of permanent injunction). The January 1994 order cited in the district court's final judgment and in Dover's notice of appeal disposes of Dover's request for permanent injunctive relief, and therefore is before this Court on appeal.

ASU argues that the order disposes only of Dover's claims for money damages; we do not read the order in so limited a fashion. Although the district court does not classify the arguments as clearly as we would wish (and as we will in our discussion of the merits, infra ), the court addressed both money damages and injunctive relief in its order dismissing all of Dover's constitutional claims: "although money damages cannot be awarded in an official capacity suit, both injunctive and technically prospective relief are available." Order of Jan. 20, 1994, at 8. The court proceeded to find that the defendants were entitled to "qualified immunity" because no constitutional claim was presented: Dover had no property right in the contract. Id. at 9-11. The court concluded this discussion by stating that "it is necessary to dismiss plaintiff's constitutional claims." Although "qualified immunity" does not pertain to a request for injunctive relief against state officials, the court's determination that Dover had no property right in the contract does, and the court's dismissal of all constitutional claims, in light of its finding that Dover had not shown a property right in its contract with ASU, constitutes a ruling on the permanent injunctive relief requested by Dover in its complaint. We therefore find that Dover, in appealing the October 1994 judgment and the January 20 order cited in the judgment, has given proper notice that it is appealing the denial of a permanent injunction against ASU and its trustees.

B. Section 1983 Claims

The district court dismissed Dover's constitutional claims, brought under Sec. 1983, on the basis, first, that ASU and its officials were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and on the basis that Dover had not asserted a constitutional violation because it did not have a property right in its contract with ASU. We prefer to begin with the question of whether Dover has presented a constitutional violation; if there is no constitutional violation, there is no basis for a Sec. 1983 claim, regardless of the immunity of the defendants.

The district court dismissed Dover's constitutional claims on the basis of ASU's motion to dismiss, for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, under Rule 12(b)(6). We review the granting of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. We examine the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief. Ruge v. City of Bellevue, 892 F.2d 738, 739 (8th Cir.1989).

"Section 1983 relief is predicated on the denial of a right or interest protected by the Constitution." Medical Laundry Serv. v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 906 F.2d 571, 573 (11th Cir.1990). In its complaint, Dover alleged that it was deprived of its property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Analysis of either a procedural or substantive due process claim must begin with an examination of the interest allegedly...