Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party
Decision Date | 13 September 2004 |
Citation | 897 So.2d 1035 |
Parties | Ginette A. DOW v. ALABAMA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Dennis R. Bailey of Rushton Stakely Johnston & Garrett, P.A., Montgomery, for appellant.
Robert D. Segall and Shannon L. Holliday of Copeland Franco Screws & Gill, PA., Montgomery, for appellee the Alabama Democratic Party.
Dorman Walker of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Montgomery, for intervenors/appellees George Higginbotham and Georgia Hampton.
In this expedited appeal, Ginette A. Dow appeals from the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Alabama Democratic Party ("the Party"), upholding the Party's decision that Dow was not qualified to appear as the Party's candidate for a district judgeship in Jefferson County in the November 2004 general election. We affirm.
On April 2, 2004, Dow announced and declared her candidacy for district court judge, 10th Judicial Circuit, place 10, Jefferson County, for the Party's June 1, 2004, primary election. On April 6, 2004, George Higginbotham, a registered voter and resident of Tuscaloosa County, filed a challenge to Dow's candidacy alleging that Dow was not qualified to be the Party's candidate under Article VII, § 1(f),1 of the bylaws of the Executive Committee of the Party because she had sought the office of circuit judge as a Republican in 1998 and 2000.
On April 7, 2004, the chairman of the Party's Executive Committee, Redding Pitt, filed with the secretary of state a certified list of the Party's candidates for the June 1, 2004, primary election. Pitt's certification stated, in pertinent part:
The list showed Dow as the Party's sole candidate for the office of district court judge, 10th Judicial Circuit, place 10, Jefferson County.
On April 8, 2004, the Party informed Dow that her qualifications had been challenged. A hearing on the challenge conducted by the Party's subcommittee on election challenges was originally scheduled for April 14, 2004; however, because Dow was unavailable on that date, the hearing was rescheduled for April 28, 2004. On April 27, 2004, Georgia Hampton, a registered voter and resident of Jefferson County, joined, through counsel, Higginbotham's challenge to Dow's candidacy. On April 28, 2004, the subcommittee conducted the challenge hearing. Dow appeared with counsel, as did Higginbotham and Hampton. Dow's counsel challenged the proceeding on the basis that the subcommittee did not have jurisdiction to conduct the challenge hearing.2 On April 30, 2004, the subcommittee issued a unanimous decision agreeing to sustain the challenge to Dow's candidacy on the ground that she was disqualified under Article VII, § 1(f), of the bylaws of the Executive Committee of the Party.
On May 3, 2004, Dow filed a notice of appeal with Pitt, again challenging the jurisdiction of the Party to entertain the challenge to her candidacy. On June 9, 2004, Pitt entered an opinion affirming the challenge subcommittee's finding that Dow was disqualified from appearing as the Party's candidate in the November 2004 general election.
On June 21, 2004, Dow filed a complaint in the Montgomery Circuit Court seeking declaratory and equitable relief against the Party and Pitt, individually, and as chairman of the Executive Committee. Dow sought a judgment declaring that the Party did not have jurisdiction to entertain the challenge against her candidacy, a writ of mandamus directing the Party and Pitt to reverse the decision of the challenge subcommittee, and a writ of prohibition enjoining the Party from withdrawing her nomination. On July 14, 2004, Hampton and Higginbotham filed a motion to intervene, which the trial court granted; Hampton and Higginbotham filed an answer the same day. On July 19, 2004, the Party and Pitt filed a motion for a summary judgment with supporting legal argument and exhibits. On July 28, 2004, Dow filed a cross-motion for a summary judgment with supporting legal argument and exhibits.
On August 13, 2004, the trial court entered a summary judgment for the defendants; it also on that day denied Dow's cross-motion for a summary judgment. The trial court's order stated, in pertinent part:
Dow then appealed the summary judgment to this Court.
This Court's review of a summary judgment is de novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So.2d 72, 74 (Ala.2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial court applied. Specifically, we must determine whether the movant has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, [Ms. 1022154, July 16, 2004] ___ So.2d ___, ___ (Ala.2004). In making such a determination, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So.2d 756, 758 (Ala.1986). Once the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce "substantial evidence" as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989); Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12. "[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).
Dow does not argue against the merits of the Party's decision to disqualify her as a candidate; rather, she contests the Party's jurisdiction to entertain the challenge filed by Hampton and Higginbotham on the ground that the challenge was not made pursuant to certain requirements found in § 17-16-70 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, the statutory framework applicable to primary-election contests. Specifically, Dow presents the following issues to this Court for review:
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