Dow v. Nat'l Assur. Co. of Ireland

• Decision Date: 13 September 1904
• Citation: 58 A. 999,26 R.I. 379
• Parties: DOW v. NATIONAL ASSUR. CO. OF IRELAND.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

58 A. 999

26 R.I. 379

DOW

v. NATIONAL ASSUR. CO. OF IRELAND.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Sept. 13, 1904.

Action by Mary P. Dow against the National Assurance Company of Ireland. Heard on petition of defendant for new trial. Judgment for defendant.

Argued before STINESS, C. J., and TILLINGHAST and DUBOIS, JJ.

Thomas F. Farrell and Henry F. Thompson, for plaintiff.

John A. Tillinghast and James E. Smith, for defendant.

STINESS, C. J. The question raised in this case is the validity of the policy, Which covered household furniture of every description in the house occupied by the plaintiff. The policy is the standard form, as provided in Gen. Laws 189(5, c. 183, and contains a clause that the policy shall be void if the interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole ownership, unless other ownership be assented to in writing. It is admitted that a considerable portion of the furniture was owned by others than the plaintiff, she holding it under what is called the installment plan.

The plaintiff claims the right to recover on what she owned herself, and had a verdict under an instruction to that effect to which the defendant takes exception. The condition of the policy is plain, and the breach of it is admitted. Ownership is an important element in a contract of insurance. As said by Marshall, C. J., in Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 2 Pet 25, 7 L. Ed. 335: "Underwriters do not rely so much on the principals as on the interest of the assured; and it would seem, therefore, to be always material that they should know how far this interest is engaged in guarding the property from loss." Accordingly, when Insurance is contracted upon property as a whole, it is no answer to say that the insured owned a part of it. A new element would be introduced into the contract We cannot say that the contract would have been made as it was, or even at all, if the fact had been known that only a small part of the property belonged to the plaintiff. Such a fact is deemed to be so important that it is no longer merely a provision of contract, but of statute, for the statute prescribes the clause in question. The terms of it apply to the policy as a whole. The policy is made void, not void simply as to the part of the property in which there may not be absolute ownership and valid as to the rest. We see no room for such a construction of the terms of the policy.

In Westchester Ins. Co. v. Weaver, 70 Md. 536, 17 Atl. 401, 18 Atl. 1034, 5 L. R. A. 478,...