Dow v. United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America

• Decision Date: 08 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 93-1127,93-1127
• Citation: 1 F.3d 56
• Parties: 143 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3013, 125 Lab.Cas. P 10,784 Joseph DOW, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 56

1 F.3d 56

143 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3013, 125 Lab.Cas. P 10,784

Joseph DOW, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, et

al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 93-1127.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard June 8, 1993.

Decided July 28, 1993.

Paul Alan Levy, Washington, DC, with whom Mark D. Stern and Public Citizen Litigation Group, Somerville, MA, were on brief, for plaintiffs, appellants.

Christopher N. Souris, with whom Feinberg, Charnas & Schwartz, Boston, MA, was on brief, for defendants, appellees.

Before TORRUELLA, SELYA and BOUDIN, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

This appeal pivots on the meaning and applicability of two documents concerning the internal governance of a labor union, Local No. 218 ("the Local"): the constitution of its umbrella union, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners ("the International" or "UBCJA") and the by-laws of Local 218 itself. Much to the dismay of two dissident members of the Local, the district court deferred to the International's construction of the texts and entered judgment accordingly. We affirm.

I Background

Local No. 218 is affiliated with, and subject to the direction of, the International. The latter's constitution and the Local's by-laws both speak to the manner in which mid-term vacancies in leadership positions on the local level are to be filled. The constitution states that:

[w]hen vacancies occur in any elective office or in the position of Business Representative, the President may appoint a qualified member to fill the vacancy pro-tem, until such time as appropriate notices are sent to the membership for the holding of an election to fill the vacancy.

UBCJA Const., Sec. 32(B). Yet, with regard to the position of Business Manager/Financial Secretary ("Manager"), the Local's by-laws provide that, if a vacancy occurs:

the Business Representative shall assume the duties of the Business Manager/Financial Secretary and shall appoint a Business Representative.

By-Laws of Local No. 218, art. II, Sec. 1(A).

In 1992, the latent tension between these two provisions surfaced. The incumbent Manager resigned. The Local's President, Joseph Dow, appointed himself to fill the vacancy on a temporary basis and called for an election pursuant to section 32(B) of UBCJA's constitution. Dow viewed the provisions we have quoted as conflicting and reasoned that the constitution trumped the by-law provision for automatic succession.

The International resisted Dow's attempt to grab the reins of power. ¹ Its president, Sigurd Lucassen, directed Dow to give effect to the by-law provision by allowing the Business Representative, Robert Cataldo, to succeed to the Manager's post. Lucassen found no conflict between the two instruments of governance; the by-law provision simply mandates automatic succession to fill a particular vacancy while section 32(B) of the constitution specifies a procedure for filling vacancies when no other mechanism has been provided. Because the by-law provision operated ex proprio vigore to fill the Manager's position simultaneously with the incumbent's resignation, it prevented a vacancy from occurring and eliminated any need for resort to the constitutional provision. It was on this understanding, Lucassen intimated, that the International approved the inclusion of article II, section 1(A) in Local 218's by-laws. ²

Little placated, Dow and a fellow union member, Robert Renda, sued in federal district court, premising their action on section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185 (1988), and section 101(a)(1) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411 (1988). The plaintiffs named the International, the District Council of Carpenters, and Local 218 as defendants. ³ They sought to compel recognition of Dow's status as Manager pro tem and to precipitate an election to fill the balance of the unexpired term. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court gave controlling weight to the International's interpretation of the governing documents and entered judgment for the defendants. 810 F.Supp. 23. This appeal ensued.

II Analysis

A.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record documents that possess evidentiary force "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The mechanics of Rule 56 are familiar: once the moving party avers "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), the burden of production shifts to the nonmovant. To defeat a properly focused motion, the nonmovant must tender "significant probative evidence," First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1593, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968), which, when viewed in the light most flattering to the nonmovant, illumines a genuine and material factual dispute. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990); Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990). While the required proof need not necessarily rise to the level of admissible trial evidence, see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, it must consist of something more than "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8; accord Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F.2d 878, 886 (1st Cir.1993); Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 357 (1st Cir.1991). Brash conjecture, coupled with earnest hope that something concrete will eventually materialize, is insufficient to block summary judgment.

This appeal implicates a specialized application of Rule 56. It is common ground that a labor union's internal affairs comprise an enclave best kept free from judicial intrusion. See Local No. 48 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 920 F.2d 1047, 1051 (1st Cir.1990); Howard v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices, Local # 131, 560 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1977). Thus, the scope of judicial inquiry is narrowly circumscribed in such cases. And, moreover, the resultant circumscription is particularly stringent when, as now, a labor organization's interpretation of its own constitution is singularly at issue. See Local No. 48, 920 F.2d at 1052.

B.

In Local No. 48, a case construing the very union constitution that is at issue here, this court concluded that a general union's interpretation of its own governance documents will ordinarily be upheld "unless that interpretation is patently unreasonable." Id. On that basis, we refused to second-guess the International when it advanced a "plausible" reading of its constitution. Id. At bottom, then, Local No. 48 stands for the proposition that, in the absence of bad faith, ⁴ a labor organization's interpretation of internal union documents puts an end to judicial scrutiny so long as the interpretation is "facially sufficient" or grounded in " 'arguable authority.' " Id. (citation omitted); accord Newell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 789 F.2d 1186, 1189 (5th Cir.1986); Local 334, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices, 669 F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir.1982); Stelling v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 1547, 587 F.2d 1379, 1389 n. 10 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944, 99 S.Ct. 2890, 61 L.Ed.2d 315 (1979).

This black letter law simplifies our task. We afford plenary review to the entry of summary judgment below. See Garside, 895 F.2d at 48. To do so here, we need only determine whether the International's synthesis of the juxtaposed documents, i.e., its view that section 32(B) of the constitution leaves room for, and can comfortably operate side by side with, a by-law provision mandating automatic succession to a particular post, is "so implausible or patently unreasonable as to be undeserving of deference." Local No. 48, 920 F.2d at 1052.

C.

We turn now to the record, first examining the relevant texts. On one hand, the constitution, quoted supra p. 57, states that when "vacancies occur in any elective office," the president of the local "may" appoint a replacement to serve until an election is held. On the other hand, the by-laws, see supra p. 57, state that "the Business Representative shall assume the duties of the [Manager]" if a "vacancy [in that position] occurs." While these provisions can assuredly be read to conflict--and if they clash, the constitutional provision prevails, see UBCJA Const., Secs. 6(C), 25(A)--a harmonious reading of them is hardly implausible. We think it is significant that the constitution uses precatory rather than mandatory language. The permissive "may" contained in the constitution, as opposed to the directory "shall" contained in the by-law, signals that a temporary, presidential appointment and subsequent election is but one available method for filling vacancies, impliedly suggesting that other, equally satisfactory methods can be employed. Accord La Joie v. Bay Counties Dist. Council, 143 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2547, 2549 (N.D.Cal.1990) (refusing, for this reason, to find a conflict between the identical constitutional provision and the by-laws of a different local). On this (entirely plausible) reading, automatic succession is a permissible method of selection. ⁵ Hence, there is ample textual support for the International's conclusion that the constitution's words are inapplicable here because a new Manager has already been designated--that is, the vacancy has already been filled--through an authorized alternative process.

Dow contends that in determining whether the International proffered an interpretation worthy of deference, a reviewing court must not examine the letter of the texts in majestic isolation, but must read them in conjunction with available extrinsic evidence of past union...