Dowd-Feder, Inc. v. Truesdell

Citation130 Ohio St. 530,200 N.E. 762
Decision Date18 March 1936
Docket NumberNo. 24902.,24902.
PartiesDOWD-FEDER, Inc., v. TRUESDELL.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Ohio

130 Ohio St. 530
200 N.E. 762

DOWD-FEDER, Inc.,
v.
TRUESDELL.

No. 24902.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

March 18, 1936.


Error to Court of Appeals, Franklin County.

Action by one Truesdell against the Dowd-Feder, Incorporated. To review a judgment of the Court of Appeals which affirmed a judgment for plaintiff, defendant on allowance of motion to certify brings error.-[Editorial Statement.]

Affirmed.

On August 18, 1931, plaintiff's automobile was parked along the curb, facing west on the north side of Fourth avenue in Columbus. While plaintiff was standing on the left running board of his parked automobile, cleaning the front of the windshield, an automobile, driven by a man named Clay, going west on Fourth avenue, ran into the side of plaintiff's automobile, by reason of which plaintiff was injured. Suit was filed against plaintiff in error, the petition alleging among other things, that the defendant was engaged in the sale and distribution of automobiles, that the automobile operated by Clay was its property, and that Clay was one of its employees. The answer of defendant, after admitting its corporate capacity and that the streets named were public thoroughfares in the city of Columbus, denied generally the allegations contained in plaintiff's petition.

At the trial of the cause the following questions were permitted to be asked of prospective jurors on their voir dire over the objection of counsel for plaintiff in error:

‘Q. I will ask you this question, members of the jury, are any of you members of the jury employed by any casualty insurance company that writes automobile liability insurance?

‘Q. Are any of you owners of stock in and liability insurance company?’

Plaintiff in error moved for the withdrawal of a juror on account of those questions, which motion was denied, whereupon exceptions were duly taken.

The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $1,500, upon which judgment was rendered. Error was prosecuted to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment was affirmed. The matter is now before this court on the allowance of a motion to certify.



Syllabus by the Court.

[Ohio St. 530]1. The purpose of the examination of a prospective juror upon his voir dire is to determine whether he has both the statutory qualifications of a juror and is free from bias or prejudice for or against either litigant.

2. In the examination of a juror upon his voir dire, in cases involving property damage, personal injury, or both, he may be asked the general question whether he has or has had any connection with or interest in a casualty insurance company. If the answer be in the affirmative, the juror may then be asked the name of such company and the nature of his connection with or interest therein. Paragraph three of the syllabus of Pavilonis v. Valentine, 120 Ohio St. 154, 165 N.E. 730, and paragraph three of the syllabus of Vega, Adm'r, v. Evans, 128 Ohio St. 535, 191 N.E. 757, 95 A.L.R. 381, modified.

3. All questions in the voir dire examination must be propounded in good faith. The character and scope of such questions cannot become standardized, but must be controlled by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion, the court having for its purpose the securing to every litigant an unbiased jury.

[Ohio St. 537]JONES, J., dissenting.


[Ohio St. 531]

[200 N.E. 763]

John F. Ward, of Columbus, for plaintiff in error.

Huggins & Liggett, of Columbus, for defendant in error.


DAY, Judge.

Two questions are presented for our determination: First, whether it is error for a trial court to allow interrogation of prospective jurors on...

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